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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation offers an account of the moral permissibility of criminal 
punishment. Punishment presents a distinctive moral challenge in that it involves a 
community’s inflicting harm on individuals, treating them in ways that would typically 
be morally wrong. We can distinguish a number of different questions of punishment’s 
permissibility. This dissertation focuses on four central questions: (1) Why may we 
punish? Why is it in principle permissible to inflict harm on criminal offenders? (2) Why 
should we punish? Is there a compelling reason to do so? (3) How may we punish? What 
principles should constrain impositions of punishment? And finally, (4) who is properly 
subject to punishment? Rather than expect to answer all of these questions by appeal to 
the same moral principle, this dissertation contends that the questions should be seen as 
distinct, and thus as appropriately answered by appeal to distinct moral considerations. 
Ultimately, the dissertation concludes that an institution of punishment that aims at 
deterrence, constrained by considerations of retribution and reform, is permissible insofar 
as the institution is among the mutually beneficial practices with which community 
members have reciprocal, fairness-based obligations to comply.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Disaggregating the problem of punishment 
 
This dissertation offers an account of the moral permissibility of the legal 
institution of punishment. As an institution, punishment presents a distinctive moral 
challenge in that it involves a political community’s inflicting harm on some of its 
members, treating them in ways that would typically be morally wrong. Why are those 
who break the law subject to the state’s imposing on them the sort of harms that are 
characteristic of punishment? Most theorists of punishment, like most members of the 
public, believe that punishment is indeed permissible. Nevertheless, providing a 
satisfactory explanation of why this is so has proven to be a thorny task, and this has led a 
number of theorists to argue in favor of abolishing the practice. Given how pervasive 
punishment has become — roughly one in every 31 American adults was in jail or prison, 
on probation, or on parole in 20081 — the prospect that the abolitionists may be right, 
that the practice may be morally impermissible, is a particularly troubling one. In this 
dissertation, however, I contend that punishment, properly constrained, can be 
permissible. 
The question of punishment’s moral permissibility is actually not one question but 
several. This dissertation focuses on four central questions: (1) Why may we punish? 
Why is it in principle permissible to inflict harm on criminal offenders? (2) Why should 
                                                 
1
 U.S. Department of Justice, “Total Correction Population,” Bureau of Justice Statistics. Online at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (accessed Oct. 8, 2010). 
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we punish? Is there a compelling reason to do so? (3) How (especially, how severely) 
may we punish? What principles should constrain impositions of punishment? And (4) 
who is properly subject to punishment?2 Disaggregating several distinct questions of 
punishment is a strategy endorsed perhaps most notably by H. L. A. Hart, who 
distinguished the question of punishment’s general justifying aim (i.e., why should we 
punish) from questions of its just distribution (i.e., who may be punished and how 
severely). Hart saw the seemingly intractable debate between consequentialists and 
retributivists about punishment’s justification as a product of the tendency to 
oversimplify, to treat punishment as if it could be justified by some single moral principle 
or consideration. He wrote: 
To counter this drive, what is most needed is not the simple 
admission that instead of a single value or aim (Deterrence, 
Retribution, Reform or any other) a plurality of different 
values and aims should be given as a conjunctive answer to 
some single question concerning the justification of 
punishment. What is needed is the realization that different 
principles (each of which may in a sense be called a 
‘justification’) are relevant at different points in any 
morally acceptable account of punishment.3 
Like Hart, I believe a defense of punishment requires answers to several distinct 
questions, answers that may appeal to different moral considerations. 
 
                                                 
2
 We might also ask who may permissibly do the punishing. I do not address this question explicitly, 
although it implicitly falls out of my account (in chapter 1) of punishment’s in-principle permissibility that 
only the community’s legal authority (rather than, say, the victims of the crime) may permissibly impose 
punishment. 
3
 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 3. 
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I. Why may we punish? 
Although I agree with Hart about the importance of disaggregating various 
questions of punishment, I structure the questions somewhat differently than he did. Hart 
indicated that punishment’s general justifying aim must be determined first, and that once 
this aim is known, it is then left to decide (based on distinct considerations) who may 
properly be punished, and how severely. As he put it, “in relation to any social institution, 
after stating what general aim or value its maintenance fosters we should enquire whether 
there are any and if so what principles limiting the unqualified pursuit of that aim or 
value.”4 As a number of scholars have argued, however, a normatively prior question to 
punishment’s aim is whether the practice itself is morally permissible. Given the value 
that liberal political communities such as ours place on individual autonomy, there 
appears to be a strong prima facie case against any institution that is centrally concerned 
with restricting individuals’ freedoms. Defenders of punishment must explain, then, why 
a community’s political authority can be justified in “treating some of its citizens in ways 
that it would be clearly wrong to treat others.”5 
Appeal to various aims will by itself typically be insufficient to justify 
punishment. We might think, for instance, that deterrence is a significant social benefit of 
punishment, but most of us would object to a practice that called for occasionally 
punishing innocent people even if this could be demonstrated to increase the deterrent 
impact significantly. Thus deterrence alone is an insufficient justification of the practice. 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., p. 10. 
5
 David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 29. 
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What we first need is an account of why, in principle, the practice of imposing harms on 
people in the ways characteristic of punishment is permissible. If it is not, then appeal to 
whatever positive aims will be insufficient to justify the practice. 
In chapter 1, I defend the claim that punishment is in principle permissible. 
Specifically, I develop a version of the fair play view, according to which the 
permissibility of punishment derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a 
political community. Because community members benefit from general compliance with 
the rules of the community, they incur a presumptive, fairness-based obligation to 
reciprocate by complying. On the standard fair play account, criminals gain an unfair 
advantage over other community members, and punishment is thus permissible as a 
means of removing this advantage. I contend, however, that this standard account is 
unsatisfying, largely because there is no advantage that an offender unfairly gains, in 
proportion to the seriousness of her crime, relative to other community members 
generally. Instead, I offer a more straightforward fair play account, according to which 
the rule instituting punishment as the response to crimes is itself among the community’s 
mutually beneficial rules; as such, the rule instituting punishment is among those with 
which community members are presumptively obliged to comply. For offenders, 
compliance entails accepting being subject to punishment. This appeal to the reciprocal 
obligations that emerge in a political community explains why restricting the liberties of 
offenders is in principle permissible. 
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II. Why should we punish? 
Even if punishment is in principle permissible, however, a full defense of the 
practice also requires an answer to the question of why we should want to punish. If there 
is no compelling reason to impose harms on certain individuals, no good that would come 
of it, then even if this institution can be shown to be permissible in principle, it may in 
practice be unjustified. Jeremy Bentham argued that “all punishment is mischief: all 
punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, 
it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”6 
Although I don’t share Bentham’s view that utilitarianism can ground a complete 
justification of punishment, I agree with him that an adequate defense of punishment 
requires that we provide a compelling answer to the question of why we should want to 
punish, of what good will come of it. 
The fair play account I develop in chapter 1 depends on the claim that community 
members receive significant benefits from the institution of punishment. On my account, 
the chief benefit of such an institution is that it helps protect the security of community 
members by acting as a deterrent of crime. The aim of deterrence has frequently been 
criticized, however, as inconsistent with treating offenders with appropriate respect as 
persons. Opponents have leveled the broadly Kantian charge that deterrent systems of 
punishment use offenders as mere means to the social end of crime reduction, rather than 
respecting them as ends in themselves. This objection has been fleshed out in different 
                                                 
6
 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. 
A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 158. 
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ways, and in chapter 2 I consider three prominent versions of the objection: (1) that 
deterrent systems of punishment treat offenders as mere means to some social good (i.e., 
crime reduction); (2) that deterrent punishment implicitly excludes offenders from 
membership in the moral community; and (3) that such punishment offers community 
members the wrong sort of reasons for compliance with the law. I contend that, contrary 
to these various challenges, deterrence as an aim of punishment is in fact consistent with 
respecting offenders as moral persons. 
 
III. How may we punish? 
Next, even if the institution of punishment is in principle permissible, and even if 
we have some compelling and permissible reason(s) to want such an institution, 
particular impositions of punishment may still fail be impermissible if these punishments 
are excessive, or inhumane, or otherwise inappropriate. A defense of punishment thus 
requires an account of how punishments should be constrained, in their mode and 
severity, so as to treat offenders with respect as moral persons. Philosophers and legal 
theorists typically cite the retributivist principle that punishment should be only to the 
degree that is morally deserved as though this constraint is sufficient. The notion of 
desert, however, has proven notoriously difficult to flesh out. This has led critics to 
conclude that the retributivist constraint is of no use in answering the question of how we 
may punish. In chapter 3, I offer a partial defense of the retributivist constraint, arguing 
that the notion of desert may provide some, albeit imperfect, guidance in determining 
how to punish. Nevertheless, I contend that the retributivist constraint is insufficient to 
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ensure that offenders are treated with appropriate respect as moral persons. This is 
because retributivism focuses entirely on what is the morally deserved response to the 
given crime. In fact, however, what treatment a person deserves may also be a matter not 
only of what she has done, but also of who she is, and even of who she can be. Because 
retributivism evaluates desert by focusing only on the crime committed, in many cases (in 
particular, cases of the most serious crimes) the retributivist notion of desert may indicate 
punishments that many of us will regard as overly  harsh. This indicates that the 
retributivist constraint is insufficient, and that some additional constraint is needed to 
ensure that punishments treat offenders with appropriate respect. 
In chapter 4, I argue for such an additional constraint, one grounded in 
considerations of reform. I first flesh out a Kantian conception of contempt and highlight 
certain troubling features of contemptuous treatment. In particular, contempt is person- 
rather than act-focused; it is pervasive; it presents its object as inferior, if not altogether 
worthless; and it is cold and dismissive, i.e., it gives up on its object. Next I contend that 
punishments treat offenders with contempt if, in their mode or degree, they tend to 
undermine offenders’ prospects for moral reform. On my account, such punishments are 
therefore impermissible. Unlike certain reform-based accounts, however, my view does 
not require that reform must be a positive aim of punishment — only that punishment 
should not tend to undermine the prospect of reform. Taken together, chapters 3 and 4 
conclude that punishment should be constrained not only by retributivist considerations 
of desert, but also by considerations of moral reform.  
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IV. Whom may we punish? 
Finally, we might ask who is properly subject to punishment. Generally, an 
answer to the in-principle permissibility question will imply an answer to this question of 
who may be punished. For instance, for those who contend that punishment is 
permissible because criminal wrongdoers forfeit their right against punishment, it will 
follow straightforwardly that punishment is permissible only of criminals (because only 
they have forfeited this right). Similarly, the fair play account I develop in chapter 1 
implies that only criminal offenders are subject to punishment — they made themselves 
liable to punishment when they failed to comply with the mutually beneficial rules of the 
political community. 
Even if we accept the fairly uncontroversial view that only criminal offenders are 
subject to punishment, however, a further question of who may be punished arises when 
we move from the context of domestic crimes to international crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity and genocide. Such crimes are perpetrated by groups; that is, they are 
made possible by the contributions of many individuals acting, to some extent, in concert. 
Some scholars have thus argued that punishments for international crimes should target 
the groups (typically states), as groups, rather than only targeting individual group 
members. There is a presumptive case against such a scheme, however, because of the 
very real danger that the harms of such punishments will distribute to all group members, 
many of whom may have played no role in (or even worked against) the crime. Collective 
punishment’s advocates appear to have available three lines of response to this challenge: 
They may (1) argue that the harms of collective punishment can in fact be distributed 
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among group members in a justified way, (2) acknowledge that collective punishment’s 
harms will distribute unjustly but contend that this presumptive injustice is overridden by 
the good that will be accomplished (or harm averted) by punishing groups as groups, or 
(3) contend that collective punishment can be imposed in ways such that the harms don’t 
distribute among group members. In chapter 5, I examine each of these responses. I argue 
that none succeeds in overcoming the presumptive case against collective punishment. 
  
 
10 
CHAPTER 1 
Fair play and the in-principle permissibility of punishment 
 
Since H. L. A. Hart famously distinguished three different questions of criminal 
punishment — why should we punish, whom may we punish, and how much may we 
punish — responses to this disaggregation strategy have been mixed. Some have argued 
that it is ad hoc, and that Hart’s appeal to consequentialist considerations in answering 
the first question and nonconsequentialist considerations in answering the second and 
third creates a dialectic instability in his view. Others have endorsed the disaggregation 
strategy but have argued that a normatively prior to the question of why should we punish, 
which Hart called punishment’s general justifying aim, is the question of whether the 
practice itself is morally permissible.1 As these scholars point out, to demonstrate that 
there is good reason to X does not yet establish that it is permissible to X. On this view, 
defenders of punishment must first explain why a community’s political authority can be 
justified in imposing on them the sort of harms that are characteristic of punishment, 
                                                 
1
 C.f., K. G. Armstrong, “The Retributivist Hits Back,” in H. B. Acton, ed., The Philosophy of Punishment 
(London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 141; David Dolinko, “Some Thoughts about Retributivism,” Ethics 101:3 
(1991): 537-59, on pp. 539-41; and Matt Matravers, Justice and Punishment (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). Matravers writes that “punishment theory must concern itself with the morality of 
attaching the threat of sanctions to rules (as well [as] the morality of imposing those sanctions on particular 
people). And whilst it seems plausible to think that the point of threatening sanctions must have something 
to do with preventing offending …, that is not the same as arguing that preventing offending through the 
threat and imposing of sanctions is morally permissible” p. 7. Note also the distinction between the moral 
permissibility question and the “whom may we punish?” question: The answer to the latter question might 
be, e.g., “only those culpable for criminal wrongdoing,” but this answer would, in itself, say nothing about 
why punishment, i.e., the infliction of intentional harm, is a morally permissible response to criminal 
wrongdoing.  
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harms that would be clearly impermissible if inflicted on law abiders. As David Boonin 
writes: 
Even if we assume that those who break the law are 
responsible for their actions and that the laws they break 
are just and reasonable, this practice raises a moral problem. 
How can the fact that a person has broken a just and 
reasonable law render it morally permissible for the state to 
treat him in ways that would otherwise be impermissible?2 
I refer to this throughout as the question of punishment’s in-principle moral 
permissibility. If the institution is not in principle permissible, then appeal to whatever 
positive aims will be insufficient to justify it. 
In this paper, I offer a defense of punishment’s in-principle permissibility. My 
account is a version of the fair play view, according to which, briefly, the permissibility 
of punishment derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political 
community, here understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative social venture. Mine is 
a nonstandard fair play account, however, in that most fair play accounts aspire to offer 
unified theories of punishment — that is, they employ considerations of fair play to 
ground not only punishment’s in-principle permissibility, but also its positive aim as well 
as sentencing guidance. By contrast, my fair play view is more modest; it seeks only to 
provide an answer to the permissibility question. I contend that in this context, modesty is 
a virtue. Because my account offers only an answer to the in-principle permissibility 
question, but not to the positive aim question or to questions of how we may punish, it 
avoids certain powerful objections that have been raised against standard articulations of 
                                                 
2
 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 1. 
  
 
12 
the fair play view. What’s more, as I argue below, my focus on only the permissibility 
question is not ad hoc; to the contrary, a closer examination of the fair play view’s 
evolution from a theory of political obligation to a defense of punishment indicates that 
there are good reasons to expect that it is suitable as an answer only to the permissibility 
question. Punishment’s positive aim and the constraints on how it is administered in 
particular cases must be based on distinct considerations. 
It’s worth emphasizing at the outset that the challenge with which I am concerned 
here is not that this or that sort of punishment (or punishment for violation of these or 
those laws, or within this or that political system) is impermissible, but rather that the 
practice of punishing per se is impermissible. If this objection is correct, then all 
punishment will be ruled out from the start. By the same token, even if, as I argue below, 
considerations of fair play can ground a satisfactory answer to the in-principle 
permissibility question, actual inflictions of such harm could nevertheless be 
impermissible — e.g., as a response to unjust or unreasonable laws, or when inflicted to 
an excessive degree or in an inhumane manner, etc. My concern in this chapter is thus not 
to provide a complete justification for punishment, but rather to establish that, and 
explain why, punishment is in principle a permissible response to criminal violations. 
In section I, I examine the standard articulation of the fair play view. I consider 
how the view, first offered as an account of political obligation, has been extended to 
justify punishment, and why this justification ultimately fails. In section II, I develop my 
alternative version of the fair play view, on which the defense of punishment’s in-
principle permissibility follows more straightforwardly from fair play’s answer to the 
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political obligation question. I contend that my version of the view fares better than 
standard articulations on a number of counts. Finally, in section III, I consider certain 
objections to my view. As will become clear, these objections essentially are objections 
to the fair play view of political obligation — and although I do not attempt here to offer 
a full defense of this broader view, I do at least aim to address particular concerns that 
may emerge from my inclusion of punishment among the rules to which we have a moral 
obligation to comply. 
 
I. The standard fair play account and its drawbacks 
According to the fair play account, a political community can be understood as a 
cooperative venture in which each member benefits when there is general compliance 
with the rules governing the venture. The fact that each member benefits from the 
compliance of other members generates an obligation to reciprocate by similarly 
complying. Thus Hart wrote, 
[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who 
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have 
benefited by their submission.3 
As espoused by Hart, the fair play view grounded a reciprocal obligation to 
comply with the rules of a mutually beneficial political community. It said nothing about 
                                                 
3
 H. L. A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review 64:4 (April 1955): 175-91, 
reprinted in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1984), on p. 
85. For a similar articulation of this view, see John Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play.” In 
Law and Philosophy: A Symposium, ed. S. Hook (New York City: New York University Press, 1964), pp. 
9-10. 
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what would be a justified response to those who failed to meet this obligation. Several 
theorists of punishment, however, have used the principle of fair play as their foundation 
in developing a defense of the practice of punishment. The crucial claim for extending 
the fair play view to justify punishment is that when a member of the community chooses 
not to comply with the community’s laws, she takes an unfair advantage relative to her 
fellow community members. That is, she unfairly benefits twice: Like everyone, she 
reaps the benefits that general compliance with the law makes possible, but she 
additionally benefits in that she, unlike her fellow community members, doesn’t constrain 
her behavior in compliance. Typically, then, on fair play accounts the offender is 
portrayed as a free rider, and punishment is defended as a means of removing the 
offender’s unfair advantage by imposing a burden on the offender proportionate to the 
additional benefit she unfairly gained through her crime. As Herbert Morris writes, 
“Justice — that is, punishing such individuals — restores the equilibrium of benefits and 
burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt.”4 
The standard articulation of the fair play view of punishment is inadequate in two 
key respects: The first is that the fair play view often misconstrues what makes a criminal 
act worthy of punishment, or as R. A. Duff writes, “it offers a distorted picture of the 
                                                 
4
 Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist 52 (1968): 475-501; on p. 478. For other notable 
elaborations of the fair play view, see Jeffrie Murphy, “Three Mistakes about Retributivism,” Analysis 31 
(1971): 166-9; Michael Davis, “How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” Ethics 93 (1983): 726-52, 
and “Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What’s the Connection?” Law and Philosophy 12 (1993): 
133-56; George Sher, Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Richard Dagger, 
“Playing Fair with Punishment,” Ethics 103 (April 1993): 473-88. 
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punishment-deserving character of crime.”5 That is, we tend to think that a person who 
has, for instance, tortured someone should be punished not because she has gained an 
unfair advantage over other members of the community generally, but rather because of 
the heinous moral wrong she has committed against her victim. In other words, we do not 
typically think of serious mala in se crimes such as torture, murder, or rape as primarily 
matters of free riding. 
The second deficiency of standard fair play accounts involves the specification of 
the offender’s unfair benefit. Put simply, there doesn’t seem to be any advantage that an 
offender gains, in proportion with the seriousness of her crime, relative to community 
members generally.6 Here I briefly consider three suggestions for this unfair advantage. 
                                                 
5
 R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
p. 22. 
6
 It’s worth distinguishing two types of benefits that are not intended by any of the fair play advocates. 
First, the benefit gained by an offender is not characterized as a moral benefit. M. Margaret Falls criticizes 
the fair play view as being incompatible with “the tradition that says willing the moral good is the highest 
human good and therefore doing evil harms the evildoer.” M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, 
and Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6:1 (1987): 25-51, on p. 31. I think it’s fair to say, however, 
that the fair play view operates within a tradition that recognizes a distinction between moral and prudential 
benefit, which believes that the latter does not necessarily collapse into the former, and which holds that an 
offender gains some prudential benefit through her crime. (Of course, if it’s true that what is prudentially 
good for us reduces to what is morally good for us, or even if any ostensible prudential benefit a criminal 
gains would be outweighed by the moral harm so that the criminal should be understood as harming herself 
all things considered, this will only support my conclusion below: that the fair play view cannot 
demonstrate an advantage that the criminal unfairly gains over others that is appropriately removed by 
punishment.) Second, the benefit gained by the criminal is explicitly not characterized as the material spoils 
of her crime. Thus, the relevant benefit unfairly gained by, say, the burglar is not the actual money or 
property that she steals, nor is the tax evader’s relevant benefit the tax money she doesn’t pay. If the benefit 
were characterized as the material gain from the crime, then removing this benefit would seem to be a 
matter merely of requiring the offender to compensate her victim(s); punishment, understood as the 
intentional imposition of hard treatment, would not seem necessary. For fair play defenders of punishment, 
therefore, it is crucial that the unfairly gained benefit is something distinct from the ill-gotten material 
gains. 
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One option is that the offender gains freedom from the burden of self-constraint 
that others accept in complying with the particular law that the offender violates. If so, 
then the appropriate severity of punishment will be proportionate to the burden others 
feel in complying with that law. But compliance with laws is often no real burden for 
most citizens. In fact, compliance with prohibitions on egregious offenses (murder, 
assault, etc.) typically is less burdensome than is compliance with prohibitions on lesser 
crimes (tax evasion, jaywalking, etc.), given that we may be more often tempted to 
commit the lesser crimes. Most of us are typically not tempted to commit murder or 
assault anyway, whereas we may feel comparatively more tempted, on occasion, to cheat 
on our taxes, jaywalk, etc. Thus relatively less serious violations will often appear to 
merit relatively more severe punishments, a deeply counterintuitive conclusion. 
Instead, perhaps the offender gains freedom from the burden of compliance with 
the law in general. This general compliance, Richard Dagger writes, is a genuine burden: 
“there are times for almost all of us when we would like to have the best of both worlds 
— that is, the freedom we enjoy under the rule of law plus freedom from the burden of 
obeying laws.”7 This route, however, appears to lead to the objection that all offenses 
become, for the purposes of punishment, the same offense. Both the murderer and the tax 
cheat have failed to comply with the rule of law generally while benefiting from the 
general compliance of others. If the punishable offense is the same, however, then the 
two cases appear to warrant equal punishments, and again, this strikes most of us as 
                                                 
7
 Dagger, “Playing Fair with Punishment,” p. 483. 
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counterintuitive.8 Thus the particular- and general-compliance views appear 
unsatisfactory. 
A third account, by George Sher, holds that the offender gains an extra measure of 
freedom, not from the burden of self-constraint, but rather “from the demands of the 
prohibition he violates.”9 Sher writes: “Because others take that prohibition seriously, 
they lack a similar liberty. And as the strength of the prohibition increases, so too does 
the freedom from it which its violation entails.”10 Although Sher’s account appears to 
avoid the counterintuitive sentencing implications that beset the previous two views, his 
account faces its own problems. Specifically, it’s not clear in what sense the offender, by 
committing the crime, gains freedom from the moral prohibition. As David Dolinko 
points out, the criminal does not so much gain freedom as exhibit a freedom he already 
had — “he must have been ‘free’ from the prohibition even before his lawless act (or he 
could not have committed it!), and presumably, many law-abiding citizens are equally 
‘free’ (in this sense) to violate the prohibition.”11 Ultimately, Sher’s account fares no 
better than the particular- and general-compliance views. 
If the relevant benefit that an offender unfairly gains is not any of these types of 
freedom, then what else might constitute her unfair advantage? There certainly may be 
other things that an offender gains through her commission of a crime. For instance, Jean 
                                                 
8
 This objection is pressed by Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, pp. 125-6. 
9
 Sher, Desert, p. 82. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 David Dolinko, “Some Thoughts about Retributivism,” Ethics 101:3 (April 1991): 537-59, on p. 547. 
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Hampton’s expressive retributivism holds that wrongful acts “convey — and work to 
effect — the wrongdoer’s superior importance relative to the victim understood as an 
individual or as a class of individuals.”12 Thus we might follow Hampton in regarding the 
offender as gaining a sense of, and perhaps a realization of, relative superiority. 
Hampton’s account is explicitly not a fair play account, however, as this ostensible 
benefit to the offender, the superiority that the wrongful act expresses and seeks to 
manifest, is a superiority to the particular victim(s), not to other, law-abiding community 
members generally. For purposes of the fair play account, the punishable benefit must be 
something that the offender gains relative to the community in general, as a result of 
others’ compliance and her own noncompliance; that is, the benefit must be a result of 
her free riding. And insofar as punishment is justified as a means of removing the unfair 
advantage, this advantage must either be commensurate with the gravity of the crime or 
else risk running afoul of our deeply held intuitions regarding proportionality of 
punishment. Unfortunately for advocates of the standard fair play account, there just 
doesn’t appear to be any unfair advantage that all criminals gain, in proportion to the 
seriousness of their crimes, over other, law-abiding community members generally. 
Dagger has rearticulated, and further developed, his view in a recent article titled 
“Punishment and Fair Play.”13 Here he maintains that all crimes are indeed crimes of 
unfairness, but he contends that they may be unfair not only in the sense of yielding 
                                                 
12
 Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. 
Daniel Farnham (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 131. See also Hampton, “A New 
Theory of Retribution,” in Liability and Responsibility, eds. C. Morris and R. Frey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 377-414. 
13
 Richard Dagger, “Punishment as Fair Play,” Res Publica 14 (2008): 259-75. 
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unfair benefits, but also in undermining the political order. If we conceive of a political 
community as a fair cooperative practice whose members have equal standing, Dagger 
contends, then “considerations of unfairness can also justify the conclusion that some 
offenses are more serious violations of equal standing and fair play than others.”14 For 
instance, he writes: 
The tax evader takes advantage of many people — millions 
of them in many cases — but her offense typically does not 
make it difficult for them to continue doing their part in the 
cooperative practice. With the rapist, the murderer, and the 
batterer, however, the offender has done something that 
makes it difficult or even impossible for his victim to 
contribute further to the ongoing cooperation. He has 
offended against the interests and integrity of his victim, to 
be sure, but he has also offended against the requirements 
of a society based on fair play, and his offense is thus a 
more serious crime of unfairness than the tax evader’s.15 
There are, I believe, two significant problems with this argument. First, it’s not 
clear that the rapist does make it more difficult for his victim than the tax evader makes it 
for her victims to contribute further to the ongoing cooperation. As Dagger has (rightly) 
characterized it, the relevant sense of cooperation here is cooperation in complying with 
the law in general. When others exercise general compliance with the law, and when I 
benefit from their compliance, then I have an obligation similarly to participate in the 
cooperative venture (i.e., to reciprocate) by complying with the law. But although rape 
clearly is a more egregious violation than tax evasion, it’s not clear that one way in which 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., p. 270. 
15
 Ibid. 
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it is more egregious is that the rape victim’s ability to “further the ongoing cooperation” 
by accepting the burden of compliance with the law is especially diminished. 
Second, even if the more serious crime does more severely threaten its victim’s 
ability to contribute to the fair cooperative venture, this does not demonstrate that such a 
crime is a more serious crime of unfairness than the less serious crime. Put more simply, 
an act may undermine fairness without itself being unfair.16 On the standard fair play 
view’s characterization, crimes are unfair in the sense of free riding. Offenders accept the 
benefits made possible by the general compliance of others with the law, and then they 
choose not to reciprocate. It’s just not clear, however, that by more seriously undermining 
the fair political order, an offender has therefore been more of a free rider. In fact, given 
that the offender (like everyone) benefits from the cooperative venture, then to the extent 
that she offends against the cooperative venture (by undermining the victim’s ability to 
contribute to it), she is actually more likely to harm rather than benefit herself. Free riders 
can only ride freely when the practice from which they draw benefits, but to which they 
do not contribute, thrives. Thus it is unclear how, by more seriously offending against the 
                                                 
16
 The distinction I have in mind here, between undermining fairness and being unfair, is essentially one 
made by Philip Pettit in his article “Consequentialism,” in Consequentialism, ed. Stephen Darwall (Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 95-107, esp. p. 97. In discussing the difference between 
consequentialists and nonconsequentialists, Pettit points out two distinct ways in which we may respond to 
whatever we value: We may promote it, or we may honor it. What’s more, promoting what we value 
doesn’t necessarily imply honoring it, and vice versa. The converse is the distinction I have in mind: We 
may undermine some value, or we may violate it. 
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cooperative venture, the offender would more egregiously free-ride than in cases in 
which she less seriously offends against the cooperative venture.17 
Ultimately, the fair play view is unable to provide a plausible, univocal account of 
punishment that grounds not only its in-principle permissibility but also its positive aim 
and sentencing guidance in particular cases. Traditional fair play articulations provide the 
wrong answer, at least in many cases, to the question “why should we punish this crime?” 
In addition, they are unable plausibly to specify any benefit that an offender unfairly 
gains, in proportion to the seriousness of her crime, over law-abiding community 
members generally. And although I believe Dagger’s recent fair play defense is a 
significant improvement over traditional accounts, it is not ultimately an integrated 
account. Rather, it implicitly appeals both to the traditional, deontological conception of 
fair play as well as the consequentialist aim of preserving a fair political order. As will 
become clear in the next section, however, I do not regard fair play’s inability to answer 
all the questions of punishment (i.e., its inability to ground a unified account) as a 
liability. Rather, on the account I propose, there is good reason to expect that the fair play 
view will ground only the in-principle permissibility of punishment, and that 
punishment’s aim and guidance regarding appropriate sentencing will require appeal to 
distinct considerations. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Consider, by analogy, which is the greater violation of fair play (i.e., the greater instance of free riding): 
the citizen who avoids paying taxes but nevertheless reaps benefits from the flourishing tax system, or the 
citizen who actively works to destroy the institution of taxation itself. 
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II. An alternative fair play account 
Although I have argued against prominent fair play accounts of punishment, I 
nevertheless find something intuitively appealing about the fair play account of political 
obligation espoused by Hart and Rawls. In beginning to set out my own fair play account 
of punishment, then, I believe Hart’s concise statement of the fair play principle bears 
repeating: 
[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who 
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have 
benefited by their submission.18 
So, as a member of a cooperative enterprise, if I benefit from others’ playing by 
the rules, then I should play by the rules as well. But which rules? The rules most 
frequently appealed to by fair play accounts of political obligation and of punishment are 
the political community’s criminal statutes, the laws prohibiting, say, murder, theft, tax 
evasion, drug trafficking, etc. Two features of such rules are relevant for present purposes: 
First, they are the sort of rules with which we can comply (by not murdering or stealing, 
by paying our taxes, etc.). Second, general compliance with these rules provides a 
significant benefit. These are the two salient features for generating the fair play 
obligation: If general compliance with a rule is beneficial to me, then I have an obligation 
of fairness similarly to comply.19 In this section, I defend the claim that the rule 
                                                 
18
 Supra. note 9. 
19
 Some have objected that it is acceptance of benefits, not merely receipt of benefits, that can generate a 
fair play obligation. I consider this objection in section III. 
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instituting punishment as a response to crimes is itself one of the rules with which we 
have an obligation of fairness to comply. Thus on my account, punishment is in-principle 
permissible not because it removes some benefit offenders have unfairly gained relative 
to law abiders. Rather, punishment is permissible because the rule instituting punishment 
as a response to crimes is itself one of those rules with which we, who benefit from 
general compliance with the rule, have a fair play obligation to comply. To defend this 
claim, I need to say more about how I understand the rule instituting punishment as a 
response to crime. In particular, I need to establish that this is the sort of rule with which 
we can comply, and also that general compliance with this rule yields significant benefits. 
The rule instituting punishment is a rule of remediation. Whereas criminal laws 
tell us things such as “don’t commit murder” or “pay your taxes,” the rule instituting 
punishment tells what is to be done when community members violate these laws. There 
is nothing in the conception of a criminal law that entails that the law must be backed by 
punishment.20 Indeed, other forms of response to the violation of such laws have been 
suggested: nonpunitive censure or restitution, for example. Thus if punishment is to be 
the response to criminal violations, this will be because it has been so designated by some 
rule of the political community. Essentially, this rule takes the form of a conditional, and 
                                                 
20
 Hart appears to have disagreed on this point, as he indicates in various passages that, as a conceptual 
matter, criminal laws must be backed by physical sanctions, i.e., punishment (see, e.g., Hart, The Concept 
of Law 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 34-5, 86). If this is right, so that criminal laws 
without punishment are not really criminal laws, then those who would endorse the abolition of punishment 
will face the unenviable task of also defending the abolition of criminal laws altogether. As I have 
indicated, however, I reject the view that criminal law entails punishment. Thus on my view, even if 
criminal statutes are themselves justified, the proposition that punishment is an appropriate mode of 
response to violations of these statutes nevertheless requires its own defense. I am grateful to Larry May for 
raising this point to me. 
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it says that if you commit a crime, then you will be subject to having your liberties 
restricted in ways to which law abiders are not subject. The question, for present purposes, 
is whether this is a rule with which we can comply, and if so, whether general compliance 
with it yields significant benefits. 
On first blush, it may seem that the suggested rule is not one with which we can 
comply. That is, it might appear to be what Hart, in his The Concept of Law, called a 
secondary rule rather than a primary rule. Put simply, Hart characterized primary rules as 
imposing duties or obligations, and secondary rules as conferring powers.21 Unlike 
primary rules such as “don’t commit murder,” the rule instituting punishment may appear 
less the issuance of a command than an instruction to legal authorities as to what may be 
done to us if we violate rules of the first type. I contend, however, that the rule instituting 
punishment is not solely an instruction to legal authorities. A significant element of the 
institution of punishment is that it communicates to, and indeed imposes obligations on, 
citizens themselves. 
To construe the rule instituting punishment merely as an instruction to officials, 
e.g., “punish those who violate criminal statutes,” is to overlook an important 
communicative element of punishment. The institution of punishment communicates to 
citizens generally that the community condemns certain actions as morally wrong — 
condemns them so strongly that it is willing to impose hard treatment on those who 
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 Hart, The Concept of Law, esp. pp. 79-99. 
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commit such actions.22 In my view, the central benefit of this threat of hard treatment is 
its role in reducing the frequency of violations of community members’ security and 
well-being. The institution of punishment, then, communicates the central importance 
that the community places on protecting its members. Similarly, it asks its members, as 
community members, to share in this commitment. And insofar as punishment itself plays 
a key role in securing these important aims, the community asks its members to comply 
with this institution. 
Still, we might wonder whether — and if so, how — one could comply with the 
rule instituting punishment? We tend to think of punishment, after all, as coercively 
imposed on offenders who may be no more than passive recipients. I contend, however, 
that the rule instituting punishment as a response to crimes is one with which we can 
comply (or fail to comply). As I have indicated, I believe the rule instituting punishment 
does communicate to community members, and it is a rule of remediation: It tells us that 
if we commit some crime, then we should accept being subject to punishment as a 
response. One way to comply, then, would be to constrain one’s behavior so as to avoid 
being liable to punishment; another way to comply would be, if one has committed a 
criminal offense, to accept the prescribed punishment. Conversely, one could fail to 
                                                 
22
 For discussions of the communicative aspect of punishment, see, e.g., Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive 
Function of Punishment,” in Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility. Princeton (N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1970); Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in 
Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Daniel Farnham (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
and Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community. Note that, unlike Hampton and Duff, my view is 
not that this communicative aspect itself grounds the permissibility of punishment. But I do accept that an 
aspect of punishment is communicative, and as I discuss, part of this communication is to ask something of 
all community members, law abiders and offenders alike — viz., that if they don’t comply with the 
community’s criminal statutes, then they should accept being subject to punishment. 
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comply with this rule by committing a crime and attempting to evade apprehension (and 
subsequent punishment). In other words, if the rule is stated as the conditional “if you 
commit a crime, then you are subject to punishment,” then we can comply either by not 
committing crimes, thus rendering the antecedent false (and the conditional itself trivially 
true), or by accepting being subject to punishment, so that the consequent (and thus the 
conditional) is rendered true. Both forms of compliance warrant further explanation. 
First, we can comply by not committing crimes. A likely objection here is that 
when we refrain from committing crimes, we comply not with the proposed rule of 
punishment, but rather with the rule prohibiting the particular crime. I offer two 
responses: In one sense, when we refrain from committing crimes, we comply with both 
rules. We comply straightforwardly with the rule that says “do not murder,” and we 
comply with the remedial rule (“if you commit a crime, then you are subject to 
punishment”) by falsifying the antecedent and thus rendering the conditional trivially true. 
In another sense, whether we can be understood as complying with the rule 
instituting punishment may depend on our reasons for compliance. Antony Duff argues 
that the criminal law of a liberal polity is best understood as offering moral reasons, not 
prudential reasons, for compliance.23 I agree that the criminal law should offer moral 
reasons. But unlike Duff, I believe the institution of punishment often permissibly offers 
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 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. 78-79. He writes, “[T]he reasons that citizens 
have to refrain from [criminal] conduct, the reasons to which the law refers and on which it depends, are 
precisely the moral reasons that make such conduct wrong.” 
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prudential reasons for compliance.24 When we comply with the law because we accept 
our community’s moral condemnation of the criminal act, we do not need the threat of 
punishment to motivate our compliance. But inevitably, there will be times when the 
moral appeal of the criminal statute itself is not sufficient to motivate us. In these cases, 
the threat posed by the institution of punishment may provide a prudential incentive to do 
what the moral reason was not sufficient to persuade us to do. I suggest that in cases 
when we constrain our behavior not because of the moral reasons offered by the law itself 
but because of the prudential reason presented by the threat of punishment, we may be 
said to comply with the remedial rule: if you commit a crime, then you will be subject to 
punishment. 
A second way to comply with the proposed rule is by accepting, if we do commit 
some crime(s), being subject to punishment. In my view, this rules out attempting to 
evade apprehension or falsely representing oneself as innocent once one has been 
apprehended (though it does not prohibit appealing to what one may believe are 
genuinely mitigating circumstances). Also, the punishment itself may require an active 
response from the offender. She may be required to pay a fine, to appear for community 
service, or to meet with her probation officer. Even incarceration may require the 
offender’s active participation: For instance, courts will in some cases require the 
convicted person to report to prison on a certain date to serve her term.25 Thus those who 
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 On this point, I am in general agreement with Andrew von Hirsch’s view. See, e.g., von Hirsch, Censure 
and Sanctions (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
25
 I thank Antony Duff for suggesting this point to me. More generally, I follow Duff in thinking that 
respect for offenders as autonomous moral agents, and as still members of the political community, requires 
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commit crimes, although they fail to comply with the particular rules prohibiting the 
crimes they commit, may still comply with the rule instituting punishment if they accept 
being subject to punishment, in ways such as I’ve suggested here. 
I conclude, then, that the rule instituting punishment is one with which we can 
comply. The second question is whether general compliance with this rule yields 
significant benefits. I doubt that we receive significant benefit from general compliance 
of the second sort (accepting punishment if one has committed a crime), simply because 
most people who have committed crimes typically do not accept punishment in ways 
such as I suggested.26 Many people do comply, however, in the first way: by not 
committing crimes. We should ask, then, whether general compliance of this first sort 
yields significant benefits to community members. If so, then insofar as I reap these 
benefits of general compliance, I have an obligation to comply as well. 
To deny that general compliance with the rule instituting punishment yields 
substantial benefits, one would need to demonstrate that the protections afforded to 
citizens by the rule of law would not be significantly undermined if punishment were 
abolished (perhaps to be replaced by some alternative, such as public censure or 
restitution). Such an argument would thus need to refute the intuitively compelling and 
widely accepted claim that punishment has a substantial deterrent effect.27 If general 
                                                                                                                                                 
that we engage them as active participants in their punishment, rather than passive recipients (see, e.g., 
Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community). 
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 Although perhaps some, such as already repentant offenders, may do so. 
27
 Engaging with the important empirical debate about whether in fact punishment yields significant 
deterrent effects is beyond the scope of this chapter. I note, however, that if there are no considerable 
deterrent impacts from maintaining the institution of punishment, then the fair play account I have 
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compliance with the rule instituting punishment does provide significant benefits, then it 
falls within the scope of those rules to which the fair play account grounds an obligation 
of compliance. 
If the rule that says criminal violations are subject to punishment is among those 
rules with which we are obliged to comply, then the remainder of my argument for 
punishment’s in-principle permissibility follows fairly straightforwardly. Because having 
a moral obligation to X implies not having a moral right not to X, it follows that none of 
us has a moral right not to comply with this rule. Because, as I indicated earlier, 
compliance for a lawbreaker requires accepting one’s punishment, it follows that no one 
has a right not to be punished if she violates some criminal statute. The practice of 
punishment in general, then, is not a violation of criminals’ rights. 
To briefly sum up my argument to this point: Punishment is in principle morally 
permissible not because it removes some benefit(s) that an offender unfairly gains in 
failing to meet her obligation to play by the community’s legal rules; rather, it is 
permissible because punishment as a response to crime is itself one of the rules with 
which the offender, like all those who benefit from mutual compliance with the rules, is 
obliged to comply. My fair play account of punishment just is the fair play account of 
political obligation, along with the recognition that the rules of punishment are among 
                                                                                                                                                 
developed here would be unable to ground its in-principle moral permissibility. This fits with my own 
intuition, however, as I believe that punishment’s yielding some significant deterrent benefit is a necessary 
(albeit not sufficient) condition of the institution’s moral permissibility. In what follows, however, I assume 
(in keeping with the predominant view) that the institution of punishment — or more specifically, general 
compliance with the rule instituting punishment — does yield significant benefits to members of the 
political community. 
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those rules of the community that, when community members generally comply with 
them, are mutually beneficial. In section III, I address what I take to be the most powerful 
objections against the fair play view of political obligation. First, however, in the 
remainder of this section, I want to consider a number of advantages to my view in 
comparison with the standard fair play account of punishment. 
Most importantly, my view fares better against the two objections to the 
traditional fair play account of punishment that I discussed earlier. Consider the first 
objection, that the traditional fair play account misconstrues why certain crimes merit 
punishment. Murder, that is, does not seem to be centrally, if at all, a crime of free-riding 
on other community members generally. My version of the fair play account, by contrast, 
grounds only punishment’s in-principle permissibility. It does not follow from my 
account that fair play considerations also supply the positive aim of punishment; thus my 
account does not imply, for instance, that the murderer should be punished because she 
was a free rider on members of the community generally. In my view, the central benefit 
of the rule establishing punishment is that it gives citizens compelling reasons to comply 
with the laws — i.e., it acts as a general deterrent — and thus helps to ensure the safety 
and security of community members. Even if deterrence represents the reason we should 
want an institution of punishment, however, the institution’s in-principle permissibility 
will stem, on the fair play view, from the fact that an offender (like everyone else) reaps 
the benefits of deterrence as a result of the general compliance with the rule establishing 
punishment — thus the offender has an obligation of fairness similarly to comply. 
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The second objection noted to the traditional articulation of the fair play view is 
that there seems to be no benefit that an offender unfairly gains, relative to other 
community members generally, through her commission of a crime. Because the 
traditional articulation justifies punishment as a means of removing the unfair advantage, 
the inability to specify such an advantage is obviously problematic. And accounts that 
have specified some advantage appear to generate counterintuitive sentencing guidance. 
Again, my account avoids this general line of criticism, as my view does not characterize 
punishment as removing some unfairly gained advantage. Rather on this account, 
punishment is permissible because the practice is among the rules of the cooperative 
system to which general compliance yields certain benefits — benefits that offenders, 
like everyone else, enjoy. This fair play account only establishes that, and explains why, 
punishment is in-principle permissible. It does not claim also to answer the question of 
what mode and degree of punishment are permissible in particular cases. This latter 
question will depend on distinct moral considerations. 
An implication of my account, then, as I have indicated, is that it is appropriate to 
disaggregate various questions of punishment — in particular, (why) is punishment in 
principle morally permissible? what is punishment’s positive aim? and what mode and 
degree of punishment are permissible in particular cases? — and to answer these 
questions by appeal to distinct considerations. Some may criticize this sort of 
disaggregation strategy as ad hoc, but on the fair play view I have suggested, this 
objection is unpersuasive. Again, my fair play account just is the fair play account of 
political obligation, with the rules of punishment recognized to be among those rules to 
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which the obligation of fairness extends. To require this account to ground not only 
punishment’s in-principle permissibility but also its positive aim and sentencing guidance 
would be as implausible as requiring it to ground specific conclusions about the other 
rules of the cooperative enterprise. We don’t expect that the fair play view should tell us, 
for instance, which acts should be required or forbidden by criminal statutes. Why then, 
should we expect the same fair play view to generate rules about punishment? Rather 
than its being ad hoc to distinguish the permissibility question from the other questions, 
on the fair play view we have good reason to expect that the answer to the permissibility 
question will not yield guidance regarding the other two questions. 
As I have discussed, my account avoids what I take to be the two most powerful 
objections to the standard fair play articulation. More generally, however, my account has 
an advantage over any fair play account that defends punishment as a sort of appropriate 
remediation for violations of the fair play obligation to play by the rules of the 
cooperative venture. Such accounts require two substantial defenses: a defense of the fair 
play account of political obligation itself, and a defense of punishment as a permissible 
remediation for failures to meet the obligation defended in the first part. By contrast, once 
we recognize that the rules of punishment are among those rules to which the obligation 
of compliance extends, then on my account only one substantial defense is required: a 
defense of the fair play view of political obligation. My view is in this regard sturdier 
than standard fair play accounts of punishment, insofar as objections that purport to 
undermine my view will undermine the standard articulations as well, whereas not all 
objections faced by the standard articulations also threaten my account. 
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Essentially, on my fair play account, whether the institution of punishment is in-
principle permissible will be determined by whether we have a moral obligation to 
comply with the rules of our political community. Thus, this defense of punishment will 
stand or fall according to whether the fair play account of political obligation is 
persuasive. In the following section, I consider certain objections to my view. I do not 
aim to provide a full defense of the fair play view of political obligation. I do, however, 
consider what I take to be among the strongest objections to this broader view, and in 
particular, their implications for my strategy of including punishment among those rules 
with which we have a fair play obligation to comply. 
 
III. Objections 
The first objection I want to consider involves my strategy of deriving the moral 
permissibility of punishment from an account of political obligation. On my account, the 
rules instituting legal punishment are among those with which we are reciprocally 
obliged to comply as members of a political community, here characterized as a mutually 
beneficial, cooperative enterprise. According to the objection, therefore, this strategy 
implies that punishment would not be morally permissible in the absence of such a 
political community, viz., in the state of nature. Insofar as we have intuitions that 
punishment would be morally permissible in the state of nature, then my account appears 
deficient.28 
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 I thank Christopher Heath Wellman for raising this objection to me. 
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I actually have mixed intuitions about whether punishment would be permissible 
in the state of nature. On one hand, I’m somewhat inclined to maintain that punishment 
would not, perhaps could not, be permissible in such conditions. Those in a state of 
nature might retaliate against wrongs perpetrated against them, but it’s not clear that 
harming in this context, even if proportionate to the wrongdoing, would constitute just 
punishment. Kant, for one, believed that just punishment is impossible in the state of 
nature, because there is no public authority to settle disputes.29 If we accept the notion 
that punishment, to be permissible, must be imposed by a proper authority with standing 
to settle disputes between opposing parties, then it appears that such punishment is by 
definition impossible in the state of nature. 
On the other hand, it seems that I might permissibly impose intentional harm on 
someone who has wronged me, even if there is no recognized authority to confirm that 
punishment in such a case is permissible. If this is true, however, I contend that such 
punishment would be morally permissible for roughly the same reasons that it is 
permissible in a political community. In the state of nature, if George steals from Kramer, 
and Kramer responds not only by retrieving his stolen goods but also by inflicting some 
sort of harm on George, then presumably this will tend to deter others who might have 
otherwise considered stealing from Kramer. Conversely, if Kramer didn’t respond, others 
might take this as evidence that they could get away with similar behavior as George. 
                                                 
29
 C.f., Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Right 6:312, in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 456. See also Helga Varden’s helpful discussion of Kant’s account in Varden, “Kant’s Non-
Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature,” Kantian 
Review 13:2 (2008): 1-45. 
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Furthermore, when Kramer punishes George, seeing this may lead Elaine to think twice 
not only about stealing from Kramer in the future, but about stealing from anyone. This is 
because Kramer’s punitive response to George’s stealing may cause Elaine, especially if 
she has witnessed others responding in similar retaliatory ways in similar circumstances, 
to believe that this sort of response is the sort that tends to follow attempts at stealing. All 
of this is just to say that general deterrence would be a significant benefit (arguably the 
central benefit) of punishing wrongdoing in the state of nature. As noted above, the 
deterrent effect will be particularly strong if those in the state of nature see wrongdoing 
meeting with punitive responses with some regularity. That is, if individuals begin to 
regard it as a sort of informal rule that wrongdoing is met with a punitive response, then 
they may be persuaded to comply with this rule by constraining their behavior to avoid 
the punishment. But if such compliance with this informal rule is beneficial to those in 
the state of nature, then they have an obligation of fair play to comply with it as well, 
either by appropriately constraining their behavior or by accepting the punitive response 
when they do engage in wrongdoing. 
On the view I have developed here, considerations of fair play could ground the 
in-principle permissibility of punishment even in the absence of a formal cooperative 
scheme, such as a political community. Whether it actually did ground punishment’s 
permissibility would be a matter of whether (a) individuals came to regard it as a sort of 
informal rule that wrongdoing is met with punishment, (b) recognition of the rule led to 
general compliance with it (with compliance here taking the form of choosing not to 
engage in wrongdoing so as to avoid punishment), and (c) general compliance with the 
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rule yielded significant benefits for individuals. Although I have argued that each of these 
requirements might hold in the state of nature, notice that the existence of a political 
community governed by the rule of law makes each of them much more likely. In such a 
political community, the rules of punishment are not merely regularities of behavior that 
may come to be seen as informal rules; rather, they are set out formally, so that everyone 
can clearly recognize them as rules of the community. The more clearly individuals 
recognize the rules, the more likely they will be to comply. The greater the general level 
of compliance, the greater will be the benefit — i.e., general deterrence — to community 
members. Finally, the greater the benefit community members enjoy from the compliance 
of others, the greater their (fair play) obligation is similarly to comply. 
So to sum up my response to this first objection, punishment may be in-principle 
permissible in the state of nature, but if so it will be because of the same considerations of 
fairness that ground its permissibility in a political community. The fair play obligation to 
comply with the rules of punishment will be significantly stronger, however, in a political 
community than in the state of nature, because the benefits yielded by punishment will be 
comparatively greater in a political community than in the state of nature. 
The state-of-nature objection charged that the fair play view is insufficient in that 
it can only establish punishment’s permissibility in the context of a cooperative social 
order. A second line of objection contends that, even in the context of such a social order, 
the fair play view is insufficient in that it can only establish the permissibility of 
punishing those who benefit from the institution of punishment. The worry here applies to 
the fair play view of political obligation generally. The objection is that, although the 
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goods yielded by the cooperative social order may be generally beneficial, there may be 
individuals for whom the costs of compliance with the rules of the scheme outweigh the 
corresponding benefits. If so, then in such cases considerations of fair play seem ill-suited 
to ground obligations of compliance. In the context of the rule(s) instituting punishment 
of crimes, one might object that many criminals do not, all-things-considered, benefit 
from the existence of such an institution (or, to put it another way, that the costs outweigh 
the benefits). That is, we might be hard pressed to demonstrate that, say, an individual 
serving an extended prison term is better off than she would have been had there been no 
institution of punishment. In the counterfactual case, she might not enjoy the benefits that 
punishment yields (general deterrence, etc.), but she also would not face the hardships 
associated with the prison term. Thus on balance, one might argue that she would be 
better off if there were no institution of punishment.30 
Whether an individual being punished would be, on balance, better off in a 
society with no institution of punishment is an empirical question. It is not obvious to me 
that she would be better off in such circumstances. On one hand, without the prospect of 
legal punishment to deter others from committing crimes, the individual’s own safety and 
security (as well as that of her loved ones) might be significantly jeopardized. On the 
other hand, if the person herself engaged in wrongdoing against others, the void created 
by the absence of a legal institution of punishment might be filled by private vengeance. 
This vengeance might be much more severe than the legal punishment that the offender 
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 I am grateful to Victor Tadros for raising this objection to me. 
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would face.31 More importantly, however, as I noted earlier, the rule instituting 
punishment as the response to crimes is best understood as a conditional: if you commit a 
crime, then you will be subject to punishment. The rule thus offers individuals not only 
the benefits of general deterrence (or perhaps special deterrence, incapacitation, 
retribution, etc.) but also the opportunity to constrain their behavior so as to avoid 
punishment. So to the prisoner who claims she has not benefited from the rule instituting 
punishment, we might reply: “Is it more beneficial (a) that there be a rule that helps 
protect you and your loved ones by deterring crimes and allows you the opportunity to 
avoid being punished yourself, or (b) that there be no such rule, so that harms to you and 
your family may go undeterred, and if you wrong others you will be subject to their 
vengeance?” If we thus consider the benefits individuals receive from the institution of 
punishment and the choice each person has to avoid punishment herself, then punishment 
does appear, on balance, beneficial.32 
                                                 
31
 Lisa H. Perkins cites the hazards of private vengeance to ground her justification of punishment in 
“Suggestion for a Justification of Punishment,” Ethics 81:1 (Oct. 1970): 55-61. See also John Locke, 
Second Treatise of Civil Government, ch. 2 para. 13, in Readings in Social & Political Philosophy, ed. 
Robert M. Stewart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 15-6; John Hospers, “Punishment, 
Protection, and Retaliation,” in Justice and Punishment, ed. J. B. Cederblom and William L. Blizek 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 35; and Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political 
Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 184. 
32
 One might press the objection by claiming that surely there may be those — mob bosses or drug lords, 
for instance — for whom the legal institution of punishment is not, on balance, beneficial. I actually think 
mob bosses and drug lords do benefit from, and actually depend on, the existence of institutions of law 
enforcement and punishment to preserve the social order in which they illegally operate. Nevertheless, I 
concede the general point that if examples can be produced of criminals who cannot be said to benefit from 
the institution of punishment (yet for whom we nevertheless believe punishment is permissible), then this 
represents a serious challenge to the fair play account. I submit that proponents of the fair play account of 
punishment would do well to focus on objections such as this, rather than trying to establish what sort of 
advantage an offender unfairly gains, relative to other community members, through the commission of her 
crime. I thank Julia Driver for pressing me on this point. 
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The previous objection contended that the fair play view is insufficient in that it 
can only ground the permissibility of punishing those who benefit from the institution of 
punishment. The final objection I want to consider charges that the fair play view is 
insufficient in that it can only ground the permissibility of punishing those who accept 
the benefits of this institution. It has been commonly suggested that my merely receiving 
benefits from others’ compliance with the rules of a cooperative enterprise is not itself 
enough to generate obligations on me to reciprocate.33 Rather, as A. John Simmons has 
written, what is required is that I accept these benefits.34 With respect to certain kinds of 
benefits, which Simmons calls readily available, determining whether we accept them is 
fairly straightforward — if we seek them out and obtain them, then we have accepted 
them. For instance, if I request and receive “special protection by the police, if I fear for 
my life, say, or if I need my house to be watched while I’m away,” this would constitute 
my acceptance of a readily available benefit.35 By contrast, many benefits of membership 
in a political community are not the sort that we seek out; rather, they are open benefits, 
                                                 
33
 Robert Nozick notably made the point that mere receipt of benefits is not sufficient to confer obligations 
by way of this example: Imagine you live in a neighborhood in which a group of your neighbors buys a 
public address system and decides to start a public entertainment program for the neighborhood (which 
happens to comprise 365 neighbors). Each neighbor is assigned one day per year in which she is 
responsible for running the PA system. “After 138 days on which each person has done his part, your day 
arrives. Are you obligated to take your turn? You have benefited from it, occasionally opening your 
window to listen, enjoying some music or chuckling at someone’s funny story. The other people have put 
themselves out. But must you answer the call when it is your turn to do so? As it stands, surely not.” 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York City: Basic Books, 1974), p. 93. 
34
 See A. John Simmons, “The Principle of Fair Play,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 8:4 (1979), reprinted in 
Robert M. Stewart, ed., Readings in Social & Political Philosophy (New York City: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 66-81. 
35
 Ibid., p. 77. 
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which we cannot avoid, except perhaps at great inconvenience.36 Examples of open 
benefits include police protection, national security from external threats, assurance of 
air- and water-quality standards, etc. 
On Simmons’ account, acceptance of an open benefit normally involves “taking 
the benefit willingly and knowingly,” where this requires, at least, (a) regarding the 
benefit “as flowing from a cooperative scheme” rather than seeing it “as ‘free’ for the 
taking,” and (b) thinking that the benefit is “worth the price we must pay for [it],” so that 
given a choice of taking the benefit and accepting the concurrent burdens or rejecting the 
benefit, we would take it.37 These are fairly steep requirements on what counts as 
acceptance of a benefit. Not surprisingly, he concludes that many, perhaps most, citizens 
do not meet these criteria for acceptance of benefits. Many do not notice or think much 
about the benefits they receive from the political order, and many of those who do think 
about these benefits mistakenly undervalue them relative to the corresponding burdens — 
thus for Simmons they cannot be said to have accepted the open benefits in the sense 
necessary to confer political obligation. 
George Klosko has provided what I take to be a persuasive response to this 
objection. Essentially, Klosko contends that acceptance, of the sort Simmons has in mind, 
is not necessary in some cases for open benefits to confer fair play obligations. Klosko 
contends that in situations where you benefit from our compliance with the rules of a 
cooperative venture but do not yourself comply (i.e., in free-rider situations), fairness 
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 Ibid., p. 76. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 77 and 80. 
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demands either (a) that you no longer benefit, (b) that we (i.e., the rest of us) be similarly 
freed from the burden of compliance, or (c) that you start to comply.38 Open benefits, by 
definition, benefit everyone — they cannot be provided generally but withheld from 
certain members of the community. Thus with respect to open benefits, (a) is not an 
option. Klosko argues that (b) also is not an option for certain open benefits, specifically 
those that are indispensable to the welfare of all community members.39 National defense, 
for instance, “is essential to the well-being of X and all its members, [therefore] it must be 
provided. The consequences of nonprovision would be catastrophic for all concerned”40 
— to the free rider herself as well as everyone else. Thus to allow that no one has the 
burden of compliance (and thus to sacrifice the corresponding benefits) is not a 
practically viable option. With (a) and (b) unavailable as options, only (c) remains — the 
free rider is obliged to comply. Klosko writes: 
It is difficult to imagine what Pickerel could say to the 
members of X, who have provided him with national 
defense, in order to justify his unwillingness to cooperate. 
Because the benefits are indispensable, he could not say 
that he does not want them. Nor could he distinguish 
himself from the other X-ites because he has not sought the 
benefits out. Because of the nature of national defense, 
none of the X-ites have pursued them. The X-ites can be 
presumed to differ from Pickerel in their willing acceptance 
of the scheme’s burdens. But Pickerel’s unwillingness to 
participate is difficult to defend. Unless there is some 
morally relevant difference between Pickerel and the 
members of X, his refusal to cooperate must be interpreted 
                                                 
38
 C.f., Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1992), p. 35. 
39
 Ibid., pp. 39-54, esp. p. 43. 
40
 Ibid., p. 43. 
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simply as a desire to profit from their labor without doing 
his fair share, and so as a clear instance of free riding.41 
Klosko thus concludes that we may be obliged to comply with rules that provide 
us with open, indispensable benefits even if we have not accepted these benefits in the 
sense Simmons requires. Note, however, that on this account, fair play only grounds 
obligations to comply with the rules that provide open and indispensable benefits.42 The 
relevant question for present purposes, then, is whether the benefits provided by the 
institution of punishment are open and indispensable. I contend that they are both. As I 
indicated earlier, I believe the central benefit of the institution of punishment is that it 
gives genuine bindingness to the rule of law by providing significant incentives not to 
violate legal rules (i.e., through general deterrence). In this way, the institution of 
punishment plays a crucial role in ensuring the security of community members. If I am 
right, then this seems fairly clearly to be an open benefit. Receiving this benefit does not 
require actively seeking it, and in fact it’s not clear how we might refuse this benefit. 
                                                 
41
 Ibid., p. 42. One might object to Klosko’s claim here by pointing out that a community member could 
sincerely (albeit unwisely) claim not to want the benefits provided by national defense (or for our purposes, 
punishment), or at least not to want them enough to make cooperating worthwhile. This is a fair point. As 
Klosko’s phrase “must be interpreted” indicates, there is an intractable problem in such cases of 
determining whether the noncooperator is genuine about being willing to forego the benefits. Because the 
benefits are open and also indispensable to the community generally, there is no practical possibility of 
actually testing whether the noncooperator’s claim is sincere (and of course, it is reasonable to assume that 
the noncooperator is aware that this is so). Klosko indicates, and I’m inclined to agree, that we thus have 
good reason in such cases to suspect that the noncooperator’s claim is disingenuous. I recognize, however, 
that if a noncooperator could be determined to be sincere in her willingness to forego the benefits of the 
institution of punishment, then the fair play account would be hard-pressed to justify punishment in such a 
case. As I suggested in response to the previous objection, I believe this is the sort of challenge with which 
those sympathetic to a fair play defense of punishment should concern themselves, rather than questions 
surrounding the identification and removal of unfair advantages gained through criminal offenses. 
42
 Klosko has argued elsewhere that we nevertheless have political obligations with respect to other rules, 
and that these obligations are grounded in distinct principles. See his Political Obligations (Oxford, U.K.: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. chapter 5. Analyzing Klosko’s broader account is beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
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The benefit provided by punishment is also, I believe, indispensable. In describing 
indispensable open benefits, Klosko writes that this class of benefits is likely quite small; 
however, he maintains that it comprises, at least, goods necessary to protecting the 
physical security of community members, such as national defense, protection from a 
hostile environment, provisions for satisfying basic bodily needs, and notably, law and 
order. “That we all need the public goods just mentioned regardless of whatever else we 
need is a fundamental assumption of liberal political theory.”43 In particular, the 
fundamental importance of security has been widely recognized by liberal political 
theorists. As John Stuart Mill pointed out, security is a requirement for the enjoyment of 
virtually all other goods: 
… but security no human being can possibly do without; on 
it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the 
whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing 
moment, since nothing but the gratification of the instant 
could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of 
anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily 
stronger than ourselves.44 
As Mill recognized, whatever the things are that matter to us — whether these be 
possessions, projects, relationships, or whatever — these things will typically have value 
for us insofar as we can be secure in their pursuit or enjoyment. We buy things, and we 
count on their not being stolen or destroyed by others; we travel, and we count on the fact 
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 Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, p. 40. 
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 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 2d ed., ed. George Sher (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 
p. 54. Similarly, Klosko emphasizes the importance of security in describing “law and order” as “the 
advantages of a secure, protected environment, which provides one with security of the person and the 
realistic expectation of similar security in the future that allows one to plan ahead. According to major 
liberal theorists, e.g., Locke, the absence of law and order in this sense makes life in the state of nature to 
some degree intolerable,” The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, n30, p. 59. 
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that those around us will drive responsibly; we work to earn a living, and we count on the 
fact that our employers will not take advantage of us. The rule of law plays a crucial role 
in ensuring the security of all community members, and the institution of punishment 
plays a crucial role in ensuring that the rule of law genuinely binds.45 Thus I conclude 
that the institution of punishment provides an indispensable open benefit. As such, it 
grounds a fair play obligation of compliance even for those who have not met Simmons’ 
standards for acceptance of the benefit. 
This is not to say that the institution of punishment will therefore be permissible 
no matter what punishments it prescribes in particular cases. As I have indicated from the 
outset, the defense I have offered here is only of punishment’s in-principle moral 
permissibility. That is, my argument has been that punishment per se, that is, the 
intentional infliction of harm on criminal wrongdoers, does not in itself constitute a 
violation of offenders’ rights. Particular instances of punishment, however, may still be 
morally impermissible all things considered if they fail to treat offenders with the respect 
to which they are entitled as moral persons. Again, I take it that my account is similar in 
this respect to fair play accounts of political obligation generally. In other words, if 
considerations of fair play ground an obligation to comply with criminal statutes, this 
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 My claim here rests on two empirical claims, either of which might be challenged. One might contend 
either that the security of community members does not depend on the rule of law, or alternatively that the 
rule of law’s bindingness does not depend on the institution of punishment. Thus even if security is 
understood to be an indispensable benefit, one might argue that punishment is not an indispensable means 
to achieving that benefit. Arguing for these empirical claims is beyond the scope of this paper, but I 
concede that if it could be shown convincingly that the security of community members could be ensured 
as (or more) effectively by means other than a system of laws backed by punishment, then the case I offer 
here for punishment’s in-principle permissibility would be correspondingly undermined. I am grateful to R. 
A. Duff for pushing me on this point. 
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surely is only a presumptive obligation. Such accounts would not ground (nor purport to 
ground) an absolute obligation of compliance irrespective of the content of the statutes. In 
fact, any plausible account of political obligation, be it grounded in considerations of fair 
play, tacit consent, natural duties of justice, or whatever, will allow that in certain cases 
we may be permitted, perhaps even required, to violate unjust laws (perhaps through civil 
disobedience, or in extreme cases, even outright revolution). Nevertheless, there is a 
presumptive moral obligation to comply with a community’s laws — and relevant for 
present purposes, there is a presumptive moral obligation to comply with the rule 
according to which one is subject to punishment when one has violated some criminal 
statute. Thus the institution of punishment is in principle morally permissible. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have aimed to provide a more plausible version of the fair play 
justification of punishment, one that follows more straightforwardly from the fair play 
account of political obligation and also avoids the objections typically leveled against fair 
play defenses of punishment. The merits of my account could be evaluated in a couple of 
ways: First, we could ask whether, from within the perspective of the fair play view, my 
account provides a more plausible route to grounding the permissibility of punishment 
than do the standard articulations of the view. Second, we could ask whether the fair play 
view itself is plausible. 
Although I am obviously sympathetic to the fair play view itself (that is, to the 
fair play view of political obligation), I have in this paper offered only a brief defense of 
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this view against what I take to be the most powerful objections raised against it. A full 
defense of the view is well beyond the scope of this paper. For others who would endorse 
the fair play account of punishment, however, I suggest that the political obligation 
question should take center stage. If the fair play view of political obligation can be 
defended, then the fair play account of punishment follows straightforwardly. 
My primary focus in this paper, however, has been with the first point. That is, I 
contend that my fair play account is more plausible, as a fair play account of punishment, 
than are standard versions of the view. As I have discussed, my account leads to the 
implication that the question of punishment’s in-principle permissibility is distinct from 
the questions of its positive aim and of how to punish in particular cases; answers to these 
distinct questions will require appeal to distinct moral considerations. Rather than 
regarding this implication as regrettable, however, I suggest that fair play theorists should 
embrace it. As I have argued, doing so is not only defensible in its own right, but it also 
allows the fair play view to avoid a number of unappealing implications. 46 
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CHAPTER 2 
Deterrent punishment and respect for persons 
 
In the previous chapter, I grounded punishment’s in-principle moral permissibility 
in certain considerations of fairness shared by members of a political community. Even if 
punishment is permissible in principle, however, it may be unjustified all things 
considered if there is no legitimate, compelling reason to have such a practice. In my 
view, the reason we should want an institution of punishment is that it helps to protect 
community members’ security and well-being by reducing criminal activity. In this 
chapter, I defend deterrence as the central aim of punishment. 
Deterrence-based accounts of punishment have been criticized frequently because 
they are unable to rule out occasionally punishing innocent citizens, or disproportionately 
punishing guilty ones, if doing so would yield net deterrent benefits.1 In response to these 
sorts of objections, some theorists have argued that although considerations of deterrence 
cannot ground a complete justification of punishment, they may nevertheless shoulder 
some of the justificatory burden. Perhaps most notably, H. L. A. Hart contended that 
consequentialist considerations such as crime prevention represent the central aim of 
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 See, e.g., David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), pp. 41-52; Deirdre Golash, The Case Against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the 
Law (New York City and London: New York University Press, 2005), pp. 43-44; John Braithwaite and 
Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 
1990), p. 46; H. J. McCloskey, “Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment,” Journal of Philosophy 64:3 
(1967): 91-110, on pp. 93-102, and “An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical 
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punishment, but that particular impositions of punishment should be constrained by the 
familiar principles that only the criminally guilty should be punished, and only in 
proportion with the seriousness of their crimes.2 Constrained by principles such as these, 
deterrence as an aim of punishment looks significantly more appealing. 
Even with these constraints, however, deterrence as an aim of punishment has 
been subject to a further line of criticism. Here, the objection is not that in some cases 
considerations of deterrence might permit the punishment of law abiders, but rather that 
punishment aimed at deterrence fails to respect offenders as autonomous moral agents — 
or in Kantian terms, as ends in themselves. This challenge is particularly powerful. It 
does not merely charge that deterrent punishment might allow, in certain cases, the 
disrespectful treatment of offenders; if this were the charge, then perhaps constraints 
could be articulated, similar to the constraints against punishing the innocent, to rule out 
such treatment. The objection here, however, is that punishment aimed at deterrence by 
its nature fails to treat offenders with respect. If the charge is valid, then additional 
constraints won’t help.3 
This paper defends deterrence as an aim (in my view, the central aim) of 
punishment against this objection that deterrent punishment fails to respect offenders as 
moral persons. I examine three prominent ways in which this charge has been fleshed out. 
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 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (New York City: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), pp. 8-13. See also Don E. Scheid, “Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, 
and the Distribution of Punishments,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10 (1997): 441-506. 
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Good, pp. 61-64. 
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First, some theorists, such as Jeffrie Murphy, have objected that punishing with the aim 
of deterrence uses the offender as a mere means to secure some social benefit, namely, 
crime reduction. The second and third versions of the objection have been developed 
thoroughly by R. A. Duff. A system of criminal law and punishment aimed at deterrence, 
Duff claims, offers reasons for compliance that are inappropriate to autonomous moral 
agents, and it implicitly excludes criminals from membership in the political community. 
Duff offers these as aspects of the same line of critique, but I argue below that they are in 
fact separate charges and thus merit distinct consideration. I contend that none of these 
objections ultimately succeeds. That is, none of them establishes that punishment aimed 
at deterring crime fails to demonstrate appropriate respect for persons. Specifically, a 
deterrent system of punishment — bounded by appropriate constraints on who may be 
punished and how severely — does not treat offenders as mere means to securing certain 
social goods, it does not offer inappropriate reasons for compliance with the law, and it 
does not implicitly exclude criminals from membership in the political community. 
In section I, I examine and refute the objection that deterrent punishment uses 
offenders as mere means to securing the social goal of crime reduction. In section II, I 
take a closer look at Duff’s account and contend that he actually offers two 
distinguishable versions of the respect-based objection. In sections III and IV, I examine 
each of these objections in turn, and I conclude that neither succeeds. Ultimately, 
deterrence is a permissible aim for a system of criminal punishment; that is, punishment 
aimed at deterring crime can be consistent with respect for moral persons. 
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I. Does deterrence use offenders as mere means? 
One way to interpret the charge that deterrent punishment fails to respect 
offenders as persons is that such punishment appears to use offenders as mere means to 
deterring crime. Jeffrie Murphy, for instance, has written of deterrence that “a guilty man 
is, on this theory, being punished because of the instrumental value the action of 
punishment will have in the future. He is being used as a means to some future good — 
e.g., the deterrence of others.”4 Such punishment thus appears inconsistent with 
maintaining proper respect for offenders as autonomous moral agents. 
Murphy’s characterization of the good being sought as “the deterrence of others” 
points to a sense in which we might think one form of deterrence can be especially 
problematic. That is, it might seem bad enough that punishment subjects offenders to 
hard treatment with the aim of promoting the social good of crime reduction. A critic 
might further point out, however, that one type of deterrence, general deterrence, seeks to 
achieve this social good by treating offenders in certain ways in order to affect others’ 
behaviors, to persuade others to comply with the law. Special deterrence may also seem 
troubling insofar as it subjects an offender to hard treatment to bring about the social 
good of crime reduction, but at least it treats the offender in this manner with the aim of 
affecting her own future behavior, of persuading her to comply with the law in the future, 
rather than treating her in this way to affect others’ behavior. Thus insofar as this 
objection is valid, it strikes particularly hard at general deterrence. 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., on p. 219. For similar articulations of this critique, see, e.g., R. A. Duff, Punishment, 
Communication, and Community (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 13-14; and Boonin, 
The Problem of Punishment, pp. 60-61. 
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We might respond to this line of critique by pointing out that political 
communities often harm law abiders for the sake of promoting some greater good, as well. 
Construction of a new highway may be beneficial to the community generally, but it may 
harm those who live nearby (perhaps by generating noise pollution or diminishing their 
property values). Similarly, those with a communicable disease may be forced to endure 
certain restrictions of their liberties in the interest of protecting public health. If harming 
some for the greater benefit of others is permissible in cases such as these, and numerous 
others, then perhaps harming offenders to benefit the public by deterring crime is 
similarly permissible. 
David Boonin rejects this line of response, however, because he believes it 
overlooks the distinction between intending harm and foreseeing harm. Boonin points out 
that cases such as those described above — the highway construction, or quarantining 
those with a communicable disease — “do not involve intentionally harming some people 
in order to benefit others. Rather, they involve intentionally doing acts that foreseeably 
cause some harm to some people and provide greater benefits to many others.”5 He 
continues: 
[T]he fact is that punishment stands alone as the one 
instance in which the state not only does an act that 
predictably harms some of its citizens, but in which it acts 
with the explicit aim of causing harm. Punishment is utterly 
anomalous in this respect. This is precisely what makes 
                                                 
5
 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, p. 62. 
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punishment distinctively difficult to justify in the first 
place.6 
Thus for Boonin, a deterrent system of punishment is objectionable because it 
intentionally harms some to benefit others. The harm is the means by which the good is 
achieved, not merely a foreseeable consequence. 
Given that the ultimate aim of a system of deterrent punishment is to reduce crime, 
however, I suggest that actual inflictions of punishment are not the means by which the 
system seeks to achieve this aim. Rather, the threat of punishment is intended to do the 
deterrent work.7 A deterrent system of punishment communicates a threat to everyone in 
the community: If you do these acts, you will be subject to punishment. Consider that if 
the threat of deterrent punishment were perfectly effective, no one would violate the 
community’s laws, and thus no one would be punished. Actual instances of punishment, 
then, are best seen as cases where the deterrent threat failed.8 The inflictions of harm that 
constitute punishment are not the means by which the good of crime reduction is 
achieved; rather, the means by which deterrent systems of punishment aim to reduce 
crime is by issuance of a threat. Obviously, in the actual world deterrent systems of 
punishment are not perfectly effective. Individuals continue to commit crimes despite the 
existence of the deterrent threat. In these cases, such individuals are harmed in the ways 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. See also Nathan Hanna, “Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism,” Law and Philosophy 
27 (2008): 123-150, on pp. 124-28. 
7
 One might worry that the threat of punishment is itself a sort of coercive sanction, in that its aim is to 
change incentives so that, in effect, it restricts citizens’ viable options. I consider this point more below. 
8
 S. I. Benn noted this point in his “An Approach to the Problems of Punishment,” Philosophy 33:127 
(1958): 325-41, on p. 330. 
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characteristic of punishment. But such individuals are foreseeably rather than 
intentionally harmed. Again, this is because the intention of a deterrent system of 
punishment is that everyone should take the threat seriously and avoid criminal behavior 
(and, in turn, punishment). 
Boonin insists, however, that the intended-harm element is essential to our 
conception not only of deterrent punishment, but of punishment in general. He writes: 
When the state punishes someone, … it inflicts various 
harmful treatments on him in order to harm him. It is not 
merely that in sentencing a prisoner to hard labor, for 
example, we foresee that he will suffer. Rather, a prisoner 
who is sentenced to hard labor is sentenced to hard labor so 
that he will suffer, and if a given form of labor turned out to 
be too pleasant and enjoyable, he would be sentenced to 
some other form of labor for precisely that reason.9 
Boonin may be correct with respect to punishment whose central aim is 
retribution, or perhaps even special deterrence (although even on these accounts there 
would presumably be plausible considerations cautioning against lengthening or altering 
sentences once they had been issued). But his point is mistaken with respect to general 
deterrence. In a system of punishment aimed at general deterrence, sentences are not 
imposed to inflict suffering on the offender, but rather to maintain a credible threat to the 
public generally. Typically, of course, the more severe the sentence, the more the 
offender will suffer and the more credible the threat will be. But the concern, from the 
perspective of general deterrence, is not how much an offender suffers, but rather how 
effectively the general public is deterred from committing the given offense. In fact, if the 
                                                 
9
 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, p. 13. 
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credible threat could be maintained without harming any offenders, then this would be 
entirely acceptable based solely on considerations of general deterrence.10 Punishment 
aimed at general deterrence, then, is best characterized not as intentionally harming some 
to benefit others, but rather as intentionally threatening everyone, and then foreseeably 
harming those who nevertheless commit crimes. 
Suppose, however, that I am wrong about this. Suppose that punishment aimed at 
deterrence is in fact best understood as intentionally harming some to benefit others. This 
is still not enough to establish that such punishment would violate the Kantian principle 
of respect for persons. It’s widely recognized that this principle does not forbid treating 
others as means, but as mere means. We frequently treat others as means to our own or 
other people’s ends, and we typically consider such treatment permissible. I ask a taxi 
driver to take me to my destination, our country sends soldiers to fight in a war to protect 
our interests, I ask a friend to lend me money. The taxi driver, the soldiers, and my friend 
are all treated as means to others’ ends (mine, or in the case of the soldiers, the country’s), 
but we do not find these cases objectionable as long as they are not treated merely as 
                                                 
10
 This point, in fact, grounds a distinct objection commonly leveled against deterrent punishments 
generally: Insofar as the deterrent threat is what is crucial, the legal authority might be justified in some 
cases of merely pretending to punish offenders. This prospect is particularly troubling to those with the 
retributivist intuition that the guilty deserve to suffer. Advocates of deterrence as an aim of punishment 
might respond to this objection in various ways: They might contend that the public’s likely discovery of 
the pretend punishment cases could undermine the general deterrent effect of the threat; or that whereas 
general deterrence constitutes one aim of punishment, there are others (retribution, reform, etc.) that rule 
out the possibility of pretending to punish. Whether these or other responses would be persuasive need not 
worry us here, because the question of whether general deterrence would permit pretend-punishing is a 
distinct one from the question of whether punishments aimed at general deterrence treat offenders as mere 
means. For present purposes, the relevance of the pretend-punishing objection is that it underscores that 
punishment-as-general-deterrence aims to reduce crime not by harming offenders but rather by issuing a 
threat. 
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means. The relevant question for this version of the respect-based objection, then, is 
whether deterrent punishment treats offenders merely as means to the social good of 
crime reduction. 
There are good reasons to doubt that punishing for deterrence uses offenders 
merely as means to the end of crime reduction. First, note that insofar as the institution of 
punishment does yield a deterrent effect, those who commit crimes typically will have 
reaped benefits from the existence of this institution just as law abiders have done. 
Perpetrators of crime are also, like other community members, potential victims of crime. 
Thus insofar as the institution of punishment helps to deter crime, it protects the safety 
and security of everyone. 
One might respond that an offender may still be treated merely as a means when 
she is harmed in the interest of securing this social good, even if the social good is also a 
good for the offender herself. If our legal system sanctioned the occasional punishment of 
innocent people for the purpose of achieving the beneficial deterrent effect, for instance, 
then these individuals would be used as mere means even if they themselves had 
benefited from the deterrent effects of the institution generally. Thus even if offenders as 
well as law abiders enjoy the general benefits of deterrent punishment, this fact by itself 
appears insufficient to assure that such punishment avoids using offenders as mere means. 
Deterrent punishment with prohibitions on punishing the guilty is relevantly 
different, however, from a system of deterrent punishment (even an overall beneficial one) 
that allowed the punishment of the innocent. To punish law abiders would be to treat 
them in ways that were not responsive to choices they had actually made, and thus it 
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would fail to respect them as autonomous moral agents. Respectful treatment requires at 
least that we treat others according to what they have actually done (or failed to do); 
punishing those who have violated no criminal laws fails to meet this minimal standard of 
respect. Notice, though, that a deterrent system of punishment does not only offer to each 
community member the benefits that come from reduced crime. Deterrent punishment 
constrained by the retributivist principle against punishing the innocent also allows each 
individual to choose whether she will risk suffering the harms associated with 
punishment. Such a system offers everyone a choice: Comply with the law, or be subject 
to punishment. Thus unlike the innocent person who is punished to achieve the deterrent 
effect, the offender’s punishment is a response to the choice she made to violate the law. 
Given that her punishment is a response to her own free choice, the fact that the aim of 
punishing her is to deter others from committing similar crimes (or her from committing 
similar crimes in the future) does not imply that she is treated merely as a means to this 
end. Hart expresses essentially this idea, as he describes the institution of punishment as 
“offering individuals including the criminal the protection of the laws on terms which are 
fair, because they not only consist of a framework of reciprocal rights and duties, but 
because within this framework each individual is given a fair opportunity to choose 
between keeping the law required for society’s protection or paying the penalty.”11 
Still, even if an institution of deterrent punishment offers benefits to everyone, 
and even if it offers each community member equally a choice about whether to endure 
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 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 22-23. 
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the threatened sanction, one might still object that this choice itself is coercive, that it 
employs the threat of harm to restrict citizens’ viable options. Richard Burgh objects to 
Hart’s account by offering what he considers an analogous case, in which terrorists take a 
group of people hostage and tell each that if he tries to escape, he will be beaten. The 
terrorists treat all of the hostages equally, and they stay true to their pledge only to beat 
those hostages who try to escape. “Simply because a hostage is given a fair opportunity to 
avoid being beaten,” Burgh concludes, “it does not follow that his beating is just.”12 Even 
if the terrorists “were to inform the hostages that if they do as they are told they will 
receive positive benefits,” beating those who tried to escape would be unjust.13 Burgh 
concludes that, analogously, deterrent punishment cannot be justified on grounds that it 
provides a choice either to comply with the law and reap benefits from others’ 
compliance or to break the law and suffer punishment. 
Contrary to Burgh’s charge, however, there is a fairly straightforward difference 
between the choice offered by the institution of deterrent punishment and the choice 
offered by the terrorists. Given that the terrorists violate each hostage’s liberty rights, the 
hostages’ choice is either not to do that which they have a moral right to do (namely, 
leave) or to be beaten. So the terrorists use the prospect of force to persuade the hostages 
not to do what they have a right to do. A system of deterrent punishment, however, 
employs the prospect of force to persuade community members not to do the sort of acts 
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 Richard Burgh, “Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?” The Journal of Philosophy 79:4 (1982): 193-210, 
on p. 199. 
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 Ibid., p. 200. 
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that they have a moral obligation not to do.14 Thus the relevant question is whether a 
system of punishment that provided significant benefits to community members generally, 
and that offered a choice either not to commit acts that one has moral obligations not to 
commit or to be harmed, is coercive in a way that renders it inconsistent with respect for 
moral persons. Given that such a system offers each community member benefits, treats 
each according to her own choices, and seeks to persuade citizens not to do that which 
they have a moral obligation not to do anyway, I suggest that such a system is consistent 
with respecting individuals, even those punished, as autonomous moral agents. 
Kant himself provides support for the view that punishment, properly constrained 
by the retributivist principle, may aim at deterrence while nevertheless respecting the 
offender. A criminal, he writes, “must previously have been found punishable before any 
thought can be given to drawing from his punishment something of use for himself or his 
fellow citizens.”15 Although Kant’s full view of punishment continues to be the subject of 
substantial debate, in this passage he suggests that deterrence is a permissible aim, which 
for him means that it does not use the individual as a mere means, as long as punishments 
are limited to those who are guilty of crimes. 
I conclude that punishment aimed at deterrence does not use offenders as mere 
means, and thus that this version of the respect-based objection fails. Still, Kant’s respect 
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 This is the case, at least, when the laws backed by deterrent punishment are justified. By contrast, unjust 
laws (e.g., laws allowing, or requiring, what is morally prohibited) backed by deterrent punishment would 
be analogous to Burgh’s terrorist example. As such, a system of deterrent punishment backing such laws 
would fail to respect those punished as moral persons. 
15
 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:331. In Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. and 
ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 473.  
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principle instructs us not only not to use others as mere means, but also to respect them as 
ends in themselves. Respecting people as ends may require more than merely not using 
them as mere means. Perhaps, then, there is a sense in which punishment aimed at 
deterrence nevertheless violates the respect principle. In the following three sections, I 
consider what I take to be the most thorough and compelling development of this sort of 
objection, by R. A. Duff. 
 
II. Duff’s critique of deterrence 
Duff conceives of the criminal law as fundamentally a communicative enterprise. 
He argues that a system of punishment that aims to deter potential offenders is 
inappropriate for a liberal political community, committed to respecting its members as 
members of the community. Essentially, this is because deterrent punishment 
communicates in prudential rather than moral terms: 
The law of [a liberal political] community, as its common 
law, must address its members in terms of the values it 
embodies — values to which they should, as members of 
the community, already be committed. It portrays criminal 
conduct as wrongful in terms of those values; and the 
reasons that citizens have to refrain from such conduct, the 
reasons to which the law refers and on which it depends, 
are precisely the moral reasons that make such conduct 
wrong. A purely deterrent law, however, addresses those 
whom it seeks to deter, not in terms of the communal 
values that it aims to protect, but simply in the brute 
language of self-interest. It thus addresses them, not as 
members of the normative community of citizens, but as 
threatening outsiders against whom the community must 
protect itself. It implicitly excludes them from membership 
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of the citizen community by no longer addressing them in 
terms of that community’s values.16 
Duff is concerned, commendably, that offenders should be treated as moral 
persons, and in fact as continuing members of the community, rather than merely as the 
“they” against whom “we,” the law-abiding community members, must protect ourselves. 
His concern is well founded — it is all too easy, and too common, to assume that the 
criminal act necessarily demonstrates a criminal, perhaps even irredeemably criminal, 
character. Duff urges us, however, always to regard the person guilty of a criminal 
offense as nevertheless one of us, a member of our community who may come to share 
(or recommit to) the moral values that the community endorses. Despite the significant 
virtues of Duff’s account, however, I contend that his objection to punishments aimed at 
deterrence misses its mark. There is a real sense in which a system of punishment aimed 
at deterring crime (with appropriate constraints) can nevertheless demonstrate appropriate 
respect for criminal offenders, and thus avoid being objectionably exclusionary. 
Note that Duff actually offers two critiques of systems of punishment aimed at 
deterrence — two ways in which such systems of punishment fail to treat individuals 
with appropriate respect as autonomous moral agents. First, deterrent punishment offers 
individuals the wrong sort of reasons to comply with the law. It offers merely prudential 
reasons to comply — i.e., to avoid incarceration, community service, etc. — rather than 
the appropriate moral reasons — i.e., that the prohibited acts are morally condemned by 
the community. Second, by offering merely prudential reasons, rather than making the 
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sort of moral appeal that is appropriate to members of a liberal political community, a 
deterrent system of punishment implicitly excludes those it addresses from membership 
in the community. It fails to respect them as fellow community members who, as 
members, share (or should share, and can come to share) the community’s moral values. 
Punishing to deter is thus exclusionary, Duff believes, in that it reinforces the distinction 
between “we,” the law-abiding citizens, and “they,” the criminals, rather than treating 
offenders as continuing to be fellow members of our community. 
Duff implies that the second critique follows from the first. That is, he indicates 
that a system of punishment aimed at deterrence excludes certain individuals from the 
political community because it offers them the wrong sort of reasons (i.e., prudential 
reasons) to comply with the law. In fact, however, these are distinct critiques. The charge 
that deterrent punishment is exclusionary rests on the notion that it treats offenders 
differently from law abiders. It perpetuates the distinction between “us” (the law abiders) 
and “them” (the criminals) and implicitly excludes “them” from the community in which 
“we,” as law abiders, are still included as members. By contrast, the objection that 
punishment aimed at deterrence provides the wrong sort of reasons to comply with the 
law does not depend on its offering different reasons to offenders and to law abiders. 
Rather, a system of punishment might offer the same, inappropriate reasons for 
compliance to everyone. As such, it would not treat one group (offenders) as less of a part 
of the political community than another group (law abiders). It would not perpetuate the 
objectionable “we” and “they” distinction, because such a system would communicate 
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the same message, and offer the same reasons, to everyone.17 Thus whereas one objection 
contends that deterrent punishment offers the wrong sort of reasons, the other contends 
that it inappropriately offers different reasons to different members of the community. 
I suggest, then, that these two critiques warrant distinct consideration. We should 
ask, first, if punishment aimed at deterrence communicates a different message to (or 
provides different reasons to, or in some other way excludes) criminals from the political 
community generally; and second, if the reasons such a system of punishment offers for 
complying with the law are themselves the wrong sort of reasons to offer fellow members 
of the political community. I consider each of these critiques in turn and contend that, 
ultimately, each fails. A system of punishment aimed at deterrence communicates the 
same message to everyone in the political community, thus it does not implicitly exclude 
anyone. Furthermore, a deterrent system of punishment is compatible with demonstrating 
appropriate respect to all members of the community as members who share (or should 
share, and can come to share) the community’s fundamental moral values. 
 
III. Is deterrent punishment exclusionary? 
The first objection evident in Duff’s account is that a system of punishment aimed 
solely at deterrence implicitly excludes offenders from their community. It treats 
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 One might respond that such a system of punishment would then be exclusionary of everyone. But if 
everyone is excluded, then we must ask, excluded from what? Duff’s point is that deterrent punishments 
exclude offenders from their community, but if all community members (law abider and offender alike) 
were excluded, then it is not clear what community would remain for those excluded to be excluded from. 
Thus central to the charge that deterrent punishment excludes certain community members is the claim that 
it treats some (the excluded) differently from others (the included). 
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offenders as the “they” against whom “we,” the law-abiding members of the community, 
must protect ourselves. Thus it fails to treat offenders with appropriate respect. Given 
Duff’s conception of the criminal law as a fundamentally communicative enterprise, the 
worry with deterrent punishment is that, insofar as it offers the offender only prudential 
reasons why she should not have committed, say, theft or tax evasion, it fails to 
communicate with her as (still) a member of the community. A more appropriate message 
to a community member would appeal to the moral reasons that her act was wrong, 
namely, that such acts violate important moral values that the community shares (and 
thus that she, as a member of the community, should also share). 
The thrust of the “exclusion” objection to deterrent punishment, then, is that once 
a member of the community commits a crime, the criminal law stops talking to her as it 
talks to law abiders, to whom it offers appropriate, moral reasons not to violate the law; 
instead, it begins to talk with her in the language of mere prudence, as though this is the 
only language she is capable of understanding. As such, it inappropriately excludes her 
from membership in her community. 
One might understandably be tempted to respond here that the offender, in 
committing her crime, essentially excludes herself from membership in the community 
— or at least, that she demonstrates that she does not share the community’s moral values. 
If so, then it may seem appropriate for a system of punishment to communicate to her 
solely in the language of prudence rather than in the language of the community’s moral 
values. Duff rejects this argument, however, for several reasons, the most persuasive of 
which is that it is empirically dubious. Often, criminal acts are not evidence that 
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offenders have no regard for the community’s moral values, but rather “that their regard 
is not wholehearted, or consistent, or always sufficient to overcome the temptations of 
self-interest. They — or rather we, since these comments surely apply to many of us — 
are not wholly deaf to the law’s moral appeal, though we do not attend to it carefully or 
consistently enough”18 Duff is right to caution against assuming that an individual’s 
criminal act is evidence of a complete rejection, or lack of regard, for the community’s 
values. 
There is a more fundamental problem, however, with the claim that deterrent 
punishment somehow communicates to offenders differently from law abiders, and thus 
excludes offenders from the political community. The message communicated by a 
system of punishment aimed at deterrence essentially takes the form of a threat: If you 
commit some criminal act, then you will be liable to have some form of suffering 
inflicted on you. It is important to consider, however, to whom this message is 
communicated. For deterrent punishment to be exclusionary, to create the sort of “we-
they” dichotomy that concerns Duff, it would have to be the case that a system of 
deterrent punishment communicates one (prudential) message only to criminal offenders, 
and that law abiders, by contrast, receive another (moral) appeal that is appropriate to 
members of the political community. 
But this is doubly wrong. First, a system of deterrent punishment communicates 
its prudential message, its threat, to everyone. For those who have not committed a crime, 
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the prospect of punishment offers reasons not to do so (i.e., it acts as a general deterrent). 
For those who do commit crimes, their punishments — or more specifically, the 
unpleasant prospect of another term of punishment in the future — provide reasons not to 
recidivate (i.e., they act as a special deterrent). From the perspective of deterrent 
punishment, then, everyone is a potential offender (or reoffender), and such a system of 
punishment communicates the same prudential message to everyone. Therefore, second, 
if law abiders do receive the moral appeal that Duff believes is appropriate to members of 
the political community, the source of this appeal is not the system of deterrent 
punishment. Rather, the moral appeal must come from somewhere else, such as perhaps 
the criminal laws themselves. But if it is the criminal laws that communicate the moral 
message, that declare certain actions to be morally condemned by the community, the 
intended audience of this communication is everyone, law abider and offender alike. 
Thus it is not the case that, in receiving the prudential message of a deterrent system of 
punishment, offenders are treated differently from others in the community, who are 
exclusive recipients of the moral message. It appears that deterrent punishment is not 
essentially exclusionary in the way Duff indicates. 
There are other ways, of course, in which existing penal practices tend to exclude 
offenders from the community. Imprisonment, by its nature, removes offenders 
physically from the larger community. Beyond this, prisoners are typically excluded from 
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participation in the political process, most obviously by being denied the vote.19 Also, 
offenders are excluded from access to basic financial services (bank accounts, credit, 
insurance), not only during their incarceration but often, in practice, even after their 
release.20 These and other forms of exclusion should be troubling to members of a liberal 
political community who are concerned to treat individuals, even offenders, with respect 
as autonomous moral agents. But notice that such forms of exclusion are not distinctively 
characteristic of systems of punishment aimed at deterrence (and constrained in the ways 
suggested earlier). Because punishment involves the restriction of offenders’ liberties in 
ways that law abiders’ liberties are not restricted, issues of exclusion will always arise. 
But such issues are not distinctive of systems of punishment aimed at deterrence. Rather 
than communicating differently to offenders and law abiders, and thus perpetuating the 
“we-they” distinction that concerns Duff, systems of punishment aimed at deterrence 
regard everyone equally as potential offenders, and thus they communicate the same 
message, namely, if you commit a crime, then you will be liable to be harmed. I conclude, 
then, that punishment aimed at deterrence is not exclusionary as Duff charges. 
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 In the United States, only Maine and Vermont allow incarcerated felons to vote. A number of states go 
further than this, imposing a lifetime ban on voting for anyone with a felony conviction, even those who 
have served their sentences. 
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 See Gaynor Pengelly, “Give prisoners bank accounts,” This is Money, 25 October 2010, online at 
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IV. Does deterrent punishment offer the wrong sort of reasons for compliance? 
Given that deterrent punishment communicates the same reasons to everyone, the 
question then becomes whether these reasons are appropriate. Duff contends that they are 
not. He writes, “The criminal law of a liberal polity, and the criminal process of trial and 
conviction to which offenders are subjected, are communicative enterprises that address 
the citizens, as rational moral agents, in the normative language of the community’s 
values.”21 And the institution of punishment, a constitutive element of the institution of 
criminal law generally, must similarly communicate in moral rather than prudential terms. 
A system of punishment aimed at deterring criminals, however, aims to secure general 
compliance with the law by means of a threat, rather than by moral appeal. Thus Hegel 
famously objected: “To base a justification of punishment on threat is to liken it to the act 
of a man who lifts his stick to a dog. It is to treat a man like a dog instead of with the 
freedom and respect due to him as a man.”22 Like Hegel, Duff worries that the prudential 
terms in which deterrent punishment communicates with community members, the 
prudential reasons it gives them to comply with the community’s laws, are not the sort of 
reasons that are appropriate to offer to autonomous members of a liberal political 
community, who endorse (or could come to endorse) the community’s moral values. 
I offer a couple of responses to this worry. First, punishment may communicate a 
prudential message to community members without communicating a solely prudential 
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message. In my view, the good of punishment, the reason we should want such an 
institution, is that it plays a key role in ensuring the well-being of community members. 
Thus the proper aim of punishment is to prevent or reduce crimes by offering potential 
wrongdoers reasons not to offend. Punishment may serve this aim by supplying potential 
offenders with prudential reasons not to offend (reasons such as the desire to avoid the 
harms characteristic of incarceration, etc.), but it may also provide moral reasons. As is 
commonly recognized, punishment involves not only what Joel Feinberg called a “hard 
treatment” aspect but also an expressive aspect — punishment expresses the 
community’s condemnation of the offender for her criminal act.23 Even before the 
commission of a crime, however, the threat of punishment also expresses the 
community’s condemnation not of a particular offender but rather of the offense itself. If 
a potential offender receives and accepts this message of condemnation, it may play a 
role in persuading her not to do what she otherwise would have done. If so, then even if 
the fear of punitive suffering also played a role in dissuading her, I suggest that she is 
treated with the respect due to her as a moral person. Thus even if a system of 
punishment’s central aim is to provide prudential reasons for compliance, this does not 
preclude its also providing moral reasons. 
Second, even if a system of punishment did provide solely prudential reasons to 
comply with the law, this doesn’t show that the criminal legal system more generally fails 
to communicate with community members as moral persons. I agree with Duff that the 
                                                 
23
 Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory 
of Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 95-118. 
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criminal law should appeal to citizens as moral agents who share (or should share, and 
can come to share) the community’s values. But punishment is only one aspect of the 
criminal legal system. Suppose we grant, then, that a community through its criminal 
statutes declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community 
members to comply, whereas trials and convictions communicate a message of deserved 
moral censure to the wrongdoer, and they urge the wrongdoer “to understand and accept 
the censure as justified … .”24 Why, then, must punishment also make a moral appeal? 
Why is it inappropriate for the institution of punishment to communicate a solely 
prudential message? 
First, one might argue that the criminal legal system must be univocal in the 
message it communicates to community members, and that this message must be a moral 
rather than a prudential one. Thus the institution of punishment, as one element of the 
criminal law generally, must communicate a moral message. It’s not clear why this 
should be so, however. We can grant, with Duff, that the criminal legal institution should 
communicate a moral message to community members while still (a) recognizing that 
distinct elements of the institution can communicate different messages, (b) maintaining 
that the criminal statutes themselves, and perhaps the process of trial and conviction, 
sufficiently communicate the moral message, and thus (c) denying that punishment must 
communicate this same message. Notice, too, that if the entire criminal legal system must 
be univocal in its moral message, much more than deterrent punishment would be 
                                                 
24
 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 80. 
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prohibited. The practice of plea bargaining, for one, would appear unjustifiable if 
prudential appeals are inappropriate in criminal law. More reasonable, I suggest, is to 
claim that the criminal law should address community members in moral terms, and in 
fact that the moral message should be central, but that as long as this moral message is 
present, prudential appeals also have an appropriate role. 
A second possible response is that whereas the criminal law need not, in principle, 
communicate only a moral message, the prudential message of deterrent punishment is 
inappropriate in practice because it tends to drown out the moral message. That is, 
perhaps the threat of punishment is so powerful that it tends to focus community 
members’ attention on the prudential reasons not to commit crimes and cause them to 
lose sight of the moral appeal. Andrew von Hirsch, who conceives of punishment as 
offering prudential reasons to supplement the (sometimes insufficiently motivating) 
moral reasons supplied by the criminal law, advocates a “decremental strategy” according 
to which prescribed sentences would be reduced gradually to levels at which the 
prudential reasons they offered would not drown out the moral reasons for compliance 
with the laws.25 Duff is skeptical of such a strategy, however, as he believes that 
sentences mild enough so as not to overwhelm the moral message with the prudential 
threat would be too mild to achieve much deterrent effect at all, whereas by contrast, 
                                                 
25
 Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1996), chapter 5. 
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sentences sufficiently severe to provide any genuine deterrent effect would replace, rather 
than merely supplement, the moral appeal.26 
I suggest that this worry, that the prudential appeal of deterrent punishment may 
drown out the moral message of the criminal law generally, inaccurately depicts the 
relationship of the moral and prudential appeals. Rather than accepting that a stronger 
prudential message will tend to weaken the moral message comparatively, why not 
acknowledge that the prudential threat actually can reinforce the moral appeal? Granted, 
an institution of punishment aimed at deterrence provides prudential reasons to comply 
with the community’s laws. But the existence of such an institution also invites us to 
consider, or remind ourselves, why our community believes that these laws, and the 
interests they protect, are of sufficient moral weight that we are willing to invoke the 
threat of hard treatment to help ensure that they are not violated. Rather than drowning 
out the moral message of the criminal law, as Duff fears — the message that certain acts 
are prohibited because society regards them as significant moral violations — deterrent 
punishment can reinforce this message, as it underscores that protecting community 
members from such violations is sufficiently important to warrant the infliction of harm 
as a response. 
The prudential message of deterrent punishment, therefore, is compatible with the 
criminal law’s nevertheless communicating a moral appeal to community members, and 
thus with respecting them as autonomous moral agents. On one hand, a system of 
                                                 
26
 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 88. 
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punishment aimed at deterrence may nevertheless provide moral as well as prudential 
reasons for compliance. On the other hand, even if punishment itself provides only 
prudential reasons, the criminal legal system need not be univocal. As long as the moral 
message is communicated prominently (by the laws themselves and the process of trial 
and conviction), respect for persons does not require that the institution of punishment 
communicate in moral terms. I conclude, then, that this third articulation of the respect-
based objection fails. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In closing, it’s worth emphasizing again the scope of the defense of deterrence 
that I have offered here. Specifically, I have not aimed to defend deterrence as sufficient 
to ground a complete justification of punishment. Rather, my focus has been on 
deterrence as the aim of punishment, constrained by certain considerations such as the 
retributivist principles against punishing the innocent or excessively punishing the guilty. 
Critics of deterrence, such as Murphy and Duff, claim that even as one element of this 
sort of hybrid account of punishment, deterrence is objectionable because it fails to treat 
individuals with appropriate respect as autonomous moral agents. I have contended, 
however, that on what I take to be the three most plausible articulations of this critique, it 
nonetheless fails. Constrained in certain ways, then, I conclude that deterrence is a 
permissible aim of punishment.27
                                                 
27
 I am grateful to Larry May, Christopher Heath Wellman, and David Wood for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Retributivism as a constraint on punishment 
 
I claimed in the chapter 2 that deterrence is a legitimate aim of punishment if we 
accept certain constraints to ensure that particular impositions of punishment are 
consistent with respect for moral persons. In this chapter and chapter 4, I focus on what 
sort of constraints are warranted. An ostensible virtue of retributivism is that it entails 
intuitively compelling limitations on punishments, namely, that only the guilty may be 
punished and that punishments should be no more severe than is deserved as a response 
to the crime (viz., punishment should fit the crime). Proponents of such a constraint 
worry that punishment grounded purely in consequentialist considerations such as 
deterrence may not have the resources to rule out punishment of the innocent or excessive 
punishment of the guilty, insofar as there could be cases in which such punishment would 
promote the best overall consequences. In Kantian terms, the retributivist constraints are 
intended to ensure that those punished are treated with respect as moral persons. These 
constraints are viewed by many legal theorists and practitioners not only as necessary to 
ensure that those punished are appropriated respected, but also as sufficient. 
My focus in what follows is on the second retributivist constraint, that punishment 
should be no more severe than is deserved. Critics of retributivism point to its notorious 
inability to make sense of the notion of desert, or of a punishment’s fitting a crime. Many 
see it as a fatal flaw of retributivism that it doesn’t have the resources to provide guidance 
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about what punishments are deserved for various crimes. Russ Shafer-Landau, for 
instance, writes: 
I do not believe that we can make sense of commensurating 
punishment with moral desert. If we can’t, then the 
commensurability thesis [that sentencing guidelines are 
morally justified if and only if they assign punishments 
commensurate with moral desert] is false. And if the 
commensurability thesis if false, so too is retributivism.
1
 
In this chapter, I argue that the retributivist principle is indeed insufficient to 
ensure adequate constraints on punishment — in particular, it is unable to provide 
sufficient protection against overly harsh punishment. But this is not, at least not 
primarily, for the reason that critics such as Shafer-Landau suggest. On the contrary, 
considerations of moral desert may ground genuinely useful, albeit imperfect, guidance in 
sentencing determinations. The more serious problem with retributivism is that, even if it 
could provide definitive guidance regarding what punishment is morally deserved for a 
given crime, in some cases this punishment will nevertheless strike many as too severe. 
What treatment an offender morally deserves all things considered will often depend on 
more factors than those on which retributivism focuses: the seriousness of a person’s 
crime and her degree of responsibility for it. Retributivism itself provides no basis for 
taking considerations other than these into account in determining how a political 
authority should punish. Thus retributivism is insufficient as a constraint on punishment. 
                                                 
1 Russ Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2000): 189-214, on 
p. 190. 
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Insofar as we are concerned to treat even offenders as ends in themselves, some 
additional constraint(s) will be warranted.  
In section I, I flesh out the retributivist constraint and examine the objection often 
raised against retributivism that there is no adequate way to determine what punishment 
is morally deserved for a given crime. I focus on Shafer-Landau’s particularly thorough 
development of the objection, which, using an argument by elimination, concludes that 
there is no fact of the matter about what punishment an offender deserves for a crime. 
Thus his account includes not only the epistemological claim that we cannot know what 
punishment a given crime morally deserves, but also the metaethical claim that there is 
no fact of the matter to be known. In section II, after briefly taking issue with the 
metaethical claim, I turn my focus to the epistemological worry: Given the inevitable, 
apparently irresolvable disagreements about what punishments are morally deserved in 
various cases, is the retributivist injunction on punishments that exceed what is deserved 
essentially useless as a practical constraint on sentencing determinations? In response, I 
contend that we may (at least if we reject nihilism about moral desert) believe this 
retributivist constraint has some value insofar as (a) it may provide some guidance as a 
general moral principle from which particular moral judgments may be, albeit 
imperfectly, inferred, and (b) it ensures that desert, rather than various consequentialist 
considerations, is the target in determining sentences. The deeper problem with the 
retributivist constraint, however, lies in retributivism’s overly narrow criteria in 
determining what response a wrongdoer morally deserves. In section III, I contend that to 
treat offenders with respect as moral persons, it is not sufficient that we ensure that their 
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punishments fit their crimes. Respect requires some additional, nonretributivist 
constraint(s) on punishment. Defending such a constraint is my project in chapter 4. 
 
I. The retributivist constraint, and the standard objection 
Theorists who endorse the retributivist constraint that punishments should be only 
to the degree morally deserved (no excessive punishment)2 see it as a valuable check on a 
political authority’s ability to impose overly harsh sentences to further some 
consequentialist goal. Two features of this constraint are worth noting. First, as typically 
endorsed — viz., punishments may be only as severe as is morally deserved — this 
constraint is sometimes referred to as a negative retributivist principle, and it is contrasted 
with the positive retributivist view that punishments should be no more or less than is 
morally deserved.
3
 Negative retributivism (sometimes called minimalism) thus differs 
from positive retributivism in that the former, but not the latter, could permit punishment 
less severe than is believed to be deserved. For instance, J. Angelo Corlett endorses 
negative retributivism and suggests as reasons for decreased punishment of the guilty, 
“plea bargaining for the sake of securing stronger punishments for greater offenders who 
deserve it, or simply not punishing minor offenses so that limited resources can be 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 62-63; James 
Sterba, “Retributive Justice,” Political Theory 3 (August 1977): 349-362; David Wood, “Reductivism, 
Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders,” Utilitas 9:1 (1997): 131-146, esp. p. 132; 
and J. Angelo Corlett, “Making Sense of Retributivism,” Philosophy 76:295 (Jan. 2001): 77-110.  
3 C.f., J. L. Mackie, “Morality and the Retributive Emotions,” Criminal Justice Ethics (1982): 3-10; R. A. 
Duff and David Garland, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 7-8; R. A. 
Duff, “Legal Punishment,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008), at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (accessed Sept. 8, 2008); and John Cottingham, 
“Varieties of Retribution,” The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 238-46, at pp. 240-42. 
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focused on more important wrongdoings.”4 Much of the popularity of the negative 
retributivist constraint is that this constraint prohibits excessive punishment but also 
allows for the intuitively attractive possibility that the mitigation of punishment may, in 
some cases, be justified. The negative retributivist constraint is thus widely endorsed, 
both by those (such as Corlett) who offer purely retributivist accounts of punishment and 
also those (such as Ross and Hart) who endorse a consequentialist aim for punishment as 
well as nonconsequentialist constraints.5 
Second, the requirement that offenders should be punished only to the extent they 
deserve is best understood as a claim about moral rather than legal desert. It’s true that, in 
speaking of what punishment a criminal deserves, one might refer solely to the legally 
deserved punishment, i.e., the punishment (or range of punishments) authorized by 
sentencing guidelines. But this is no help if what we trying to determine is whether the 
legally sanctioned sentences are themselves justified. The existence in some society of a 
law according to which the offense of jaywalking is punishable by death would not 
convince most of us that jaywalkers in such a society therefore deserve to die; rather, 
most of us would feel that the law is unjust. What the retributivist needs, then, is an 
account of moral desert, not merely legal desert. As Ted Honderich writes, “We get no 
conceivable moral justification for punishment, no obligation or permission to punish, 
                                                 
4
 J. Angelo Corlett, “Making Sense of Retributivism,” Philosophy 76:295 (Jan. 2001): 77-110, on p. 78, fn. 
7. 
5
 Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 56-64; H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-13. 
  
 
78 
from the fact that an act was against a law, no matter how wrong or useless or disastrous 
the law, no matter the worth of the whole body of law of which it is part.”6 
A common objection to the claim that punishment should be only as severe as is 
morally deserved, and in fact to retributivism in general, is that there is no apparent way 
to determine what punishment a given crime morally deserves. Those who would try to 
link an offense directly to some punishment it deserves will face the problem of 
explaining in what respect, in virtue of what, the punishment is deserved. Those who 
would instead attempt first to rank crimes from least serious to most serious, and then to 
map this ordinal ranking onto sentences that similarly run from least severe to most 
severe, do not avoid the problem. Such accounts would need not only an explanation of 
why one crime merits more severe punishment than another, but also of how to map the 
ordinal ranking of crimes onto the penalty schedule. For a retributivist, these questions 
will all need to be answered in terms of moral desert, but again, it’s unclear how desert 
should be understood to link crimes and punishments.
7
 Shafer-Landau describes the 
problem this way: 
                                                 
6
 Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 23. 
7
 Among those who have cited concerns about retributivists’ inability to settle questions of moral desert, 
either directly or as part of a proportional mapping of punishments onto crimes, are S.I. Benn, “An 
Approach to the Problem of Punishment,” Philosophy 33:127 (Oct. 1958): 335-37; Edmund L. Pincoffs, 
“Are Questions of Desert Decidable?” in J.B. Cederblom and William L. Blizek, eds., Justice and 
Punishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 75-88, esp. pp. 84-86; Hugo Adam 
Bedau, “Retribution and the Theory of Punishment,” The Journal of Philosophy 75:11 (Nov. 1978): 601-
20, on pp. 610-15; Andrew Ashworth, “Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences,” Criminal Law Review 
(1989): 340-55, on pp. 344-46; Michael Tonry, “Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of 
Punishments,” in R. A. Duff and David Garland, eds., A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 145-51; and Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited, pp. 36-41.  
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If the commensurability thesis is true, and if legal 
punishment can be morally justified, then there must be 
some sanction or range of sanctions that a criminal morally 
deserves for his conduct. But consider some standard cases 
and see the difficulty for yourself: how much suffering is 
morally deserved for one who impersonates an officer, or 
counterfeits currency, or hijacks an airplane, or batters a 
child? … [There] does not appear to be any way to know 
whether the impersonator morally deserves eighty, eight 
hundred or eight thousand days behind bars, or even 
whether some amount of jail time is the appropriate kind of 
punishment to impose in the first place. We can allow for 
some indeterminacy in the sentencing correlations, but at 
some point we must ask whether moral desert is giving us 
any guidance at all.
8
  
. Although the critique of retributivism for its inability to settle questions of moral 
desert is quite common, Shafer-Landau’s essay is distinctive, as far as I can tell, in that it 
not only cites this difficulty, but thoroughly illustrates how the difficulty arises for the 
various versions of retributivism. He sets about an argument by elimination, as he 
considers and rejects a number of retributivist attempts to answer the question of what 
punishment a crime morally deserves. Here I consider five of the more prominent of 
these (which, I take it, are sufficient to demonstrate the general problem for retributivists 
in determining moral desert): (1) punishment should be equal in kind to the crime; or (2) 
it should inflict equal suffering; or (3) it should be a product of the seriousness of the 
crime multiplied by the offender’s degree of responsibility; (4) it should correct the unfair 
advantage gained by the perpetrator; or (5) it should communicate public condemnation 
of the crime. 
                                                 
8
 Ibid.  
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First, there is the famous law of retribution, lex talionis, often expressed as “an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” which holds that a criminal should receive treatment 
equal in kind to that which she inflicted on her victim. Kant famously endorses lex 
talionis in his Doctrine of Right, where, discussing the appropriate amount and kind of 
punishment for a given crime, he writes: “whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon 
another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult 
yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike 
yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.”
9
 As Shafer-Landau points out, problems with 
this sort of strict interpretation of lex talionis quickly become apparent.
10
 For many 
offenses, an in-kind response is impossible, either because there is no clear victim (e.g., 
many cases of reckless endangerment); the harm is spread over numerous victims, each 
of whom is only negligibly harmed (e.g., tax fraud, or vandalism of public property); or 
the perpetrator is in a relevantly different situation from her victim (e.g., kidnapping by a 
childless person). Thus this strict interpretation of the law of retribution, according to 
which crimes deserve punishment that is equal in kind, seems implausible in many cases. 
Attempts to modify lex talionis to address these concerns do not fare much better. 
For instance, some have argued that the principle is best interpreted not as endorsing an 
in-kind response, but rather punishment that inflicts an equal amount of suffering on the 
                                                 
9
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:332. In Mary J. Gregor, trans. and ed., The Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All 
citations to the Metaphysics of Morals are to this edition. 
10
 Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” p. 193.  
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criminal as her crime inflicted on the victim(s).11 But as Shafer-Landau indicates, this 
version of the law of retribution encounters similar problems to the equal-in-kind 
version.
12
 How much suffering is deserved, for instance, for reckless endangerment, or 
for tax fraud? Further, how do we make interpersonal comparisons of suffering? Also, for 
both the above interpretations of lex talionis, in which desert is wholly determined by the 
harm done to the victim, there seems no room for consideration of mens rea (criminal 
intent), although intent is typically held to be directly relevant to sentencing decisions. 
A third sort of retributivist answer, offered by Robert Nozick, attempts to deal 
with the mens rea concern by explicitly building considerations of responsibility into his 
account of moral desert.
13
 Essentially, on Nozick’s account, we determine desert by 
multiplying an offender’s degree of responsibility for an offense, r, by the wrongness of 
the offense, H. On this formula, the value of r may range from 1 (full responsibility) to 0 
(no responsibility), and the value of H “is a measure of the wrongness or harm, done or 
intended, of the act.”14 Thus an offender deserves punishment proportionate to H when he 
is fully responsible for his crime (1 x H = H), he deserves no punishment when he is not 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Jeffrey Reiman, “Justice, Civilization and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 115-48, esp. p. 125. 
12 Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert, pp. 193-94.  
13 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 
363-97. 
14
 Ibid., p. 363. 
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at all responsible (0 x H = 0), and “otherwise punishment is discounted by (because 
multiplied by) the person’s intermediate degree of responsibility.”15 
Nozick’s account improves on the two previous accounts insofar as it 
acknowledges the role of responsibility in determining moral desert. Still, this account 
still doesn’t provide definitive guidance in sentencing. After all, it’s unclear how we are 
to quantify the person’s responsibility, r, in any of the intermediate stages between full 
and no responsibility. Similarly, Nozick provides no adequate account of how to 
determine degrees of wrongness, H. He indicates only that the H-value for an offense 
should be whichever is greater, “the amount of disutility the victim reasonably could have 
been expected to undergo, [or] the amount of disutility the perpetrator would (reasonably 
be expected to?) undergo from that same act.”16 Even if we find this claim compelling in 
principle, it offers no guidance in how to measure disutility, or for that matter, what 
would count as a reasonable expectation. So it is unclear on Nozick’s view how to 
determine values for r or H, and because r and H are his determinants of moral desert, 
this account cannot avoid the objection that it offers insufficient guidance in determining 
moral desert. 
A fourth retributivist account, which I discussed in chapter 1, is the fair play 
view.
17
 According to the standard articulation of this view, the wrong to be redressed by 
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid., p. 365. 
17
 Note that the nonstandard version of the fair play view that I defended in chapter 1 was not a retributivist 
account. Among the most prominent articulations of this view as a retributivist justification of punishment 
are Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist 52 (1968): 475-501, and Jeffrie Murphy, 
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punishment is a wrong against society generally. Essentially, the idea is that we all 
benefit from our society’s laws, which protect against interferences with our liberties; but 
along with this benefit comes the corresponding responsibility to refrain from breaking 
these laws. A criminal, like other members of society, benefits from the general 
obedience to laws, but she fails to reciprocate by obeying the laws herself. By failing to 
restrain herself appropriately, she gains an additional degree of liberty, an unfair 
advantage over the rest of society (in a sense, she becomes a free rider), and the 
justification of punishment is that it corrects this unfair advantage by inflicting harm on 
the offender proportionate to the benefit she gained by committing her crime. 
This version of retributivism aims to avoid the problems of the earlier versions 
with determining punishment deserved where there is no clear victim; on the reciprocity 
view, punishment is a response not to a specific harm done to some specific victim(s), but 
rather to an unfair advantage taken against society. Reciprocity theories still face two 
significant problems, however: First, as has been commonly noted, it is counterintuitive 
to think of the wrong perpetrated by, e.g., a rapist as a sort of free-riding wrong against 
society in general, rather than an egregious wrong perpetrated against the victim. Second, 
even if we grant that the relevant harm to be addressed by punishment is the additional 
liberty unfairly enjoyed by the offender, how are we to determine the deserved 
punishment, which on this account would be the punishment sufficient to offset, or 
nullify, the criminal’s unfair advantage? What degree of unfair advantage over society, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1978), esp. pp. 82-115 and 223-49. 
For a useful critical discussion of reciprocity theories, see M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and 
Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6:1 (1987): 25-51, on pp. 27-38. 
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how much additional liberty, is gained by, e.g., a child molester? And what type and 
degree of punishment would be sufficient to offset the unfair advantage?
18
 Ultimately, 
it’s not clear that the fair play view gets us much closer to an answer to the moral desert 
question than do the other retributivist efforts. 
A fifth, increasingly popular retributivist answer to the question of how much 
punishment is deserved is offered by the retributivist strain of communicative theories. 
Communicative theorists contend that punishment is justified insofar as it is expresses a 
message of public moral condemnation, or censure. Typically, modern communicative 
theories incorporate a retributivist element: the condemnatory message is justified 
because it is morally deserved.
19
 In particular, Shafer-Landau focuses on a retributive-
communicative view espoused by Jean Hampton, according to which the wrongness of 
crimes is that they demean their victims, or communicate a message of their victims’ 
inferiority. Thus punishment is justified insofar as it sends a contrasting, nullifying 
                                                 
18 Perhaps the most sustained, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to answer these questions is offered by 
Michael Davis. See, e.g., “How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” Ethics 93 (July 1983): 726-52; and 
“Using the Market to Measure Deserved Punishment: A Final Defense,” in Davis, ed., To Make the 
Punishment Fit the Crime: Essays in the Theory of Criminal Justice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), pp. 
234-53. For objections to Davis’ account, see Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” pp. 206-07; and 
David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 
129-35. 
19 On other censure theories, the message communicated by punishment may be justified on nonretributivist 
grounds. Emile Durkheim offers an account on which the message communicated by punishment is 
justified insofar as it promotes social solidarity (Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. G. 
Simpson (New York City: The Free Press, 1964)). An account by A.C. Ewing claims that punishment is 
justified as a valuable communication that morally educates the public (Ewing, “Punishment as Moral 
Agency: An Attempt to Reconcile the Retributive and the Utilitarian View,” Mind 36:143 (July 1927): 292-
305). 
  
 
85 
message to victim and perpetrator, a message that affirms their equal status.
20
 Like the 
views discussed above, however, Hampton’s retributivist-communicative theory faces 
difficulties in determining what manner and degree of punishment is deserved in cases 
with no clear victims. Also, even in cases with clear victims, it’s not clear that the 
relevant feature of such crimes, the wrong that deserves to be punished, is that they 
demean their victims, or express their inferiority. Shafer-Landau points out that, e.g., 
thieves or embezzlers need not feel superiority over their victims, and in any case this 
doesn’t seem to be what is centrally wrong about such crimes.21 
Other retributivist-communicative accounts may fare better on some of these 
points. For example, a Kantian account offered by M. Margaret Falls contends that 
punishment is justified in that it respects wrongdoers by holding them morally 
accountable for their crimes, and that holding offenders accountable requires that 
sentences should “appropriately communicate the state’s condemnation of the criminal’s 
deed.”
22
 Falls’ account determines the proper communication of condemnation in terms 
of what would hold the offender appropriately accountable, rather than what would 
reaffirm the victim’s equal status, thus it seems less susceptible to Shafer-Landau’s worry 
about determining desert in cases with no clear victims. Nevertheless, Falls’ account 
                                                 
20 Jean Hampton, “A New Theory of Retribution,” in C. Morris and R. Frey, eds., Liability and 
Responsibility (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 377-414, esp. pp. 400-05. 
Hampton believed her view captured what Hegel had in mind when he famously wrote that punishment 
“annuls the crime.” She wrote, “Of course it can’t annul the act itself, but it can annul the false evidence 
seemingly provided by the wrongdoing of the relative worth of the victim and the wrongdoer” (p. 403). 
21
 Shafer-Landau’s discussion of Hampton’s view is in “Retributivism and Desert,” pp. 195-97. 
22 Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” p. 45. 
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ultimately fares no better than Hampton’s in terms of offering definitive sentencing 
guidance. For Hampton, the unanswered question is what mode and degree of 
punishment properly nullifies the demeaning message sent by, e.g., the rapist or the 
armed robber. For Falls, the unanswered question is what mode and degree of 
punishment properly holds the rapist, the armed robber, etc., morally accountable for his 
act. Whichever the question, retributivist-communicative accounts appear unable to 
provide a clear, specific answer. 
Shafer-Landau considers several other retributivist accounts but finds them all 
ultimately inadequate in providing concrete guidance regarding morally deserved 
sentences. Given the inability of these various retributivist accounts to provide genuine 
guidance regarding the question of sentencing, what mode and degree of punishment is 
morally deserved, Shafer-Landau concludes that we have good reason to endorse nihilism 
about moral desert, according to which “there is no fact of the matter about what 
sanction(s) a wrongdoer morally deserves for his offense.”23 If nihilism about moral 
desert is true, he contends, then the retributivist thesis that punishments should be 
commensurate with moral desert is false. In the following section, I first briefly suggest 
reasons to reject his nihilist thesis. Even if nihilism about moral desert is false, however, 
so that there is some fact of the matter about what punishments are deserved for what 
crimes, one might wonder how much this helps if we do not, perhaps cannot, know this 
truth about moral desert. Thus my main task in the following section is to consider 
                                                 
23 Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” p. 191.  
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whether this epistemological hurdle fatally undermines the practical use of retributivist 
considerations for our sentencing determinations. 
 
II. Two ways the retributivist constraint may still be useful 
Shafer-Landau concludes, based on the inability of retributivist accounts to give a 
satisfactory answer to the question of how much punishment is deserved for a given 
crime, that there is no answer to this question, because there is no fact of the matter about 
moral desert. It’s worth noting, however, that our persistent uncertainty about moral 
desert is also consistent with the conclusion that there is a truth about moral desert (a 
truth that either exists objectively, i.e., moral realism, or has its grounding in the views, 
whether actual or somehow idealized, of human beings, i.e., moral constructivism).24 My 
intent here is not to dive headlong into the interesting metaethical debate between those 
who believe there are moral truths and those who do not. Indeed, I’m not sure how such a 
debate could be ultimately settled, given that our current situation of moral uncertainty is 
compatible with nihilism as well as with either realism or constructivism. But it is worth 
pointing out that the claim that there are moral truths fits more neatly with our 
pretheoretical intuitions. When we say that, e.g., the murderer got the punishment he 
deserved, we certainly speak as if there is a fact of the matter about moral desert (notice 
that even those who may disagree about what is deserved in such a case will each tend to 
speak as if there is a fact of the matter about desert). Our intuitions tend to be particularly 
                                                 
24
 Ironically, Shafer-Landau himself provides a particularly compelling, sustained defense of moral realism, 
in his aptly titled Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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strong when we move to either side of the spectrum, to cases in which we believe the 
punishment was not what was deserved, but rather was either clearly deficient (e.g., a 
corporate polluter that received a proverbial slap on the wrist
25) or clearly excessive (e.g., 
a group of students severely caned for littering
26). Appeals to intuition obviously won’t 
disprove nihilism about moral desert, but my aim here is just to point out that, based on 
our current inability to settle the question of what punishment a given crime deserves, we 
need not conclude that there is no answer to this question. There may be some 
punishment or range of punishments that is deserved in each case, some truth about moral 
desert. 
Even if there actually is in each case a correct answer to the question of what 
punishment is morally deserved for a crime, it nevertheless remains true that we have 
been unable to pin down with any certainty what those deserved punishments are. As a 
practical matter, then, a question persists as to whether the retributivist constraint on 
excessive (i.e., undeserved) punishments has any useful role to play in sentencing 
determinations. I suggest two ways in which this constraint can be seen as genuinely 
useful, albeit insufficient. 
First, note that the difficulty Shafer-Landau and others point out is essentially one 
of deriving specific guidance, in particular instances, from some general moral 
principle(s). The general moral principle at issue is that one should not be punished in 
                                                 
25
 C.f., Fanny Carrier, “Top U.S. court slashes Exxon Valdez oil damages,” Agence France Presse, 25 June 
2008.  
26
 C.f., Sulok Tawie, “Now, case of excessive caning by teacher,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), 23 July 
2007.  
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excess of what she deserves, but the difficulty comes in trying to determine what this 
general principle implies in specific cases. Understood this way, it becomes clear that the 
problem is not one unique to moral desert. (Consider, for instance, the difficulty in trying 
to determine what constitutes a just distribution of societal resources.) In fact, the 
problem will arise whenever we try to move from general moral ideals, principles, or 
obligations to moral judgments in particular cases. 
W. D. Ross discusses this problem in his well-known account of prima facie 
duties.
27
 Ross endorses a pluralistic normative ethical theory; on his account, we 
intuitively recognize a number of prima facie moral duties, some consequentialist but 
also several nonconsequentialist. On Ross’ account, these are duties of fidelity, 
reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and nonmaleficence.28 These 
various duties are prima facie in the sense that they may be overridden in certain cases, 
but they will nevertheless continue to be recognized as duties. So we have, for example, a 
prima facie duty to keep our promises (fidelity), but there may be certain circumstances 
in which, for instance, our prima facie duty of beneficence overrides the duty of fidelity. I 
promise to meet you for lunch, but as I drive along the lakeside drive to meet you, I 
notice a child drowning and am in a position to help. My duty to help the child overrides 
my duty to keep my promise to you, and so my all-things-considered obligation is to stop 
                                                 
27 Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 16-47.  
28
 Ibid., pp. 21-22.  
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and try to save the child (even though I still recognize my broken promise to you as a 
duty that I did not fulfill). 
Ross’ account is irreducibly pluralistic; any of his seven basic, prima facie duties 
may override any others in the right circumstances. The question arises, then, of how we 
are to draw guidance from these general obligations in particular cases; how do we 
weight them, and thus determine which one, or group of them, overrides which others? 
Ross recognizes this problem, as he writes that the correct choice in a particular case is 
neither self-evident nor a logical conclusion inferred from the more general prima facie 
duties. But despite the fact that there is no clear, systematic way to infer particular 
judgments from the general obligations, these general obligations can nevertheless 
provide some guidance. As Ross writes: “we are more likely to do our duty if we reflect 
to the best of our ability on the prima facie rightness or wrongness of various possible 
acts in virtue of the characteristics we perceive them to have, than if we act without 
reflection. With this greater likelihood we must be content.”
29
 Like Aristotle, Ross thus 
indicates that there is no clear moral decision procedure; rather, arriving at the morally 
correct decisions in particular cases is an exercise in practical reason. 
My suggestion is that, similarly, although there may be no precise, 
straightforward inferential path from the general moral principle that offenders should be 
punished only to the extent of their moral desert to the correct, morally deserved 
sentence, the ideal of moral desert may nevertheless offer some guidance as judges 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., p. 32.  
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attempt, in exercises of practical reason, to arrive at appropriate sentencing 
determinations in particular cases.
30
 If so, it may be that some of the various retributivist 
accounts of desert may prove useful after all, not because any one of them specifically 
implies a determinate deserved punishment in every given case, but rather because, 
insofar as some of these accounts reflect our intuitions about an aspect of moral desert, 
they may provide at least some guidance in determining desert in some cases. So, for 
instance, Shafer-Landau rightly points out that retributivist accounts according to which 
an offender deserves only as much suffering as she inflicted on her victim will be entirely 
unhelpful in determining sentences for crimes with no clear victims. But in cases in 
which there are clear victims (assault cases, for instance), the principle that an offender 
deserves no greater degree of suffering than he inflicted on his victim seems a relevant 
consideration in the exercise of practical reason to determine an appropriate sentence. 
Similarly, fair play accounts appear ill-suited to prescribe appropriate sentences for 
crimes that are centrally wrongs done to some particular victim(s), rather than cases of 
free-riding on society as a whole. But in other cases (e.g., tax evasion), the principle that 
an offender deserves no more punishment than is required to offset the unfair advantage 
she gained over other members of the community may be an appropriate consideration in 
determining a suitable sentence. Again, these considerations will not directly imply any 
                                                 
30
 Note that this proposal implies a presumption against practices such as mandatory sentencing guidelines, 
in favor of more flexibility for judges: Because the sentence that reflects the general ideal of moral desert 
will differ from circumstance to circumstance, our sentencing policies should allow for more fine-grained 
exercises of practical reason. This is, however, a presumptive consideration, rather than an absolute one, in 
favor of greater sentencing discretion for judges. It could thus be overridden by other considerations, such 
as if there was believed to be a significant danger of abuse of this discretionary power. 
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determinate conclusions regarding deserved sentencing. But they may provide some, 
albeit imperfect, guidance in the deliberations of those making sentencing decisions. 
Second, even given that we do not know precisely what sentence is morally 
deserved in a particular case, the retributivist constraint on undeserved punishments can 
protect against focusing solely on consequentialist considerations in sentencing. As 
mentioned before, those who endorse retributivist constraints typically worry that, 
without such constraints, offenders might be given sentences well in excess of what they 
deserve to further some consequentialist aim. The retributivist requirement that 
punishments be only in a manner and to a degree that is deserved is not, in itself, able to 
ensure that political authorities never impose excessive punishments — at least, not 
without an account of moral desert that can ground specific sentencing determinations — 
but this retributivist constraint is sufficient to ensure that political authorities never 
impose excessive punishments to further some consequentialist goal. Note that this does 
not prohibit considerations of social benefits from playing any role in determining 
punishments; in Kantian terms, respect for humanity does not prohibit treating offenders 
as means to some consequentialist end, but rather it prohibits treating them merely as 
means to such an end. 
The retributivist constraint, then, can tell us that sentencing determinations should 
be governed by considerations of moral desert, even if this constraint cannot itself ensure 
that the morally deserved sentence is established. This is a significant constraint. Again, 
the point here is not that it rules out certain sentences per se as inappropriate, but rather it 
rules out certain considerations as inappropriate in governing sentencing decisions. Of 
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course, this argument is unlikely to persuade a nihilist about moral desert. After all, if 
there is no such thing as a morally deserved punishment (or range of punishments) in 
particular cases, then it would make no sense to make moral desert one’s governing aim. 
But if nihilism about moral desert is false (and I have suggested above that, at least, this 
remains an open question, and in fact our intuitions tend to oppose the nihilist), then the 
retributivist requirement that punishments be deserved can provide some useful guidance, 
at least in terms of what is the appropriate aim of sentencing (and, importantly, what aims 
are inappropriate). 
So perhaps the retributivist consideration that punishments should not be more 
than is deserved can be of some use as a constraint on sentencing determinations. It may 
provide some guidance in deliberation about appropriate sentences in particular cases, 
and it can help to protect against excessive punishments inflicted solely on 
consequentialist grounds. But although this constraint can provide some useful guidance 
in determining how we may punish, it is insufficient. This is not, at least not primarily, 
for the reason suggested by critics such as Shafer-Landau, viz., that retributivism cannot 
make adequate sense of the notion of moral desert to ground determinate constraints on 
punishment. In fact, even if retributivism did provide the resources with which to 
determine definitively what punishment appropriately reflects the severity of (and 
offender’s responsibility for) a crime, the retributivist constraint would still be 
insufficient. To begin to see why, I return to the lex talionis. 
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III. Retributivism and respecting offenders as moral persons 
Shafer-Landau’s critique of retributivism focuses on the difficulty of determining 
moral desert. But in discussing the strict, eye-for-an-eye version of lex talionis, one of his 
objections is worth noting. In addition to pointing out (as discussed earlier) that equal-in-
kind punishment will be impossible in many cases, he alludes to a distinct objection: 
Finally, in many cases where lex does offer concrete 
advice, many of the recommendations are morally unsavory 
— raping a rapist, or torturing a torturer, for instance. Some 
may be prepared to bite the bullet, and insist that such 
treatment is what these criminals deserve. Even if it is, we 
surely do not want such desert verdicts used as a basis for 
structuring sentencing guidelines. Better to knowingly fail 
to mete out such deserts than to authorize a line in the 
budget for an official rapist or torturer.31 
Here the worry is not that lex talionis will be unable to provide definitive sentencing 
guidance; the worry is that it will be able to provide such guidance, and that we’ll find its 
prescription morally unpalatable. 
Recognizing this problem, Kant claims that certain exceptions to strict lex talionis 
will sometimes be warranted. For instance, for the crime of rape, Kant prescribes not that 
the perpetrator likewise be raped (he explains that this would itself be an unjustified 
violation of humanity), but rather that he be castrated. This punishment respects the law 
of retribution, Kant believes, “if not in terms of its letter at least in terms of its spirit.”
32
 It 
is unclear why Kant believes castration is the appropriate, “like for like,” response to 
rape. The physical damage of castration is not particularly similar to that of rape, nor is it 
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 Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” p. 193. 
32
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:363 (p. 498). 
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clear that the two are similar in their emotional impact (also, this punishment is 
inapplicable in cases of rape by a female). Instead, his discussion here feels ad hoc, as 
though he is trying to avoid the unsavory implication that a rapist deserves to be raped. 
But there seems to be nothing in the fairly straightforward, in-kind version of lex talionis 
that would warrant such a deviation. 
It is just these kinds of unsavory implications of the strict lex talionis that have led 
many theorists to adopt alternative forms of retributivism, several of which I cited above. 
But all versions of retributivism face the general worry that, in many cases, the 
punishment determined on retributivist grounds to be morally deserved will be quite 
severe. Consider what the equal-suffering retributivist will be obliged to advocate as a 
deserved punishment for the torturer. Similarly, Nozick’s equation for determining the 
appropriate retributive punishment (seriousness of crime multiplied by degree of 
responsibility) doesn’t avoid the problem, at least not in cases where the rapist, or the 
torturer, acted fully voluntarily. In fact, any retributivist account, because it links moral 
desert to the seriousness of a crime, will face this problem. Some crimes are extremely 
heinous, and these are sometimes committed completely voluntarily. It’s true that, in such 
cases, some may be inclined to endorse the extremely harsh punishment that retributivism 
will dictate. But to the extent that many of us are troubled by the idea of torturing the 
torturer, raping the rapist, etc., we will need to find some justification for restricting such 
practices. 
One could, of course, simply insist that the punishment indicated by retributivism 
as the proper response to, say, torture is some significant degree of suffering that is 
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nevertheless not as severe as torture itself. Such an argument runs the risk, however, of 
appearing arbitrary or ad hoc unless the retributivist can offer some principled 
justification for the claim that the morally deserved response to the crime is less severe 
than the crime itself. It just isn’t clear that retributivism has the resources to ground such 
an account. Lex talionis obviously cannot, nor can the equal-suffering account. The fair 
play account would need to explain why some less severe response is sufficient to 
remove the unfair advantage the offender gained by the more severe crime. And a 
communicative account such as Hampton’s would need to explain why some less severe 
response can adequately nullify the message of the criminal’s superiority to her victim(s). 
None of the standard retributivist accounts provides a clear explanation of why, as a 
response to some serious criminal wrongdoing, retributivism would indicate the infliction 
of some lesser degree of suffering on the perpetrator.   
These concerns are, in part, why the retributivist constraint is typically cited in the 
form in its negative, or minimalist, form — that is, that punishment must be only as 
severe as is morally deserved. As indicated earlier, negative retributivism reflects the 
widespread intuition that offenders should not be punished more severely than their 
crimes deserve, but it also allows us to avoid the implication that we may be required to 
impose troublingly harsh punishments in certain cases. Thus it may seem that the 
appropriate remedy to the concerns about unpalatably harsh punishments raised by the lex 
talionis and other versions of retributivism discussed above is simply to endorse negative 
retributivist constraints. 
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Despite the intuitive appeal of negative retributivism, however, it’s ultimately 
unclear how we could justify endorsing only this negative version, but not the positive 
version; at least it’s unclear how we could justify this on purely retributivist grounds. 
Accounts of retributivism vary widely, but a general thread running through all accounts 
is that there is some sort of value in wrongdoers getting what they deserve
33
 — either it is 
intrinsically valuable, or it is good because it communicates the appropriate message, or 
somehow nullifies the crime, etc.34 Given that the value of wrongdoers’ getting what they 
deserve is fundamental to retributivism, there seems to be no purely retributivist 
justification for distinguishing the view that offenders should get no more than they 
morally deserve from the view that offenders should get no less than they morally 
deserve, and for endorsing the former but not the latter. From a purely retributivist point 
of view, moral desert should determine both the ceiling and the floor for appropriate 
punishments. If there is no retributivist justification for accepting negative but not 
positive retributivism, however, then proponents of only the negative constraint will need 
to appeal to some nonretributivist considerations to justify endorsing one but not the 
                                                 
33 As John Cottingham points out, “retribution” derives from the Latin re+tribio, “to pay back.” 
Cottingham, “Varieties of Retribution,” p. 238.  
34
 Boonin, in The Problem of Punishment, contends that retributivism that is concerned with moral desert is 
only one form of retributivism. I disagree with Boonin’s taxonomy, which, for instance, considers what I 
have called fair play theories not to be desert-based accounts. Developing a full objection to Boonin on this 
point is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will point out that the proponents of the fair play view take 
themselves to be addressing questions of moral desert — see, e.g., W. Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985); George Sher, Desert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Michael 
Davis, “Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage: What’s the Connection?” Law and Philosophy 12 (1993): 
133-56. Regardless of whether there could be a retributivism that is not concerned with moral desert, 
however, my project in this paper is focused on the widely endorsed negative retributivist constraint that 
punishment should be no more severe than is morally deserved. 
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other. Retributivist considerations alone will thus be insufficient to ground constraints on 
punishment. 
One might instead attempt to defend retributivist constraints by endorsing the full-
throated retributivist claim that offenders should be punished to the full extent of their 
moral desert, but then insisting that this is only a presumptive principle, one that could be 
overridden by other concerns. This would allow for mitigation of punishments for various 
reasons, and thus provide a way to avoid the unwanted conclusion that extremely, 
unpalatably harsh punishments may in some cases be warranted. Whatever these 
overriding considerations happened to be, however, they would be nonretributivist ones. 
And so, again, on this strategy retributivist constraints would be insufficient. 
Falls’ retributivist account, discussed earlier, employs essentially this sort of 
strategy. On her Kantian theory, punishment is justified in that it holds wrongdoers 
morally accountable for their acts, and the suitable severity of punishment is that which 
appropriately communicates the state’s message of moral condemnation. A punishment 
appropriately communicates this condemnatory message, on her view, when it is 
proportionate to the offense.
35
 Thus her proportionality principle states that the “severity 
of punishment that is one’s [earned moral desert] is the degree of severity proportionate 
to that of the wrongdoing.”
36
 Falls explicitly acknowledges that the morally deserved 
punishment will often be quite severe: “The proportionality principle is solely about 
                                                 
35 Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” p. 45.  
36
 Ibid., p. 41.  
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earned moral desert, and according to it torture, death, whatever, can be the earned moral 
desert of the most wicked.”
37
 
Falls’ proportionality principle turns out to be only presumptively binding, 
however. In cases in which one’s earned moral desert would be torture or death, etc., the 
proportionality principle will be overridden by what she calls a limiting principle. The 
limiting principle states that “punishment is justified only if the one suffering it remains 
capable of reflectively responding to the treatment being received and the condemnation 
it communicates.”
38
 Whereas the proportionality principle is grounded in considerations 
of earned moral desert, the limiting principle is grounded in considerations of unearned 
moral desert: As Falls sees it, an implication of Kant’s principle of respect for humanity 
is that “persons simply as persons deserve that the state hold them morally accountable 
(at least for certain kinds of acts).”39 This desert is unearned — that is, each of us 
deserves to be held accountable simply in virtue of our humanity. But to hold a person 
accountable, or responsible, for wrongdoing requires that we allow the offender to 
respond to her punishment (to the message it communicates) as a moral agent. Thus 
punishments that preclude such response are prohibited. 
I believe Falls is onto something here. But note that her limiting principle, as 
attractive as it is, is not a retributivist constraint. Falls makes clear that retributivist claims 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., p. 47.  
38
 Ibid. The proportionality principle is presumptively binding because even when it is overridden by the 
limiting principle, it remains the case that offenders still morally deserve (in the sense of earned moral 
desert) the particularly harsh response. 
39
 Ibid., p. 41. 
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such as her proportionality principle are earned-moral-desert claims.
40
 Her limiting 
principle, by contrast, is justified by considerations of unearned moral desert. It is clear, 
then, that the limiting principle is not a retributivist principle. So again, on this account 
retributivism is insufficient to guide how a political authority may punish; an additional, 
nonretributivist constraint is warranted. 
I actually find Falls’ limiting principle quite plausible. It helps to clarify that the 
treatment an offender morally deserves may be a matter of more than the severity of her 
crime and her degree of responsibility for it. Retributivism, grounded in the notion of 
payback, is insufficient in its inability to account for the fact that the treatment an 
offender deserves is a matter not only of the crime she has committed, but of who she is. 
As Falls puts it, part of what each of us deserves is unearned — that is, it attaches merely 
in virtue of our status as moral persons.41 Retributivism, however, deals only in earned 
desert, i.e., the treatment an offender comes to deserve through the commission of her 
crime. Thus retributivism is unable to make sense of the intuition many will share that an 
offender does not always deserve to be treated as harshly as might be indicated by 
considerations solely of the seriousness of the crime and her degree of responsibility for 
it. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., p. 40.  
41
 Stephen Darwall makes a similar point in “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88:1 (1977): 36-49. 
  
 
101 
IV. Conclusion 
Retributivism is unable to account for the idea that the treatment an offender 
deserves all things considered is not solely a matter of the treatment she has earned by 
committing a crime. Part of what an offender deserves is grounded in her status as a 
moral person. In the next chapter, I defend an additional constraint on punishment, one 
grounded in the Kantian notion that a central feature of humanity is our capacity for 
moral reform and redemption. Kant believed that redemption was always possible, even 
for the most vicious individuals. Thus he wrote: 
[T]he censure of vice … must never break out into 
complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a 
vicious human being; for on this supposition he could never 
be improved, and this not consistent with the idea of a 
human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never 
lose entirely his predisposition to the good.42 
 
Building on Kant’s discussions of contempt and the prospect of redemption, I contend 
that punishments should not, in their mode or degree, tend to undermine offenders’ 
prospects of moral reform, and that certain forms of punishment, notably capital 
punishment and incarceration in certain types of maximum-security facilities, tend to do 
just this. In doing so, they fail to respect offenders as persons, as ends in themselves. 
My goal in this chapter, however, has been to lay the groundwork for this 
upcoming account by demonstrating the insufficiency of the commonly cited retributivist 
constraint. Contrary to those who object that retributivism is either useless or false 
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 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:463-64 (p. 580) 
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because it is unable to provide definitive guidance regarding what punishments are 
morally deserved, the retributivist constraint can provide some genuinely useful 
guidance. Nevertheless, the guidance retributivism does offer will in some cases strike 
many of us as excessively, inflexibly harsh. Retributivism itself provides no reason to 
accept its negative prescription (punishments no more severe than is deserved) while 
rejecting its positive one (punishments no less severe than is deserved). And by focusing 
only on what an offender morally deserves for her crime, (which may in some cases be 
quite severe), retributivism fails to account for what an offender morally deserves all 
things considered.43 
                                                 
43
 I am grateful to Larry May, Christopher Heath Wellman, and David Wood for their helpful comments on 
previous drafts of this chapter. Also, I presented a version of this paper at the Washington University in St. 
Louis Workshop on Politics, Ethics, and Society in November 2008. I appreciate the thoughtful feedback I 
received from participants at that workshop. 
  
 
103 
CHAPTER 4 
Punishment, contempt, and the prospect of moral reform 
 
For the institution of criminal punishment to be morally permissible, it is widely 
accepted that penal practices must treat criminals with some basic level of respect. The 
most common account — endorsed (whether explicitly or implicitly) by most theorists of 
punishment and widely reflected in legal practice — is that respect for offenders requires 
that punishments not be more severe than the corresponding crimes morally deserve. In 
chapter 3, I contended that this retributivist constraint, although a valuable check against 
the imposition of excessive punishments on consequentialist grounds, is ultimately 
insufficient for two reasons: First, as has been widely noted, it is often unclear precisely 
what punishment (or range of punishments) is morally deserved in a given case. Second, 
and more importantly, what guidance we do get from prominent retributivist accounts 
indicates that the punishment that is morally deserved for a given crime may often be 
quite severe — so severe, in fact, as to strike many as intuitively excessive. This is in part 
because retributivism seeks to assess desert solely in terms of what the offender did, 
rather than who she is, or who she can be. The concerns associated with retributivism 
give us reason to examine more closely what treating offenders with respect requires, and 
whether respect warrants some additional constraint(s) on punishment. 
My aim in this chapter is to argue for one such constraint, albeit one that has often 
been overlooked both in the literature on punishment and in legal practice. Specifically, I 
contend that punishment, if it is to treat offenders with respect as autonomous moral 
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persons, should never be of a mode or to a degree that tends to undermine the prospect of 
offenders’ moral reform. As I discuss below, although this principle is centrally 
concerned with the moral reform of the offender, my account differs from typical 
offender-improvement theories of punishment, insofar as such accounts characteristically 
set offender improvement as the aim of punishment, whereas on my account reform need 
not be an aim of punishment but is rather a prospect that penal practices should take care 
not to undermine. 
In section I, I appeal to certain discussions in Kant, not (primarily) of respect but 
rather of contempt, which Kant took to be the opposite of respect. By highlighting certain 
relevant features of contempt that make it especially problematic, we can gain insight into 
what is, conversely, required by respect for persons. After discussing what is implied by 
contemptuous treatment generally, I consider in section II what would constitute 
contempt, and thus would violate the requirement of respect, in the context of punishing 
criminal offenders. Again, on my account, respect prohibits punishments that tend to 
undermine offenders’ prospects for moral reform. In sections III and IV, I further flesh 
out my own view, first by contrasting it with accounts that cite reform as a positive aim 
of punishment, and then by considering some possible objections to my account.1 
                                                 
1
 I should note at the outset that, although my account takes as its starting point certain Kantian themes, my 
central project here is not one of Kant interpretation. My aim is to consider what conclusions we might 
draw if we apply certain useful, compelling themes in Kant’s practical philosophy to an analysis of how a 
political community may permissibly treat offenders. In fact, certain conclusions that I reach about which 
punishments are and are not permissible (e.g., regarding capital punishment) contradict Kant’s own explicit 
conclusions. But whether or not Kant’s explicit about punishment can be reconciled with certain other, 
fundamental principles in his moral philosophy, my aim is to develop and expand on certain Kantian 
themes that I take to be particularly plausible and to suggest how they are relevant to questions of 
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I. What’s wrong with contempt? 
Kant famously believed that all human beings, as rational beings, possess a 
dignity, an absolute inner worth, that warrants respect (both self-respect and the respect 
of others).2 Thus his second formulation of the categorical imperative instructs us, “Act 
in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means.”3 In various 
passages Kant indicates that the converse of respect, as he conceives of it, is contempt. In 
the Doctrine of Virtue, for instance, he writes, “To be contemptuous of others 
(contemnere), that is, to deny them the respect owed to human beings in general, is in 
every case contrary to duty; for they are human beings.”4 One strategy, then, for better 
understanding what respect for persons requires is to examine, conversely, what it 
prohibits, by looking more closely at what it means to treat others with contempt. 
                                                                                                                                                 
punishment. Thus, my concern is less with whether Kant’s theory does, or should, commit him to the 
conclusions I draw than with whether mine is a plausible account in its own right. 
2
 See, e.g., Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:435 and 6:462. In the Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 557 and 579, respectively. All citations to the Metaphysics of Morals are to 
this edition. 
3
 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:429. In Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy, 2d ed., 
trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, Inc., 1994), p. 36. All citations to the 
Groundwork are to this edition. 
4
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:463 (p. 579). Similarly, in Georg Ludwig Collins’ notes from Kant’s 
ethics lectures, Kant explicitly describes contempt as the opposite of respect. In the Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath and ed. Peter Heath and J.B. 
Schneewind (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 173. 
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To treat someone with contempt, on Kant’s view, is to treat her as morally 
worthless.5 This conception may strike some as too strong. Michelle Mason, for instance, 
describes contempt somewhat more modestly, “as presenting its object as low in the 
sense of ranking low in worth as a person in virtue of falling short of some legitimate 
interpersonal ideal of the person.”6 Thus for Mason, contempt takes its object to be 
fundamentally deficient, or comparatively low in worth, along some dimension(s) of 
moral personhood, but perhaps not altogether morally worthless. Whether contempt picks 
out a (perceived) complete lack of moral worth in someone, however, or just a 
fundamental deficiency, we can say that a person regards the object of her contempt as 
inferior as a person. 
It’s worth noting here the distinction between treating someone with contempt 
and regarding her with contempt. Kant recognized this distinction, and he seemed to 
view contemptuous regard as, at least to a degree, outside our control. He writes, “At 
times one cannot, it is true, help inwardly looking down on some in comparison with 
others; but the outward manifestation of this is, nevertheless, an offense.”7 Here Kant 
indicates that contempt as regard is, or significantly involves, a feeling that cannot be 
rationally controlled at the time at which it emerges. 
Still, it’s plausible that one could, over time, cultivate a disposition not to regard 
others with contempt. To the extent that this is possible, there are at least two good 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Metaphysics of Morals 6:462 and 6:463-4 (pp. 579-80). 
6
 Michelle Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” Ethics 113 (January 2003): 234-272, pp. 240-41. 
7
 Metaphysics of Morals 6:463 (pp. 579-80). 
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reasons to do so: First, it may be exceedingly difficult to harbor contemptuous feelings 
for another without these feelings manifesting themselves in contemptuous treatment. 
Thus if contemptuous treatment is morally prohibited, then as a practical matter, meeting 
this moral proscription may require cultivation of a noncontemptuous disposition. Second, 
even if one could conceal one’s contemptuous regard, such regard veiled with apparently 
respectful treatment seems disingenuous, and thus it may not actually be respectful at all. 
Imagine discovering that a colleague who has always treated you respectfully has actually 
at the same time regarded you with contempt. On finding this out, it might cross your 
mind, in retrospect, that the years of seemingly respectful treatment actually reflected the 
depth of the colleague’s contempt: She didn’t even regard you as worthy of her honesty 
with respect to her assessment of you as a person. Contemptuous regard may thus be 
troubling even when it does not manifest itself in obviously contemptuous treatment. For 
both of these reasons, then, even if contemptuous regard does not admit of rational 
control at the time it surfaces, there are reasons to work to cultivate a disposition against 
contemptuous regard. And although the focus in what follows is on contemptuous 
treatment, contemptuous regard will at times be relevant to the discussion as well. 
A relevant feature of contempt, evident in the previous description of it as 
regarding its object as inferior as a person, is that it is person-focused rather than act-
focused. Mason rightly distinguishes contempt from resentment in that, whereas 
resentment is typically focused on what someone has done or brought about (“I resent 
that she unfairly embarrassed me in front of our colleagues”), contempt focuses on the 
person — not for what she has done, but for who she is. Thus Mason writes: 
  
 
108 
Contempt, to adopt a phrase of Augustine’s, thus will have 
none of “Despise the sin but not the sinner.” The “sin” in 
such a case is simply an outer manifestation of something 
taken to go to the core of the “sinner,” something taken to 
be contemptible.8 
Furthermore, not only is contempt person-focused, but it is pervasively person-focused. 
In other words, contempt permeates all of our interactions with those we hold in 
contempt. As Mason puts it, my contempt for another becomes that person’s “most 
salient description for purposes of my … assessment of her.”9 So whereas my resentment 
for something a person has done may not necessarily color my entire evaluation of (and 
all my interactions with) the person, contempt tends to present a person as morally 
inferior generally, or at least in her most fundamental aspects (viz., in the ways we take to 
matter most). 
 Just as distinguishing contempt from resentment highlights certain relevant 
features of contempt (namely, its person-focus and its pervasiveness), it is also instructive 
to consider how contempt contrasts with anger. Whereas anger is heated, contempt is 
cold. An angry response engages the other for a perceived offense; a contemptuous 
response, on the other hand, treats the other as not worth the trouble. Thus Kant states: 
[W]e cannot be angry and at the same time hold the other in 
contempt; for just as anger involves an emotion that 
presupposes a great exertion of effort to resist the 
impression of a felt offence, so contempt incorporates a 
conviction of the object’s unworthiness for employment of 
                                                 
8
 Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” 247. 
9
 Ibid., 249. 
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such a resistance on its behalf, and is therefore coupled 
with calmness.10 
Contempt is distinctive, then, in that whereas other negative responses to someone 
— such as anger, censure, or heated argument — treat their object, at least implicitly, as 
worthy of concern and engagement as a moral person, contempt does not. Of course, we 
might still treat such a person as worthy of our prudential concern, perhaps as a threat. 
But assessing someone as worthy of prudential concern is consistent with maintaining a 
moral attitude of contempt toward her, with regarding and treating her as beneath our 
moral concern. To treat someone as solely of prudential concern would be to treat her 
merely as a thing, rather than as a moral person — in Kantian terms, it would be to treat 
her merely as a means rather than as an end. 
Contempt, then, presents a person as fundamentally deficient (if not altogether 
worthless), is focused on the person rather than what she has done or brought about, 
pervades our entire assessment and interaction with her, and is cool and dismissive in 
virtue of not regarding her as worthy of engagement as a moral person.11 Another feature 
of contempt, which follows from these, is that it is especially unconducive to the 
prospects of moral reform, forgiveness, and reconciliation; in fact, it is arguably less 
                                                 
10
 From Johann Vigilantius’ notes from Kant’s ethics lectures. In the Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath and ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 417. See also p. 434 and p. 173 (the latter is from 
Collins’ lecture notes). 
11
 Note that, although in this chapter I write of contempt as directed at others, the points I mention here also 
apply to self-contempt. 
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compatible with these ideals than are the hotter, more engaged emotions such as anger or 
even hatred.12 As Thomas Hill writes: 
[C]ontempt is a deep dismissal, a denial of the prospect of 
reconciliation, a signal that conversation is over. Furious 
argument and accusation, and even sharp-tongued deflation 
of hypocrisy and self-deception, leave some space to 
resume communication; but cold, silent contempt does not. 
The one demands to be heard, while the other walks away 
in disgust.13 
 As Hill indicates, we can see reflected in contempt a sort of disengagement, a giving up 
on a person. Or similarly, contempt may reflect one’s never regarding the person as 
worthy of genuine engagement in the first place. 
Because contempt essentially reflects a giving up on its object, it will typically be 
unresponsive to evidence of moral reform — that is, evidence that might count in favor of 
forgiveness. After all, the relative calmness characteristic of contempt reflects not only a 
belief that the person is not worth our engagement, but also a sort of confidence that the 
person’s status as fundamentally subpar is settled, and not liable to change.14 And 
                                                 
12
 Perhaps not surprisingly, psychologist John Gottman has found that contempt between spouses is the 
most significant predictor of divorce. See John M. Gottman, James D. Murray, Catherine C. Swanson, 
Rebecca Tyson, and Kristin R. Swanson, The Dynamics of Marriage: Dynamic Linear Models (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). For a discussion of Gottman et al.’s findings, see Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The 
Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York City: Little, Brown and Company, 2005), pp. 18-33.  
13
 Thomas E. Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 60. 
14
 One might think that insofar as contempt is cool and calm relative to anger, hatred, etc., it would thus be 
more conducive to our recognizing evidence of reform. But as I indicate above, the calmness characteristic 
of contempt is a product of our being settled in our assessment of the other person’s moral character. Thus 
although contempt is calm, it isn’t necessarily conducive to the sort of calm, cool deliberation that (for 
instance) Hume endorsed, because the calmness of contempt comes essentially from one’s having finished 
deliberating, from having written the other person off, so to speak. 
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because contempt is characteristically unresponsive to evidence that might favor 
forgiveness, it will also typically be incompatible with the prospect of reconciliation. 
Mason, who in her essay aims to defend the place of contempt as a morally 
justified attitude, claims that contempt can remain responsive to evidence that would 
count in favor of forgiveness. Her argument, however, is ultimately unconvincing. 
Contempt, on Mason’s conception, assesses its object as low according to some 
interpersonal ideal. But as Mark Kalderon writes, “Even if someone were lacking in this 
way, to treat him as an end is to treat him as capable, at least in principle, of acquiring the 
requisite sensitivity and perception. … The difficulty of course is that contemptuousness 
is inconsistent” with such treatment.15 In response to this sort of worry, Mason contends 
that it is both empirically and conceptually plausible that contempt may be sensitive to 
evidence in favor of forgiveness.16 She writes: 
In response to the empirical claim, I have only my own 
experience as counterexample and ask others to consult 
experiences of their own. As for the conceptual claim, I do 
not see the basis for it; common usage, for example, does 
not suggest that it is part of the very meaning of contempt 
that once one is a contemner, one if forever a contemner.17 
In my view, Mason’s reply here is unpersuasive. Undoubtedly, many of us can 
recall instances of having held someone in contempt only to have that assessment change 
when evidence favoring forgiveness emerged. But presumably there also are likely to 
have been many counterexamples, in which our contempt rendered us slow to recognize 
                                                 
15
 Mark Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2005), 176. 
16
 Mason, “Contempt as a Moral Attitude,” 256. 
17
 Ibid. 
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mitigating evidence, or even prevented our recognizing it altogether. Thus even if we can 
recall cases in which contempt did not so color our view of a person as to leave us unable 
to recognize evidence of repentance or reform, this does not dispel the empirical worry 
that contempt tends to have this practical effect.18 
Furthermore, the claim that contempt renders us less sensitive to evidence 
favoring forgiveness is supported by certain other features of contempt discussed above. I 
followed Mason in describing contempt as person-focused and pervasive. That is, I 
regard someone with contempt not because of particular actions by which she may have 
wronged me, but rather for who she is as a person. Also, my contempt colors my entire 
assessment of and interaction with her.19 Given this conception, what sort of changes 
might I regard as evidence in favor of forgiveness? Presumably the most viable recourse 
for the person held in contempt, if she is genuinely repentant and desires forgiveness, is 
to apologize and change her behavior. But given that my contempt transcends any 
particular harms or transgressions toward me, why expect that particular acts of kindness 
or contrition would elicit the withdrawal of that contempt? Since my contempt permeates 
my assessment of the person, I would more likely view any sincere acts of contrition as 
disingenuous, or perhaps as somehow manipulative. Again, this is not to say that 
                                                 
18
 Note that it does not help to stipulate that contempt is morally justified only in the cases in which it does 
not leave one unable to recognize mitigating evidence. For contempt is contempt in either case; insofar as it 
tends to render people unable to see mitigating evidence, it is implausible to condemn contempt only in 
those cases in which this ever-present tendency happens to be realized.  
19
 Perhaps a useful, albeit imperfect, analogy could be drawn here between contempt and love. Love, we 
often say, can tend to blind us to (or at least leave us less sensitive to) the flaws in those whom we love. My 
argument is that contempt tends to have a similar affect, although in the opposite direction: Contempt tends 
to blind us (or at least leave us less sensitive to) the redeeming qualities in those whom we regard with 
contempt. 
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contempt always prevents us from recognizing evidence of reform, or that the concept of 
contempt itself rules out this possibility. But certain central features of contempt make it 
unlikely that contempt will typically leave us capable of recognizing evidence in favor of 
forgiveness. Contempt, after all, does not look for signs of repentance; contempt gives up 
the search. 
There is another sense in which contempt is in tension with reform. Not only does 
contemptuous regard tend to leave us unresponsive to evidence of reform, but also 
contemptuous treatment may tend to undermine the prospect of reform. This may occur 
in at least two, related ways: First, an implication of our treating a person as though she is 
fundamentally morally inferior, of dismissing her as not being worth our continued 
engagement, is that we will not be motivated to provide her with the resources and 
opportunities that might facilitate her reform. I say more about this below, in the context 
of whether penal institutions make available sufficient opportunities for offenders, should 
they so choose, to help themselves. Also, when we treat a person as though she is 
fundamentally inferior, when our treatment of her expresses that we have given up on 
her, that she is not worth our continued engagement and effort, she may in time come to 
agree with this assessment and, as a consequence, give up on herself. Thus again, our 
contempt may not only blind us to evidence of reform, but it may also actually undermine 
the prospect of reform. 
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Given this conception of contempt, we can perhaps see why Kant regarded 
contempt as “in every case contrary to duty.”20 In particular, Kant was concerned about 
the tension between contempt and reform. He writes, 
[the] censure of vice … must never break out into complete 
contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human 
being; for on this supposition he could never be improved, 
and this [is] not consistent with the idea of a human being, 
who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his 
predisposition to the good.21 
As this passage indicates, Kant saw contempt as inconsistent with the recognition of 
humanity’s predisposition to morality, and thus with a recognition of the possibility of 
redemption. 
Much more could be written about contempt, but for my purposes the salient 
features are these: Contempt is person-focused and pervasive; it presents its object as 
inferior, if not altogether worthless, as a moral person; and it is cold and dismissive, i.e., 
it essentially reflects our giving up on the person as a moral person. In virtue of these 
features, contempt tends to be unresponsive to evidence of repentance and reform, and it 
actually tends to undermine the prospect of reform as well.22 
                                                 
20
 Metaphysics of Morals 6:463 (p. 579). 
21
 Ibid. 6:463-4 (p. 580). 
22
 I acknowledge that some may use the term “contempt” in ways that diverge from the conception I have 
developed here. For instance, some may on occasion use “contempt” as roughly analogous to “hatred,” as 
burning hot, rather than as cold. Or some may use “contempt” as more closely analogous to “resentment” in 
the sense of being act-focused. Although I believe the conception of contempt that I have developed is 
intuitively plausible, it is undoubtedly the case that various individuals use the term “contempt” in 
somewhat varying ways on various occasions. (William Ian Miller, for instance, suggests a much more 
inclusive, and innocuous, conception of contempt, one that has “a light side as well as a dark one,” 
according to which we may regard our children, pets or even on occasion our partners with contempt 
insofar as we judge them to be endearingly subordinate and unthreatening. Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 32.) For my purposes, however, it is enough if 
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By contrast, then, what does respect for persons require? It may require quite a bit, 
and my aim here is not to give a full account of what respect demands.23 Given the 
features of contempt that I have discussed above, however, certain requirements of 
respect become apparent. Respect requires not adopting a dismissive attitude toward 
others, not giving up on them as irredeemably deficient as moral persons. It follows, then, 
that respect requires us to be open to evidence of repentance and reform, and never to 
treat others in ways that will tend to undermine the prospect for their reform. In the next 
section, I consider what implications these conclusions will have for how the practice of 
criminal punishment should be constrained. 
 
II. Treating offenders with respect 
Given the conception of contempt that I have endorsed above, and thus, 
conversely, what I have argued is required by respect for persons, my central argument 
with regard to punishment follows fairly straightforwardly: On my view, for punishment 
properly to respect offenders as persons, it should not express contempt for them; it 
shouldn’t give up on them, so to speak. In this section, I argue that this prohibition on 
contempt in our treatment of offenders grounds the following constraint on punishment: 
                                                                                                                                                 
there is form of regard and treatment that exemplifies the features I have discussed in this section. I claim 
that this is most naturally described as contempt. But what it is called is less important than that we can 
recognize a form of regard and treatment that exhibits the features I have suggested — and, as I argue 
below, that our existing penal practices often do (but should not) express this attitude in their treatment of 
offenders. 
23
 For an excellent discussion of respect in the context of moral censure, see Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and 
Justice: Kantian Perspectives, pp. 114-18. 
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Punishments should not, in their mode or degree, tend to undermine the prospect of 
offenders’ reform. 
Essentially, punishment undermines the prospect of reform when it imposes 
conditions on offenders such that the punishment itself makes it less likely (than had the 
punishment not been imposed) that they will engage in moral reflection about the 
wrongdoing for which they are being punished, come to see their actions as morally 
wrong, regret having done them and, consequently, make a genuine commitment to 
change their behavior in the future. The imposition of such conditions, on my account, 
reflects a lack of respect for offenders as persons. Punishments may impose such 
conditions in various ways. 
First, punishment may undermine the prospect of reform when a sentence is so 
severe that it inhibits the criminal’s capacity to engage in the moral reflection necessary 
to come to see her criminal behavior as wrong.24 Capital punishment is an obvious 
example of such a sentence, in that execution clearly inhibits (in fact, extinguishes) the 
individual’s capacity for moral reflection. One might object here that a criminal 
sentenced to death may have substantial time to engage in moral reflection, should he so 
choose, while he waits on death row during his appeals process. The appeals process, 
however, should not be conflated with the sentence; the death penalty itself, when carried 
out, undeniably extinguishes a person’s capacity for moral reflection.25 In doing so, it 
                                                 
24
 C.f., M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6:1 
(April 1987): 25-51, esp.pp. 46-48. 
25
 This is true unless, of course, one believes in an afterlife in which moral reflection is still possible. If so, 
one will presumably deny that execution extinguishes this capacity. For a number of reasons, however, 
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fails to afford the offender the respect appropriate to him as a person. Similarly, 
punishments imposing extreme physical suffering would be prohibited insofar as the 
severe pain associated with such treatment would significantly inhibit the individual’s 
capacity for moral reflection. 
Punishment may inhibit the capacity for moral reflection not only because of the 
severity of the sentence itself, but also because of the conditions that prevail in the 
carrying out of that sentence. Two criminals receiving identical prison sentences may 
nevertheless be said to receive different punishment if one is subject to significantly 
harsher conditions during his incarceration than the other (e.g., physical beatings, rape, 
etc.). Much of the philosophical literature on punishment, to the extent that it addresses 
the question of how (as opposed to why) we should punish offenders, centers on morally 
justifiable sentencing practices. Focusing only on imposing justified sentences, however, 
without also considering the conditions in which the sentences are administered, 
overlooks how much of the work of determining the overall character of a particular 
instance of punishment is done after the sentence is handed down.26 Respect for offenders 
must therefore be expressed not only in the formal sentences themselves, but also in the 
manner in which these sentences are carried out.27 Thus, the constraint I endorse here 
                                                                                                                                                 
religious claims of this sort are not promising bases for the establishment of penal practices in a liberal 
polity. 
26
 C.f., “Gently Does It; Prison Conditions,” The Economist, U.S. edition, July 28, 2007. 
27
 Kant alludes to this point in the context of capital punishment, when, after endorsing capital punishment 
as the required sentence for murder, he nevertheless insists that the execution “must still be freed from any  
mistreatment that could make the humanity in the person suffering it into something abominable.” 
Metaphysics of Morals 6:333 (p. 474). Unlike Kant’s explicit claim in this passage, of course, my account 
entails that capital punishment is not morally permissible. 
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prohibits not only sentences that tend to undermine the prospect of offenders’ reform, but 
also the toleration by penal institutions of conditions in the carrying out of sentences that 
tend to undermine the prospect of reform. 
Another way punishments may undermine the prospect of reform is by weakening 
offenders’ motivation, rather than their capacity, to undertake a process of moral 
reflection and reform. (As before, the weakening can be a feature either of the sentence 
itself or of the conditions involved in the administration of the sentence.) First, when a 
sentence expresses to an offender that society has given up on him, that it regards him as 
irredeemable, he may come to accept society’s judgment about him, to see himself the 
same way. Thus his motivation to engage in the process of moral reflection and reform 
may be weakened. Second, if the punishment is so harsh, demeaning, etc., as to foster 
hatred (or perhaps cold, dismissive contempt28) in the offender for the penal institution 
and the political community on whose behalf it punishes, then punishment may in this 
way weaken an offender’s motivation to contemplate whether his criminal actions were, 
in fact, wrong. The laws of a political community, after all, can be seen as reflecting, and 
even expressing, that community’s values.29 Thus if an offender, because of the harsh or 
humiliating treatment he receives from the community’s penal institutions, comes to 
regard the community itself with hatred or contempt, then he may likewise be less 
                                                 
28
 The notion of contempt directed upwardly — that is, from those out of  power toward those in power — 
is discussed at length by William Ian Miller in “Mutual Contempt and Democracy,” in his The Anatomy of 
Disgust, supra. n. 21, at pp. 206-34. 
29
 For a useful discussion of the law as an expression of the values of a political community, see R. A. Duff, 
“Liberal Legal Community,” in his Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York City: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 35-73. See also Igor Primoratz, “Punishment as Language,” Philosophy 64 
(1989): 187-205, esp. pp. 196-98. 
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motivated genuinely to reflect on which of the community’s values were expressed in the 
law(s) that he violated, and whether these values might in fact have merit. Such 
punishment would therefore make reform less likely for the offender. 
In addition, when a punishment does not at least make available the opportunities 
by which an offender may improve his situation, both during his punishment and 
afterward, this may weaken his motivation to engage in a process of reflection that may 
lead to repentance and reform. Here it is useful, following R. A. Duff, to distinguish 
“reform” from “rehabilitation,” where “reform” refers to a change in individuals’ motives 
and dispositions and “rehabilitation” refers to the improvement of their skills, capacities 
and opportunities.30 Thus, on this construal, providing an offender with the education, 
training or information he needs to improve his chances of (re)integrating himself as a 
productive member of society would constitute an example of rehabilitation. Reform, 
however, would require something different, namely, that the offender come to appreciate 
that what he did was wrong and make a commitment to change his behavior accordingly. 
Although the two concepts are distinct, they are nevertheless related. When penal 
institutions fail to make available to offenders the resources that could facilitate their 
reintegration into society, they send a message that society sees these offenders either as 
incapable of improvement, as not worth the trouble, or both. Also, apart from this 
expressive function (that is, even if the offender doesn’t recognize the contemptuous 
message being implicitly expressed), failures to make such resources available may still 
                                                 
30
 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, p. 5. 
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facilitate self-contempt in offenders. Offenders with few or no job skills, little or no 
education, and, importantly, no real tools with which they stand a serious chance of 
addressing these deficiencies and improving their lives may come to regard themselves as 
hopelessly incapable of improving their situations. That is, they may be more likely to 
regard themselves with contempt.31 Thus an offender’s motivation to reform may be 
weakened by the message sent by a punishment’s failure to make available sufficient 
opportunities for improvement, or by the lack of opportunities itself, or both. In any case, 
the result will be effectively to undermine the prospect of reform, and thus to fail to 
respect the offender as a person. 
As an example of a form of punishment that exhibits a number of the tendencies 
discussed here, consider control units, or maximum security units. These are facilities in 
which prisoners typically spend twenty-three or more hours each day in isolation in their 
cells, exiting only to shower or for solitary exercise in a small yard. In one sense, such 
units might seem especially conducive to the sort of moral reflection that might lead to 
reform. The extreme isolation of such units, after all, offers prisoners plenty of time (in 
fact, little else) during which they may choose to contemplate the wrongness of their acts. 
In practice, however, evidence indicates that prolonged terms of isolation may undermine 
                                                 
31
 Because the contrast class on this account is the likelihood of reform had the offender not been punished, 
one might raise this objection: Many offenders face considerable hardships, in particular a lack of 
opportunities to improve their condition, in their normal lives, outside of punishment. Given such 
conditions, the practices I have targeted here  (i.e., lack of available resources, and a message of society 
having given up on the individual) might not really make reform less likely, given the likelihood that these 
resources would be lacking, and the expression of societal contempt would be present, in the offender’s life 
even if she were not punished. As I see it, however, this is a problem not for my constraint on punishment, 
but for societal conditions generally. Perhaps my proposal could better be read to say that punishments 
should not undermine the prospect of reform in the sense of making reform less likely than it should have 
been had the offender not been punished. 
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both the capacity and motivation for moral reflection, and may instead push many 
prisoners toward paranoia, hopelessness, or desperation. Lorna Rhodes, an anthropologist 
who visited and studied control units in the state of Washington, writes that in “isolation 
or semi-isolation, there is nothing to nudge the mind outside of its self-preoccupation and 
discomfort.”32 Among the numerous prisoners she quotes, one says: “There is no hope for 
my future, no matter how hard I try to just be patient, be humble … There is nobody to 
talk to … and vent my frustration and as a result, sometimes I am violent. Pound on the 
walls. Yell and scream.”33 
In addition, Rhodes describes how prison officials are trained to regard prisoners 
skeptically, to view positive responses by prisoners not as good behavior but as waiting 
and manipulation. As one administrator put it: 
The inmates know the game. They know what to say … 
you have to be really guarded on that. You’d like to think 
that they’re not animals, that these are human beings: ‘Oh, 
my gosh, [he] won’t do that. And he even promised me.’ 
But that is not the reality … there’s always the risk that the 
person is just playing the game.34 
Undoubtedly, many of the individuals detained in maximum security units are adept at 
“playing the game.” But notice how the administrator’s description reflects the feature of 
contempt I discussed earlier, namely, its tendency to be unresponsive to evidence of 
moral reform. Officers in the control units are trained to regard prisoners as incapable of 
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 Lorna Rhodes, Total Confinement: Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison (Berkeley, 
Calif.: University of California Press, 2004), p. 111. 
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 Ibid., p. 112. 
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changing, and to discount apparent evidence of change as in fact evidence only of 
manipulation. As an officer told Rhodes: “A person is not a liar because he lies, but he 
lies because he’s a liar. The point is, how do we remove the liar out of a person? We can 
postpone lying … but that does not change the individual.”35 Certainly, many prisoners 
can be dangerous and manipulative, and the officers who deal with them on a regular 
basis should be wary. But to presume that each prisoner’s moral character is settled, and 
that any apparent signs of improvement must instead be evidence of manipulation, is 
essentially to give up on these prisoners. In my view, this essentially amounts to a form 
of institutionalized contempt. 
Ultimately, Rhodes is pessimistic about the effects of prolonged isolation on 
prisoners’ moral (and mental) well-being. This is not to deny that in some cases isolation 
might facilitate moral reflection and reform. But the effects of prolonged isolation merit 
further study. If empirical evidence indicated that such punishments, on balance, did tend 
to hamper offenders’ ability to engage in moral reflection, and thus tended to undermine 
the prospect of their moral reform, then these punishments would be prohibited according 
to the constraint I am endorsing. 
 
III. Reform to be promoted or not undermined? 
On the conception of contempt I have endorsed, a central characteristic is that it 
expresses a giving up on its object. Respect, conversely, requires that we not treat others 
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as hopelessly, irredeemably inferior as moral persons; that is, respect requires not giving 
up on others. One might expect, given this account, that I would defend a different 
constraint on punishment, namely, that to be permissible, punishments must tend to 
promote the moral reform of offenders. One might think, after all, that the best way to 
express that we have not given up on an individual is to make her reform our positive aim, 
or goal. Thus perhaps our institution of punishment should reflect this positive goal, 
tailoring penal practices so that they tend to promote the moral reform of offenders 
(rather than merely the negative goal, on my account, of not tending to make offenders’ 
reform less likely).36 
Typically, accounts of punishment that focus on considerations of reform of the 
offender do incorporate these as positive goals to be promoted. Prior to the 1970s, for 
instance, offender improvement was a prominent justification of punishment. R. A. Duff 
and David Garland write: 
The same programmes and attitudes which fostered ‘the 
Welfare State’ sought to make the penal system an 
instrument of social engineering through which crime could 
be prevented. Punishment could prevent crime by deterring 
potential offenders or by incapacitating actual offenders: 
but it could achieve even greater goods, it was hoped, by 
reforming and rehabilitating offenders.37 
                                                 
36
 The goal of offender improvement is reflected in the typical description of prisons as “correctional 
facilities.” In the United States, all but two states incorporate “correction” into the name of the departments 
charged with managing their prison systems. The two exceptions are Hawaii (Department of Public Safety) 
and Texas (Department of Criminal Justice). It’s unclear, however, how many of these state institutions 
actually regard offender improvement as central to their mission. 
37
 R. A. Duff and David Garland, “Introduction: Thinking about Punishment,” in Duff and Garland, eds., A 
Reader on Punishment (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 8-9. 
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As Duff and Garland explain, enthusiasm for offender improvement as a goal of 
punishment decreased significantly beginning in the 1970s, for two general reasons. Both 
lines of objection are compelling against offender improvement as a positive goal, but 
neither is damaging to my account of reform as a prospect not to be undermined. The first 
general objection centers on efficacy. Emerging evidence seemed to indicate that the 
penal programs of the mid-20th century aimed at reform simply didn’t work. Insofar as an 
account grounds punishment’s permissibility in its potential as a mechanism for 
reforming offenders, evidence casting doubt on this potential is obviously fundamentally 
damaging to such an account. 
The account I endorse, however, requires only that punishments not tend to make 
reform less likely. Thus it does not link the permissibility of punishments to their ability 
to bring about positive changes in the offender — it only requires that punishments not 
get in the way, so to speak, of this prospective outcome. My account is unaffected, 
therefore, by evidence indicating that impositions of punishment are not effective means 
of bringing about reform. 
The second objection raised against punishments geared toward reform centers 
not on whether such practices are effective in attaining their stated goals, but rather on 
whether setting reform as a positive goal of punishment is consistent with the liberal ideal 
of individual autonomy. Or as it is often expressed in Kantian terms, the objection is that 
punishments aiming at reform fail to demonstrate proper respect for offenders as persons. 
Kant’s views on punishment remain the subject of substantial debate, but for present 
purposes the relevant legacy of Kant’s account for liberal theories of punishment is that 
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by punishing in an effort to bring about reform, a political community takes as its goal 
that which is not rightfully its goal to pursue. Moral reform involves the changing of 
motives, but moral motives, on the Kantian account, are not the sorts of things 
appropriately subject to external modification. As Duff characterizes the objection, if a 
system of punishment aims to reform offenders “by so modifying their dispositions and 
motives that they will in future willingly refrain from crime, it treats them not as 
responsible agents who should be left free to determine their own values and attitudes but 
as objects to be remolded or manipulated into conformity.”38 Instead, if the process of 
moral reform is to be meaningful, genuine reform, it must be freely chosen by the 
individual herself. Simply put, reform is not the sort of thing that should be imposed from 
the outside. 
As before, this objection is not damaging to my account. This is, again, because 
my view does not require that reform be a positive goal of punishment. All that my 
proposal requires is that punishment not tend to make reform less likely. This 
requirement is entirely compatible with the view that moral reform must be freely 
undertaken by the individual herself, as it is also with the recognition that she may never 
choose to do so. 
There is a particular strand of reform-oriented justifications of punishment that 
attempts to address the previous two objections while still maintaining offender reform as 
a positive aim. These accounts fall under the broad heading of expressive, or 
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communicative, theories, according to which punishment is a kind of language; it 
communicates an important message, namely, that a particular act is condemned by 
society as being morally wrong. The primary value of this communication may be of 
various kinds: It may be intrinsically valuable as a vindication of the law or a 
reaffirmation of the right that was violated39; it may be instrumentally valuable in 
promoting some societal goal, such as social solidarity40 or a morally educated public41; 
or, relevant for present purposes, it may be instrumentally valuable in promoting the 
moral improvement of the wrongdoer herself. 
Two prominent varieties of this offender-improvement strand of the 
communicative account are the moral education theory, according to which the 
communicative aim of punishment is to teach a wrongdoer that what she did was morally 
wrong and thus prohibited by society, and Duff’s theory of punishment as secular 
penance, according to which punishment “aims not just to communicate [deserved] 
censure but thereby to persuade offenders to repentance, self-reform, and 
reconciliation.”42 Both of these theories explicitly take offender reform to be a positive 
aim of punishment; nevertheless, both share two important features with my account. 
First, both theories accept, as I do, the notion that no one should be treated as morally 
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 C.f., Primoratz, “Punishment as Language.” 
40
 C.f., Emile Durkheim’s account of punishment as a means of fostering solidarity, in his The Division of 
Labor in Society, trans. G. Simpson (New York City: The Free Press, 1964). 
41
 C.f., A.C. Ewing, “Punishment as Moral Agency,” Mind 36 (1927), 297. 
42
 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, pp. xvii-xix. 
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irredeemable.43 Second, and more important for present purposes, communicative 
theorists emphasize the Kantian ideal of respecting individual autonomy. Thus Jean 
Hampton, in her seminal development of the moral education theory, writes: 
[T]he moral education theorist will admit that the state can 
predict that many of the criminals it punishes will refuse to 
accept the moral message it delivers. As I have stressed, the 
moral education theory rests on the assumption of 
individual autonomy, and thus an advocate of this theory 
must not only admit but insist that the choice of whether to 
listen to the moral message contained in the punishment 
belongs in the criminal.44 
On these communicative accounts, then, punishment communicates a message to 
the offender urging reform, but the offender, being autonomous, may accept or reject the 
message. By respecting — in fact insisting on, as Hampton writes — the offender’s 
freedom to reject the message of reform, these communicative theories can answer the 
two objections leveled against traditional offender-improvement accounts. For the 
communicative theories, after all, punishment’s aim is not to impose reform on the 
offender, an aim not only likely to fail but also inappropriate for the penal institutions of 
a liberal state. Rather, the aim of punishment on these theories is to send a message 
asking, even urging the offender to choose freely to repent and reform. Given the 
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 Duff, for instance, writes that “we can never have morally adequate grounds — nothing could count as 
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emphasis such theories place on respecting individual autonomy, as well as their 
insistence that everyone be treated as having the capacity for redemption, it might seem 
that I should just endorse one of these accounts, accepting this sort of freely chosen 
reform as a positive aim of punishment rather than as a prospect not to be undermined. 
I actually don’t have strong objections to punishments that aim at offender reform, 
although as I discussed in chapters 1 and 2, I believe the central aim of punishment — 
the reason we should want such an institution — is that it helps to deter criminals and 
thus to protect the security and well-being of community members. Deterrence, in my 
view, constitutes both a sufficient and a necessary positive aim of punishment. That is, 
the role played by the prospect of punishment in reducing crimes constitutes enough of a 
reason to want such an institution; conversely, if empirical evidence determined that the 
prospect of punishment had no impact in reducing crime,45 and thus that it didn’t serve to 
protect community members security or well-being, then communicating a message of 
moral censure would not itself constitute a sufficient reason to justify the enormous 
financial investment that the institution of punishment requires. But if we grant that 
deterrence is properly the central aim of punishment, I don’t object to the sort of moral 
suasion that Hampton and Duff endorse as a supplementary aim of the practice. 
                                                 
45
 In fact, the empirical evidence appears to support the intuitive conclusion that criminal sanctions do have 
a deterrent effect. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-
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deterrent is much firmer than it was fifteen years ago. I now concur … that the collective actions of the 
criminal justice system exert a very substantial deterrent effect” (p. 3). See also Andrew von Hirsch, 
Anthony E. Bottoms, Elizabeth Burney, and P-O. Wikstrom, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: 
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In practice, of course, punishments may tend to have both effects. Also, the 
distinction between special deterrence (deterring the offender from committing future 
crimes) and offender reform may in practice become blurrier than is sometimes 
recognized in theoretical discussions of these aims. Still, if we consider the 
communicative aspect of punishment and ask who should constitute the primary audience 
of the institution, in my view the answer is all of us (as potential offenders), not solely 
those who have already committed crimes (as wrongdoers in need of moral reform). 
Consider also that if we took the central aim of punishment to be offender reform rather 
than deterrence, then we would have at least a relatively harder time justifying the 
punishment of already-repentant offenders, or offenders who may be persuaded to repent 
by nonpunitive means (nonpunitive censure, perhaps). A drunk driver who kills a person, 
for instance, may upon sobering up be racked with guilt about what she has done; 
furthermore, she may genuinely commit to change her behavior, to fight her addiction, 
and not to make the same mistakes again. Under a system of punishment aimed centrally 
at reform, it’s unclear how we might justify punishing her.46 Given deterrence as the 
institution’s central aim, however, it becomes clearer that we would have good reason to 
punish her in spite of her repentance. The point of punishment is to provide a compelling 
reason for potential offenders not to commit acts that violate community members’ 
security and well-being. Punishing the already repentant drunk driver would serve to 
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reinforce the credibility of the threat to other potential drunk drivers (many of whom 
would also undoubtedly be remorseful and repentant if they committed similar acts). 
In summary, then, I have no strong objections to the sort of reform endorsed by 
Hampton and Duff as an aim of punishment, as long as it is not taken to constitute the 
sole or central aim of the institution. Deterrence constitutes the reason we should want an 
institution of punishment, and although reform might represent a supplemental aim, the 
institution’s justification does not require that reform be among its aims. On my account, 
however, the permissibility of punishment does require that penal practices not tend to 
undermine the prospect of offender reform. In the next section, I consider various 
objections to this thesis. 
 
IV. Objections 
First, one might argue that any punishment might undermine the prospect of 
reform. That is, perhaps any punishment might at least to some degree increase an 
offender’s negative regard for the society on whose behalf she is punished, and thus 
weaken her motivation to reflect on, and care about, how her criminal actions violated 
certain of the society’s values. If this is the case, then one might think that all 
punishments, insofar as there exists the possibility that they might undermine reform, 
would be impermissible. Notice, however, that I have consistently phrased my constraint 
as a prohibition on punishments that tend to undermine the prospect of reform. So for my 
account to imply a prohibition on all punishments as the objection challenges, it would 
have to be the case that all modes and degrees of punishment tend to undermine the 
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prospect of reform. This seems unlikely, unless one believes that impunity always tends 
to be more conducive to moral reflection and reform than any punishment at all. 
This leads to a related point: Undermining the prospect of reform, as I conceive it, 
is to be distinguished from undermining the mere possibility of reform. The latter 
formulation could permit a great deal more in terms of punishment, insofar as reform 
may remain at least a bare possibility even for offenders subject to exceedingly harsh or 
demeaning treatment. Such treatment would undermine the prospect of reform, however, 
in terms of tending to make the requisite moral reflection less likely than it would have 
been had punishment not been administered. Thus it would be prohibited on my account. 
As the previous two points indicate, which punishments would actually be ruled 
out by my account will depend significantly on empirical evidence about what tends to 
undermine the prospect of reform. I do not attempt here to address these empirical 
questions. Rather, my aim has been to flesh out and argue for the constraining principle 
itself. But the question of how the principle would constrain in practice — that is, the 
question of what sorts of punishments actually tend to undermine the prospect of offender 
reform — is one that I suggest bears further scrutiny. If research found, for instance, that 
certain forms of punishment significantly correlated with higher frequencies of 
reoffending (or with offenders’ graduating up to more serious crimes) upon release, this 
would provide at least some tentative evidence that such punishments were undermining 
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offenders’ moral reform.47 Again, however, my point in this chapter is not to settle the 
empirical issue, but rather to defend the principle underlying it. 
Finally, one might object that some offenders are simply irredeemable, and if so, 
we need not concern ourselves with whether punishments might undermine their 
redemption.48 If some criminals are essentially moral monsters, with no potential for 
reform, then seemingly no punishments would be ruled out by the considerations of 
reform that I have proposed here. There is no punishment, after all, that will undermine 
the reform of one who cannot be reformed anyway. We should be careful, however, 
about ascribing to individuals, even apparently vicious individuals, the labels “moral 
monster” or “irredeemable.” First, it’s not clear what would count as adequate evidence 
that one is truly irredeemable, rather than merely (so far) unredeemed or unrepentant. 
Even consistently evil behavior is only evidence, in Kantian terms, that one is not 
currently exhibiting a good will, not that one has no capacity to develop a good will. Kant, 
in fact, believed that everyone possessed a predisposition to act from respect for the 
moral law.49 This feature of humanity, as Thomas Hill puts it, “implies that anyone who 
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has humanity has a capacity and disposition to follow such principles; but since his 
rationality may be imperfect or counteracted by other features, he may not always follow 
these principles.”50 Thus Kant believed everyone had the capacity for repentance and 
reform, that a human being “can never lose entirely his predisposition to the good.”51 
Suppose, however, we are less optimistic than Kant. Suppose we believe that 
some individuals truly are moral monsters, that some truly have no capacity for reform. 
Still, there is a significant epistemic challenge in trying to determine which individuals 
are truly incapable of reform and which are merely as yet unreformed. It’s not clear even 
how we might go about distinguishing, with any confidence, the former class of 
individuals from the latter.52 Given this practical epistemic challenge, any distinctions we 
attempt to make between those who can and cannot be redeemed will be suspect. In 
trying to make such assessments, then, we inevitably risk treating as irredeemable those 
who are in fact capable of reform. That is, we risk treating some individuals with 
contempt. Instead, I suggest that even if genuine moral monsters exist, we would do 
better to err on the side of treating everyone as though she is capable of reform. 
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V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have contended that punishments should not express contempt 
for offenders, should not give up on them as moral persons. Because of this, punishments 
should be constrained so that they do not tend to undermine the prospect of offenders’ 
reform. In the previous chapter, I also offered a partial defense of the retributivist 
principle that punishments should be no more severe than their crimes morally deserve. 
Both of these constraints essentially set ceilings on how severely we may punish.53 A 
worry arises, however, with respect to how these constraints fit with what I have claimed 
is the central aim of punishment, the deterrence of potential criminals. The worry is that 
for punishments to achieve the goal of deterring potential offenders, these punishments 
would need to exceed what is allowed by the retributivist and reform-based constraints.54 
I offer two responses: First, if it did prove to be the case that the floor set by the 
goal of deterrence were higher than the ceilings set by the retributivist and reform-based 
constraints, the constraints would take precedence. In other words, the social benefits of 
punishment are insufficient to justify the institution if its practices fail to respect those 
punished as moral persons. Second, however, I doubt that the aim of deterrence really 
does require sentences more severe than the retributivist and reform-based constraints 
allow. Research into punishment’s deterrent effects tends to support the notion that 
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certainty of punishment plays a much larger role than severity of punishment. This 
conclusion undermines the idea that sentences must be especially severe for the 
institution of punishment to have a significant deterrent impact; effective enforcement 
appears more relevant to the deterrent impact. Thus it’s reasonable, I suggest, to think 
that the institution of punishment might provide significant deterrent benefits even as it is 
constrained by the considerations of retribution and reform that I have discussed in these 
two chapters.55 
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CHAPTER 5 
Collective punishment and distribution of harms 
 
The institutions of international criminal law that have developed in the decades 
since the Nuremberg trials have consistently focused on prosecuting and punishing 
individual human agents for their roles in mass crimes. The International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg expressed what has since become the governing view: “Crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced.”1 In the wake of atrocities such as the Rwandan and Srebrenica genocides, 
however, the tribunal’s pronouncement may seem, at least, too simplistic. Genocide and 
crimes against humanity, after all, are by their nature group endeavors. Individuals may 
murder, torture, or rape, but no individual alone is responsible for perpetrating mass 
crimes such as genocide. Rather, such crimes typically result from the actions of groups 
of individuals, who may be organized in some strong sense or may, at least, influence 
each other in ways that make possible what would not have been possible from human 
beings acting individually. 
The question of how best to assign responsibility for group wrongdoing has 
spawned a sizeable philosophical literature.2 Scholars have debated whether 
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 International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War Criminals, judgment of Oct. 1, 1946; 
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 C.f., Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. pp. 37-40; see 
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responsibility for group-perpetrated crimes is shared, in the sense that responsibility 
distributes among individual group members, or collective, so that the group itself, as a 
group, is responsible for the crimes in a nondistributive sense (or whether the best 
conception of responsibility lies somewhere between these extremes). Because 
international criminal law views individual human beings as the responsible agents, its 
challenge has been to prosecute and punish individuals for what they, as individuals, 
actually did (or failed to do), while nevertheless accounting for the fact that their acts (or 
omissions) were part of a larger criminal enterprise. Establishing both the criminal act 
and intent elements for individuals who contributed somehow to the mass crime can be a 
thorny matter.3 
As an alternative, a number of scholars have begun to endorse what I will refer to 
as “collective punishment,” according to which states themselves, either in addition to or 
instead of their individual members, are the appropriate subjects of punishment for 
international crimes. Thus Anthony Lang writes: “[W]hile individuals have been 
rightfully accused of and punished for these crimes, it seems appropriate that states be 
held responsible as well, for only an organized community has the means to inflict 
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Press, 2005), esp. chapters 7-9; and Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (New York: Cambridge 
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violence on such a large scale.”4 On this view, punishing states is often appropriate 
because states themselves are in many cases the responsible agents of genocide and other 
mass crimes.5 Collective punishment is thus an attractive option insofar as it better 
ensures that no responsibility for the crime goes unassigned, whereas it has proven 
difficult to account fully for responsibility for mass crimes by prosecuting and punishing 
individual contributors. 
This paper examines various conceptual and normative questions about how 
international institutions might implement a practice of collective punishment. Of central 
concern is whether collective punishment is consistent with treating individual group 
members with respect as moral agents. Punishment involves inflicting harms on offenders, 
and the worry with collective punishment is that the harms produced by punishing groups 
will distribute among group members, some of whom may not have participated in (or 
may even have worked against) the criminal endeavor. Requiring some group members 
to bear these distributed burdens even though they did not contribute to the group’s 
crimes appears inconsistent with respecting them as autonomous moral agents. 
In what follows, I consider various strategies of defending collective punishment 
against the objection that its harms will distribute in unjustifiable ways: First, one might 
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offer some argument as to why a given distribution of harms is in fact justified. Second, 
one might accept that collective punishment’s harms will distribute unfairly, so that some 
members of the state will be wronged, but then contend that this presumptive injustice is 
overridden by the good accomplished (or harm averted) by the practice. Third, one might 
endorse collective punishment with nondistributive harms. I contend that the first two 
lines of defense fail. Distributive collective punishment is indeed presumptively 
unjustified, and the ostensible benefits of such a practice are insufficient to override this 
presumption. And although collective punishment with nondistributive harms may be 
morally justifiable, it presents serious difficulties with respect to implementation. 
Ultimately, international criminal law would do better to maintain its focus on individual 
human agents, and to continue seeking better ways to fully assign responsibility for mass 
crimes without imposing punitive burdens on group members who did not contribute. 
 
I. The case for collective punishment 
Proponents of collective punishment contend that we should regard the state as 
the agent of international crimes. Since Hannah Arendt famously wrote of the “banality 
of evil,”6 a number of scholars have pointed out that those who participate in perpetrating 
mass crimes often aren’t properly characterized as criminal deviants, in the sense of 
deviating from their community’s norms; instead, they may be said to act in accordance 
                                                 
6
 See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994). 
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with the norms of a community that is itself criminal.7 In circumstances such as these, in 
which the pathological instead becomes normal, or even expected, it may seem 
appropriate to hold the group itself, as a group, responsible via collective punishment. 
Thus David Luban writes: “the Nazi state, like the Hutu Power state half a century later, 
was in a literal sense criminal to the core. ... A state that turns the world upside down and 
makes the monstrous the centerpiece of civic obligation is a criminal state.”8 If 
criminality really is pervasive within a group, then collective punishment may more 
effectively ensure that all of the criminal wrongdoing is accounted for — that no aspect 
of it goes unpunished. 
By ensuring a full assignment of responsibility for mass crimes, collective 
punishment may be valuable in the message that it sends to citizens of the punished state. 
Again, given that the factors that allow, or even promote, mass crimes are often pervasive, 
and sometimes subtle, throughout a group, collective punishment may make it more 
difficult for some members of the group to avoid accepting responsibility themselves for 
the roles they played in the crimes. If only the group leaders are punished, then members 
of the group who escape punishment may find it too easy to rationalize to themselves that 
they played no role, that they bear no responsibility, for the wrongdoing. 
Underlying the idea that collective punishment is a more effective assignment of 
responsibility for mass crimes is the practical consideration that determining criminal 
                                                 
7
 C.f., Deirdre Golash, “The Justification of Punishment in the International Context,” in International 
Criminal Law and Philosophy, eds. Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 212. See also Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, pp. 25-26, 32, 173. 
8
 Luban, “State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law,” p. 63. 
  
 
141 
responsibility and punishing mass crimes piecemeal can be extremely difficult. Even if 
courts could determine each person’s individual contributions to the crime and 
sufficiently establish each person’s intent, the process would be exceedingly expensive 
and time consuming.9 Punishing a state as a whole, however, through monetary or other 
sanctions, appears simpler to accomplish from a practical standpoint. 
Finally, even for members of the state who did not contribute to the crimes, 
collective punishment may provide an incentive to work to oust the criminal leaders, or to 
change the institutions or culture that allowed the crimes to occur. Philip Pettit writes:  
By finding the grouping responsible, we make clear to 
members as a whole that unless they develop routines for 
keeping their government … in check, then they will share 
in the corporate responsibility of the group; even if they 
have little or no enactor responsibility, they will have 
member responsibility for what was done. By finding the 
grouping responsible in such a case, indeed, we will make 
clear to the members of other groupings in the same 
category that they too are liable to be found guilty in 
parallel cases, should the body to which they belong bring 
about one or another ill.10 
Thus there appear to be good reasons to give collective punishment serious 
consideration as an alternative or  a supplement to the current system of individually 
focused prosecutions and punishments. Despite the apparent virtues of collective 
punishment, however, serious concerns arise regarding how exactly such punishment 
should be imposed. As suggested before, the central worry is that punishing an entire 
                                                 
9
 C.f., Avia Pasternak, “Sharing the Costs of Political Injustices,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 
prepublished online November 29, 2010, DOI: 10.1177/1470594X10368260. 
10
 Philip Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Ethics 117 (2007): 171-201, on p. 200. See also D. J. 
Levinson, “Collective Sanctions,” Stanford Law Review 56 (2003): 345-428. 
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group as a group will nevertheless result in harms to individual members of the group, 
many of whom may not have participated in the wrongdoing (or may even have actively 
denounced it or otherwise worked against it). Thus the specter of guilt by association 
looms. That we may impose harms on an individual in response to a crime in which she 
played no role, one which she did not even endorse, merely because she is in some sense 
associated with others who did perpetrate the crime — this notion will strike many as 
deeply unfair.11 In particular, such treatment appears inconsistent with the principle of 
respect for persons, which requires at a minimum that our treatment of others be 
responsive to them, to what they have freely done or intended to do.      
If collective punishment is defensible in the face of this objection, it appears that 
the defense will need to proceed along one of the following lines: (a) the harms of 
collective punishment will distribute, but the distributions are justifiable in themselves; (b) 
the harms of collective punishment will distribute in presumptively unjustifiable ways, 
but this presumptive wrong is overridden by some greater good attained through 
collective punishment; or (c) states can be punished without the harms distributing. I 
consider each option in turn.  
 
II. Distributing collective punishment’s harms 
One alternative for an advocate of collective punishment is to concede that its 
harms will distribute among group members, and then to defend some distribution of the 
                                                 
11
 C.f., Toni Erskine, “Kicking Bodies and Damning Souls: The Danger of Harming ‘Innocent’ Individuals 
While Punishing ‘Delinquent’ States,” Ethics & International Affairs 24:3 (2010): 261-285, on pp. 272-73. 
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harms as justified. An obvious candidate is an equal distribution of harms.12 But is equal 
distribution defensible, given the fact that some members of the group will inevitably 
play a smaller role in the group’s crimes than others (or no role, or even work against the 
crime)? 
A number of theorists have argued, on various grounds, that group members, even 
dissenters, may be liable to bear equally the costs of compensating victims for the harms 
their group inflicted. David Miller, for instance, argues that in cooperative groups such as 
democratic political communities, when members reap the benefits of citizenship and 
have “a fair chance to influence” the community’s decisions, then they may be “outcome 
responsible” for what their group does.13 On Miller’s view, the equal liability of members 
of a democratic community stems, in part, from the fact that they participated (or at least 
had the chance to participate) in the decision-making process. Avia Pasternak, by contrast, 
rejects appeals to democratic authorization such as Miller’s, because she believes 
community members who actively objected to a harmful policy cannot be said to have 
authorized it.14 Instead, Pasternak defends equal distribution of the costs of political 
injustices by appeal to associative obligations among members of a democratic 
community.15 
                                                 
12
 C.f., Avia Pasternak, “The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment,” in Accountability for Collective 
Wrongdoing, eds. Tracy Isaacs and Richard Vernon (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 221.  
13
 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 
119. See also Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 78-81. 
14
 Pasternak, “Sharing the Costs of Political Injustices.” 
15
 Ibid. 
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Rather than engage here with Miller’s and Pasternak’s contrasting defenses of 
equally shared consequential responsibility for group wrongs, I want to focus on a point 
on which their accounts, and a number of other discussions of collective responsibility, 
agree: the distinction between blameworthiness and consequential responsibility. 
Theorists who endorse holding group members, even noncontributors, responsible for 
their group’s wrongdoing are typically quick to clarify that such group members may not 
be morally blameworthy, or deserving of punishment.16 Even if it is not permissible, 
however, to punish individuals for crimes in which they played no role, scholars such as 
Miller and Pasternak offer various strategies for establishing that group members, even 
noncontributors or dissenters, may share equally the consequential responsibility for 
compensating those harmed by the crime. For instance, Miller writes of a polluting, 
employee-controlled firm whose members decide in a majority vote not to implement 
more environmentally friendly practices: 
It would not in general be right to blame (or punish) 
members of the minority for what their firm has done to the 
river — they could quite properly defend themselves by 
saying that they spoke out against the manufacturing 
process that caused the pollution. But it is right to hold 
them, along with others, liable for the damage they have 
caused.17 
                                                 
16
 See also, e.g., Anna Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 
prepublished online February 12, 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00360.x; Iris Marion Young, 
“Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 12:4 (2004): 365-388; and 
Hannah Arendt, “Collective responsibility,” in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of 
Hannah Arendt, ed. James W. Bernauer (Boston: Martinus Nijoff, 1987). 
17
 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 119. 
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Miller’s discussion here reflects a common intuition: We typically believe that 
liability to punishment is an especially serious matter, and so we set a higher standard to 
hold a person liable to punishment than to hold her liable to pay compensation.18 There 
are at least two significant reasons to be especially cautious when punishment is at stake. 
First, a characteristic feature of punishment is that it expresses blame, or condemnation, 
of the offender.19 This feature is not essential to compensation. Thus if a defendant in a 
civil suit is required to pay compensatory damages, the aim of the decision is not to 
assess blame but rather to make restitution to those harmed by the defendant’s actions. 
Second, another essential feature of punishments is that they are intended to be of a 
severity that will harm those punished — whether because offenders deserve the harm, or 
because the prospect of harm will help deter wrongdoers, etc. It isn’t an essential feature, 
however, of compensation that it be harmful to the agent making compensation. Because 
of this, impositions of punishment may often be significantly more severe than would be 
required solely to compensate those harmed. More is typically at stake, then, with 
punishment than with compensatory liability, both because of punishment’s 
condemnatory message and because particular burdens imposed may often be more 
severe than compensating victims for their losses would require. These factors may help 
explain why scholars such as Miller and Pasternak are willing to ascribe consequential 
responsibility to individual group members where they would not endorse punishment. 
                                                 
18
 This fact is reflected by the greater burden of proof for prosecutors in criminal trials (“beyond a 
reasonable doubt”) than for plaintiffs in civil litigation (“preponderance of the evidence”). 
19
 See Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of 
Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
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For present purposes, then, the relevant question is whether collective punishment 
of a state in which the harms distribute equally among the state’s members looks more 
like a case of assigning consequential responsibility to these members or of punishing 
them. Pasternak believes it is the former. That is, she contends that equal distribution of 
the harms of collective punishment does not entail that the punishment itself has 
distributed; it is still the state itself that is punished, even if its members actually bear the 
burdens. She justifies her claim by focusing on the expressive or condemnatory aspect of 
punishment. Because the burdens borne by the group members have no condemning 
function, she contends, they aren’t properly punishment.20 Thus the punishment itself 
remains at the level of the state; the burdens borne equally by the state’s citizens stem 
from their consequential responsibility to share the burden of compensating those harmed. 
There are good reasons, I contend, to believe that the burden distributed among a 
state’s citizens in cases of collective punishment is indeed a punitive burden, rather than 
merely a compensatory (i.e., consequential) one. First, as indicated above, because 
punishment and compensation have different aims, the sanction imposed on a perpetrator 
state as punishment could be significantly more severe than would be required to 
compensate those harmed by the state’s actions. In such cases, the distributed burden 
shared equally by the state’s citizens would similarly be considerably greater than what 
would be required for compensation. Second, the mode of punishment may differ from 
what would be required for compensation. Monetary sanctions may be an obvious 
                                                 
20
 Pasternak, “The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment,” pp. 216-17. Toni Erskine makes a similar 
point in “Kicking Bodies and Damning Souls,” p. 273. 
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method of punishing a collectivity such as a state, but advocates of collective punishment 
have suggested other options. David Luban, for instance, mentions “capital punishment” 
for the state, that is, “conquest and reconstruction.”21 Anthony Lang suggests that 
punishment could include “coercive military actions, such as the use of aerial bombing 
against targets as identified as central to the state … .”22 The harms associated with these 
punishments, like the burdens of monetary sanctions, would be distributive — they would 
be borne by the group members. It’s at least unclear, though, how such harms would 
serve to compensate the victims of mass crimes.23 Thus in their severity and their mode, 
the burdens shared equally by group members will often be more punitive than 
compensatory. 
Similarly, these considerations cast doubt on whether the condemnatory 
expression of collective punishment really remains at the level of the state, even as the 
burdens distribute. If (a) the international community imposes punitive measures on a 
state, with explicit or implicit recognition that it is asking the state’s citizens to bear the 
associated burdens, and (b) these burdens are in many cases either more severe or of a 
different mode than would be appropriate for compensating victims, then (c) it seems 
reasonable to interpret the message conveyed to the burdened citizens as the message that 
                                                 
21
 Luban, “State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law,” p. 90. 
22
 Lang, “Crime and Punishment,” p. 250. I discuss Lang’s own strategy for defending collective 
punishment in section III.  
23
 However, for an account of how considerations of compensation, or restitution, might be seen to ground 
a number of sanctions that we typically associate with punishment, see David Boonin, The Problem of 
Punishment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 231-35. I am skeptical of Boonin’s 
account, but elaborating on this point is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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they are being punished for their state’s wrongs, not that they are being asked to bear 
consequential responsibility for their state’s harms. This is not to deny that the 
international community might intend the expression of censure to attach only at the level 
of the state itself, not to distribute. But it’s entirely possible (fairly common, even) to 
intend to communicate one message but actually to communicate something else. Even if 
the international community does not intend to communicate censure of the state’s 
citizens themselves, the punitive severity and mode of the harms imposed will tend to do 
just that. Thus the condemnatory aspect of collective punishment will distribute along 
with the harms. 
For all of these reasons, we would do best to characterize collective punishment in 
which the harms distribute equally among group members as punishing the group 
members equally. Given that some group members may have contributed less than others, 
or not at all, or even worked against the group’s crimes, we have good reason to resist 
this sort of punitive scheme as essentially a form of guilt by association, and thus as 
inconsistent with basic respect for group members as autonomous moral persons. One 
can certainly challenge this point, and endorse punishing group members, even those who 
did not contribute, for their group’s crimes (although, again, this tack is explicitly 
rejected by those such as Miller and Pasternak who want to endorse consequential 
responsibility). One strategy would be to point to the overriding net benefits to which 
such a practice would contribute. I discuss this sort of argument in section III.  
There are other options for how the harms of collective punishment might be 
distributed to group members. Pasternak, for instance, also discusses random, or 
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unpatterned, distribution as well as proportionate distribution.24 First, the harms of 
collective punishment could distribute among group members according to no real 
pattern, or at least no pattern imposed by the punishing authority. Consider Luban’s 
“capital punishment” of the state. Such punishment does not lend itself to any clear 
pattern of harm distribution — equal, proportionate, or otherwise. Even monetary 
sanctions may not distribute harm in any readily identifiable pattern, if the punished state 
chooses (and is allowed by the punishing authority) to secure the funds by reducing the 
services it provides to its citizens. These sorts of unpatterned distributions appear 
especially unfair, in that they allow for the prospect that those who had nothing to do 
with, or even worked against, the group’s crime may have to bear a greater burden than 
those who more actively contributed. Furthermore, for the same reasons discussed with 
respect to equal distribution, we should regard the unpatterned harms borne by group 
members as genuinely punitive, rather than as consequential (compensatory) burdens. 
Like equal distribution, then, unpatterned distribution appears unjustified in its own right, 
although it may be defensible because of its overriding benefits. 
Second, collective punishment’s harms could be distributed to group members 
according to their proportionate responsibility. Pasternak notes that such a distribution 
will be difficult as a practical matter.25 More importantly, though, it’s especially unclear 
that a proportionate distribution scheme could still be said to count as punishment of the 
group as a group. As I noted above, endorsements of equal distribution schemes rely on 
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 Pasternak, “The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment,” pp. 220-28. 
25
 Ibid., pp. 222-23. 
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the claim that the harms borne by group members don’t amount to punishment, because 
the condemnatory expression remains at the level of the group itself. I have suggested 
reasons to be skeptical of this claim, but notice that it is even less plausible in a scheme 
of collective punishment in which the harms are distributed proportionately. In a 
proportionate distribution scheme, determinations would need to be made of each group 
member’s relative responsibility, so that the harms could be distributed accordingly. 
Surely, however, making such determinations is sufficient to change the expressive 
nature of the punishment. By making determinations of which group member is 
responsible for what, we in effect shift from censuring the group itself to censuring, to 
different degrees, the members of the group. So a proportionate distribution scheme, even 
more than an equal distribution scheme, looks less like merely punishing the group and 
distributing the harms among members than like punishing the members themselves. 
Note, however, that my critique here is not that a proportionate distribution of 
harms would be unfair in the sense in which I claimed that an equal distribution, and even 
moreso an unpatterned distribution, would be unfair. As I have indicated, I’m ultimately 
sympathetic to the approach of focusing on individuals, holding them accountable for 
what they actually did to contribute to the larger endeavor. Rather, my claim is only that a 
proportionate distribution scheme of collective punishment is not really collective 
punishment at all. Such a scheme, in practice, would amount to what is the predominant 
practice in international criminal law today, in which judicial institutions make individual 
assessments of guilt and punish individual offenders according to what they themselves 
did to contribute to (or in some cases, did not do to help stop) the group’s enterprise. 
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Ultimately, I doubt that the practice of collective punishment with the harms 
distributing among group members is intrinsically justifiable. The burden distributed in 
equal or unpatterned schemes is genuinely a punitive burden, not merely compensatory, 
and is unfair to those who played no role in the crimes. By contrast, proportional 
distribution schemes are much fairer, but they no longer count as genuine instances of 
collective punishment, punishment of the group as a group. In the next section, I consider 
whether collective punishments whose harms are distributed equally, or randomly, among 
group members might be all-things-considered permissible, even if presumptively 
unjustified, because of the net benefits such schemes of punishment produce. 
 
III. Overriding net benefits of collective punishment? 
As we’ve seen, the key move for accounts that attempt to justify some distribution 
scheme in its own right is to claim that the distributed burdens don’t amount to 
punishment of the group members, to which we typically object for reasons discussed 
above. Rather, such schemes impose burdens of compensation on group members, and 
such burdens are somehow justifiable. I have argued that such distribution schemes are 
best understood as genuine punishment of group members, and that they are not 
defensible in their own right. But perhaps it is nevertheless all-things-considered 
permissible to impose punitive harms that will be borne even by those who did not 
contribute to the group’s wrongs, if the net benefits of collective punishment are 
sufficiently great. Anthony Lang, in endorsing regime change and lustration as state 
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punishment, admits that “this punishment might result in the harm or death of individuals 
who had nothing to do with the policies of the government.”26 
As with any use of force in the international system, 
avoiding such deaths should be a primary goal. Nonetheless, 
concern with such deaths cannot prevent the use of punitive 
measures to enforce norms. Indeed, one might argue that 
the seriousness of genocide demands that punitive 
measures be employed even knowing there is a significant 
chance that innocents might die, and regrettable as that is.27 
For Lang, collective punishment might be justified (or required), even if some of 
the group members punished contributed nothing to the group’s crimes, if such a scheme 
were an effective way of preventing atrocities such as genocide. It’s worth considering, 
then, whether the net benefits of collective punishment would be sufficient to render 
presumptively unjustified punishment of group members all-things-considered justified. 
There are, I suggest, reasons to be skeptical of this claim. 
In evaluating Lang’s claims about the net benefits of collective punishment, it’s 
important to bear in mind the distinction between, on one hand, the use of force against 
some perpetrator state as a means of warding off its attack against some victim group and, 
on the other hand, the use of force to punish a perpetrator state. Typically, self-defense or 
defense of others is understood as the imposition of force on perpetrators to stop them 
from committing (or continuing to commit) some wrongful act. Punishment, by contrast, 
imposes harm on offenders not to ward off their impending or ongoing attacks, but rather 
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 Lang, “Crime and Punishment,” p. 255. 
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in response to some wrongdoing they have already committed.28 Lang appears to conflate 
these two distinct notions — stopping crimes that are being committed and punishing 
crimes that have been committed — when he writes that one effect of punishing states 
may be “retributive, in that the specific state committing the crime would be forced to 
stop.”29 But we cannot defend collective punishment, including the regrettable killing of 
innocent group members, by appeal to the overriding benefits of the use of international 
force to stop some ongoing genocide. Rather, collective punishment must be defensible 
as an imposition of harm on some state for crimes it has already committed. 
As discussed earlier, one commonly cited rationale for holding groups 
collectively responsible is that in many cases the group itself is best understood as the 
criminal agent, and thus a full assignment of responsibility requires that the group itself 
be held accountable. Philip Pettit contends that assigning responsibility solely among 
those individuals who enact the group’s plan “may leave a deficit in the accounting books, 
and the only possible way to guard against this may be to allow for the corporate 
responsibility of the group in the name of which they act.”30 Assigning responsibility 
                                                 
28
 If the aim of punishment is to deter potential wrongdoers from committing future offenses, then 
punishment may appear more closely analogous to self-defense. Indeed, a number of authors have 
attempted to justify deterrent punishment by appeal to considerations of self-defense. Nevertheless, 
inflicting harm in self-defense and inflicting harm as deterrent punishment are distinct notions in need of 
distinct justifications. The former involves using force against some attacker who is actually threatening or 
inflicting harm in order to prevent or stop the attack. The latter involves harming an offender in response to 
some already-committed act, with the aim of discouraging the offender or other potential offenders from 
acting similarly in the future. 
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 Lang, “Crime and Punishment,” p. 253. Lang’s claim is doubly confusing given that, insofar as forcing a 
state to stop committing a crime resembles any sort of punishment, it resembles deterrent punishment, not 
retributive punishment. 
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 Philip Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Ethics 117 (2007): 171-201, p. 194. See also Lang, “Crime 
and Punishment,” pp. 243-46; Luban, “State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law,” 
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solely among individual group members may leave this “deficit in the accounting books” 
because the group’s institutional structures and the relations among group members may 
play some causal role in the crime as well. Holding the group itself accountable may 
better ensure a full assignment of responsibility for the crime. 
Ensuring this sort of complete accounting might be regarded as valuable in its 
own right, especially by those who take retributivism to be the goal of an institution of 
punishment. In my view, however, the central aim of the practice of punishment is 
deterrence rather than retribution.31 Thus the relevant question is whether a system of 
collective punishment would sufficiently promote the aim of preventing future 
perpetration of international crimes so as to override the presumptive injustice of 
imposing punishment on citizens who did not participate in the state’s crimes. 
First, we might consider the relative deterrent impact of collective punishment on 
those group leaders who develop and initiate the criminal plan. In these cases, it’s 
doubtful that such a punishment scheme would be more effective as a deterrent than 
individual prosecutions and punishments. Presumably, these leaders would prefer 
collective punishment in which the harms are distributed among community members. 
                                                                                                                                                 
pp. 78-82; Kirsten Ainley, “Individual Agency and Responsibility for Atrocity,” and Arne Johan Vetlesen, 
“Collective Evildoing,” in Jeffery, Confronting Evil in International Relations. 
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 Many contemporary scholars argue instead that the central aim of punishing international crimes is to 
express condemnation of the crime to the perpetrators, the victims, or to the international community 
generally. See, e.g., Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. In my view, however, although 
there is a genuine expressive aspect to punishment, the relevant question for accounts that appeal to this 
aspect is why it is sufficiently important to justify punishment. Typically, expressive accounts will appeal to 
the role such condemnations can play in preventing future atrocities or to the intrinsic value of expressing 
deserved censure of wrongdoers. Ultimately, then, I believe the expressivist justifications of punishment 
are best characterized either as deterrent or retributive in their aims. 
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Given the disproportionate role the leaders play in perpetrating the crime, they would 
have good reason to think they’d fare comparatively better in a collective punishment 
scheme — in which harms are distributed equally, or randomly, etc. — than if everyone 
were punished individually in proportion to what she actually did.32 
Perhaps, instead, the threat of collective punishment would be more effective than 
individual punishment at deterring potential minor participants, those who might not 
develop or initiate the plan but nevertheless might play some active, culpable role in the 
criminal endeavor. Or maybe the threat of collective punishment would more effectively 
deter those who might otherwise be complicit in the crime — that is, those who, though 
they are not the principal planners or actors, nevertheless through their actions or failures 
to act might make the crime more likely to occur.33 In one sense, this appears more 
plausible than in the case of leaders, given the greater likelihood that minor participants 
or those who aid or abet the principal agents might slip through the net of individual 
prosecutions and punishments, whereas they would be liable to share the punitive harms 
of collective punishment. 
Suppose it’s true that the threat of collective punishment would better discourage 
potential minor players than would the existing system of individual prosecutions and 
punishments. We might take this either as a point in favor of collective punishment or as 
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 It’s true that the prospect of collective punishment in addition to (rather than instead of) traditional 
individual prosecutions and punishment might yield some additional deterrent effect, although this isn’t a 
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a reason to continue to develop and improve the existing system. In other words, as we 
ask whether collective punishment would yield sufficiently greater deterrent effects to 
override the presumption against it, the appropriate comparison class is not necessarily 
the current system of individual prosecutions and punishments, but rather the best 
realistically attainable version of such a system. Under the current system, prosecuting 
and punishing large numbers of the minor players or accomplices in mass atrocities may 
be so expensive or time-consuming as to be a practical impossibility. But there might be 
ways to develop and improve the current system, to address these practical issues.34 If so, 
then the ostensible comparative advantage of collective punishment in deterring minor 
contributors would be diminished, or even negated. 
In fact, however, there is reason to doubt that the threat of collective punishment 
would be more effective as a deterrent of potential minor players than would a scheme of 
individual prosecutions and punishments — even an imperfect scheme in which some 
contributing parties slipped through the cracks. Consider which would more likely deter a 
potential minor participant: (a) the prospect that, if the crime is prosecuted and punished, 
each group member will share the punitive harms regardless of her involvement, or lack 
thereof, in the criminal endeavor; or (b) the prospect that, if the crime is prosecuted and 
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 For instance, a number of scholars have expressed tentative optimism about the gacaca courts being 
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punished, individual determinations will be made based on what role each person played 
in the larger endeavor (as planner, enactor, accomplice, etc.). Assuming she is not herself 
capable of stopping the crime, then if the crime is successfully prosecuted, (a) threatens 
punitive harms regardless of whether she participates or not; (b), on the other hand, 
represents the opportunity to escape eventual punishment by not contributing. Thus 
whereas (b) offers her a clear reason not to participate, or aid or abet those who do 
participate, (a) offers her no real reason not to contribute to the enterprise. In a collective 
punishment scheme, if the crime is not successfully prosecuted, a group member escapes 
punishment whether or not she contributes; if the crime is successfully prosecuted, she 
shares in collective punishment’s harms to the same degree whether or not she 
contributes. Thus, in this sense, collective punishment appears to represent a less 
compelling deterrent threat for lesser participants and accomplices than does a scheme of 
individual prosecution and punishment. 
One might object that if enough citizens either did not participate or actively 
worked to prevent their state’s crime (by undermining the government’s efforts, or even 
ousting the leadership), the crime might be averted. And the threat of collective 
punishment might better deter this way, by motivating dissent among the state’s 
membership, than would the threat of individual punishments.35 Similarly, even if the 
                                                 
35
 Philip Pettit writes: “By finding the grouping responsible, we make clear to members as a whole that 
unless they develop routines for keeping their government or episcopacy in check, then they will share in 
the corporate responsibility of the group; even if they have little or no enactor responsibility, they will have 
member responsibility for what was done. By finding the grouping responsible in such a case, indeed, we 
will make clear to the members of other groupings in the same category that they too are liable to be found 
guilty in parallel cases, should the body to which they belong bring about one or another ill.” Pettit, 
“Responsibility Incorporated,” p. 200. 
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state carried out the crime, the imposition of collective punishment might be sufficiently 
burdensome for citizens that they would be motivated to work to prevent such crimes in 
the future (again, perhaps by undermining the leadership’s efforts or overthrowing it 
entirely). Notice, however, that the relative deterrent advantage of collective punishment 
in these cases depends on the citizens’ each believing that enough other citizens will act 
the same way that their efforts to prevent the crime will succeed. By contrast, if a citizen 
believes the crime will or won’t occur regardless of what she does, then as the previous 
discussion indicated, the threat of collective punishment will give her less reason not to 
contribute than would the threat of individually determined punishments. Also, among 
those opposed to or at least ambivalent toward their government’s activities, the 
imposition of collective punishment could foster resentment of the punishing entity for 
harming indiscriminately, and perhaps even increased solidarity with their own leaders. 
The decades-long U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, for instance, has by many accounts 
tended to increase the Cuban people’s solidarity with the Castro regime. For all of these 
reasons, then, I am skeptical of the claim that the threat or imposition of collective 
punishment would foment more resistance to perpetrator regimes than would individual 
punishments to a sufficient degree to override the presumption against collective 
punishment. 
The considerations discussed here are not, I recognize, conclusive, but they need 
not be. We began with a presumption against collective punishment, because it imposes 
harms on individuals for what others have done — thus it fails to respect them as 
autonomous moral agents. If one is nevertheless to endorse collective punishment 
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because of the overriding net benefits it yields, the burden falls to the advocate to present 
a compelling case for these benefits. Unless this can be done, collective punishment will 
be an inappropriate alternative to individual punishment. 
Perhaps, though, even if the benefits of collective punishment alone are 
insufficient to override the presumption against it, we should still endorse collective 
punishment in addition to (rather than instead of) individual punishment.36 Now, however, 
we have the opposite problem from that with which we started. As discussed earlier, 
those who support collective punishment often cite what Pettit calls “a deficit in the 
accounting books” left from individual punishments alone. By punishing the entire group, 
as a group, we ensure that all group members are held accountable (even, unfortunately, 
those who did not contribute to the crime). But if we layer collective punishment on top 
of individual punishments, there’s a worry that we may instead be left with a surplus in 
the accounting books. At least, we need to be clear about what exactly is the crime for 
which we’re punishing the group, and what are the crimes for which we’re punishing the 
group members. The relationship between the group’s crime and the group members’ 
crimes shouldn’t be that of a whole to its parts, or this would amount to an 
overassignment of criminal responsibility. And because the collective punishment’s 
harms would distribute (equally, randomly, etc.) among group members, there’s a 
significant likelihood that some group members (those who have been prosecuted and 
punished as individuals) would be doubly punished — that is, they would bear punitive 
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., Lang, “Crime and Punishment,” pp. 239-40; Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” pp. 192-98. 
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burdens for their own contributions to the crime, and they would bear additional punitive 
burdens as members of the group that committed the crime. It would be essentially 
equivalent to punishing a three-person team of bank robbers for their recent robbery, and 
also punishing the first member for helping plan the crime and driving the getaway car, 
the second member for helping plan the crime and holding the gun, and the third member 
for helping plan the crime and issuing the demand. 
Note that my concern here is not, strictly speaking, with the severity of the harms 
imposed. It would seem strange indeed to worry that a leader who developed and initiated 
a genocidal plan resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths might not only, say, receive 
a sentence of life in prison but might also be forced to pay an equal share of some 
monetary sanction imposed on the group. My objection, rather, is with requiring that he 
suffer whatever harm is deemed sufficient for his contribution to the group’s crime, and 
then also requiring that he suffer additional harm for being a member of the group that 
committed the crime. In section II, I discussed the worry that collective punishment 
schemes would impose genuine punishment (not merely compensatory burdens) on 
innocent group members. Here, the additional worry is that such a punishment scheme, in 
tandem with individual punishments, would in effect punish guilty group members twice 
in response to the same crime.37 Thus the presumption against such a punishment scheme 
                                                 
37
 In fact, something like this occurs at the domestic level in U.S. criminal law. Douglas Husak describes 
the practice of “charge stacking,” whereby prosecutors may “bring a number of charges against a defendant 
for the same underlying conduct.” Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 
(New York City: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 22. Husak explains, “As long as these offenses contain 
distinct elements, no rule or doctrine automatically prevents the state from bringing several charges 
simultaneously, even though, from the intuitive perspective of a layperson, the defendant has committed 
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should be even stronger than before, and again, it’s not apparent that such a scheme 
would yield sufficiently greater deterrent effects, compared with the best feasible system 
of individual prosecutions and punishments, to override this presumption. 
Rather than punishing the group (and by distribution, group members) for 
committing the crime and then punishing group members individually for their roles in 
committing the crime, we might endorse punishing citizens for their individual 
contributions to the crimes and then punishing the group collectively for allowing itself to 
be structured and organized in such a way as to allow the crimes to occur.38 Thus the 
relationship of the state’s crime and the citizens’ crimes wouldn’t be that of a whole to its 
parts. This appears more promising, in that it appears to avoid unfairly punishing some 
members of the state twice for the same crime. Still, I contend that such a scheme would 
be ultimately unfair to those citizens who are not responsible for helping to create the 
institutional, cultural, or other factors that facilitated the state’s criminal acts. The 
unfairness of imposing burdens on innocent citizens for the crimes of others sets the 
presumptive bar against collective punishment quite high, I believe, and it’s just not clear 
that the added deterrent impact of such a scheme, whether instead of or in addition to 
individual punishments, is sufficient to overcome this presumption. 
                                                                                                                                                 
but a single crime.” In my view, imposing multiple punishments on an individual for the same criminal act 
is unjustified whether at the domestic or international level. 
38
 C.f., Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” p. 197. 
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One way to avoid this worry about overpunishing some group members would be 
to devise a scheme according to which collective punishment’s harms would not 
distribute. I turn now to consider the possibility of nondistributive collective punishment. 
 
IV. Nondistributive collective punishment 
Suppose individual group members could be punished for their contributions to a 
crime, and also the collective itself could be punished, but the collective punishment’s 
harms would not distribute among the group members. Such a scheme would have the 
merit not only of avoiding overpunishment of guilty group members, but punishment of 
innocent group members as well. In addition, it would presumably satisfy advocates of 
collective punishment who contend that such punishment is necessary to ensure a full 
accounting for the mass atrocity. 
But how might nondistributive collective punishment work? How could groups be 
punished in such a way that the punitive harms would not trickle down to members of the 
group? Certainly monetary sanctions would impact group members, as would embargoes, 
boycotts, or the targeted military strikes such as Lang endorses. It’s not immediately clear, 
then, how a punitive burden could be imposed on the group itself with this burden 
ultimately being distributed among some number of group members.39 
Advocates of holding groups collectively responsible typically contend that the 
actions of the group itself are often not entirely reducible to the contributions of the 
                                                 
39
 C.f., Erskine, “Kicking Bodies and Damning Souls,” esp. pp. 274-79. 
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individual leaders, participants, accomplices, etc.40 On one version of this claim, the 
corporate structure of the group itself, the institutional decision-making procedures, 
distribution of authority, etc., play a causal role in the perpetration of the crime that 
cannot be accounted for among the contributions of the individual group members. If so, 
then we might think that nondistributive collective punishment could target these 
institutional aspects of the group, replacing the problematic procedures and structures 
with more appropriate ones. This might be a way of inflicting harm on the group itself, by 
encroaching on its sovereignty and altering its structure, and also expressing 
condemnation of it. Thus it might be seen as genuine punishment of the group itself. The 
question is whether the harms associated with such punishment would ultimately 
distribute among group members. 
On one hand, if the newly imposed institutions were more effective, less 
susceptible to corruption, etc., than those they replaced, this might on average benefit 
group members. On the other hand, it’s hard to imagine how such institutional 
restructuring could be accomplished without some individuals being harmed, most 
obviously through loss of their jobs. To the extent that those most likely to be harmed by 
the institutional restructuring may be the group leaders and other active participants in the 
international crime, we may not be particularly troubled by this prospect. Regardless of 
which individuals bear the burdens of punitive institutional restructuring, however, so 
long as individuals do bear these burdens, this will not count as a case of nondistributive 
                                                 
40
 C.f., Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” pp. 194-98; and D. E. Cooper, “Collective Responsibility,” in 
May and Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied 
Ethics, pp. 35-46, esp. pp. 37-38. 
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collective punishment. Rather, it is an instance of distributive collective punishment, and 
as such it is subject to the concerns I raised in sections II and III. In particular, if those 
harmed by punitive restructuring are the leaders and other active participants, the specter 
of double punishment again arises, given that what’s at issue here is the prospect of 
collective punishment alongside individual punishments. 
There might, of course, be other ways to punish collectively with nondistributive 
harms. Perhaps, for instance, the international community might take away some of a 
state’s territory. If the territory in question was populated, however, questions would 
arise about whether this would represent a harm to those residents. Even if the territory 
was unpopulated but contained significant natural resources, questions of harm might 
arise with respect to loss of use of those resources. 
Ultimately, I’m skeptical about whether a state can be harmed without the harm 
distributing to any of its citizens. If the international community imposes some burden on 
a state, the state itself cannot be the bearer of that burden independently of its members. 
Even if the state in fact consists in more than just the aggregation of its members — even 
if, e.g., it also consists in the institutional structures that govern its members’ interactions 
— these institutional structures themselves aren’t the kind of things that can be harmed, 
because they aren’t the kind of things that have interests. It appears, then, that for any sort 
of collective punishment we consider, either (a) it will harm some members of the state, 
or (b) it will not harm at all. If (a), then it will be distributive collective punishment, and 
as such it will face the objections raised in sections II and III. If (b), then it will not 
properly constitute punishment, given that the imposition of harm is an essential feature 
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of punishment. In the end, then, it looks as though the notion of collective punishment 
with nondistributive harms is not only practically intractable, but perhaps conceptually 
mistaken. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Despite the appeal of collective punishment as a means of ensuring that full 
responsibility is assigned for international crimes, I have argued that difficulties arise in 
how such a punishment scheme could be implemented. Given that distributing the harms 
of punishment among group members ultimately amounts to punishing group members, 
such an approach will almost certainly result in the harming of those who played no role 
in (or even worked against) the crime. And if the distributive collective punishment 
scheme operates alongside a system of individual punishments, there will be the 
additional hazard of subjecting some group members (i.e., leaders and participants) to 
double punishment. Either way, such a punishment scheme appears presumptively unjust, 
and it’s doubtful whether the ostensible gain in deterrent impact from such a scheme 
would be sufficient to override this presumption. By contrast, nondistributive collective 
punishment appears, in principle, consistent with respecting individual group members as 
moral persons. In practice, however, it’s not clear how we might punish the group itself 
without the punitive burdens being borne by its members. 
It’s worth emphasizing, in conclusion, that although I oppose collective 
punishment, I recognize the imperfections of the current system of international criminal 
law. Existing legal institutions don’t have sufficient financial or human resources, or time, 
  
 
166 
to prosecute and punish all those who, through their participation or their complicity, 
contribute to genocides and other mass crimes. And as a practical reality, even with 
modifications and improvements, a system of individually focused punishments may 
never be able to assign full responsibility for such crimes. Some responsibility may 
inevitably slip through the cracks, either in the form of structural or institutional forces 
that facilitated the crimes, or individual citizens whose contributions, though real, are 
small enough to escape attention. Nevertheless, given the significance of what’s at stake 
with punishment, and the strong presumption in favor of respecting people as 
autonomous moral beings — which involves treating them according to their own 
voluntary acts and omissions — I suggest the international community should continue to 
focus on individual criminal prosecutions and punishments rather than collective 
punishment.41 
                                                 
41
 I am grateful to Larry May, Christopher Heath Wellman, David Wood for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. Also, I presented a draft of the paper in October 2010 at a departmental dissertation 
workshop at Washington University in St. Louis. I appreciate all the thoughtful questions and suggestions 
from the participants at that session, including Nate Adams, Jill Delston, John Gabriel, Jason Gardner, Don 
Goodman-Wilson, Jan Plate, and Bryan Stagner. 
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